If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists by Proulx, Vincent-Joel
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 56 | Issue 5 Article 1
1-2005
If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for
Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention
and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists
Vincent-Joel Proulx
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing
of Suspected Terrorists, 56 Hastings L.J. 801 (2005).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol56/iss5/1
Articles
If the Hat Fits, Wear It,
If the Turban Fits, Run for your Life:
Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and
Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists
VINCENT-JOEL PROULX*
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 80 2
I. INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES .............................................................. 81I
II. INDEFINITE DETENTION OF ILLEGAL COMBATANTS ................................ 813
A. WHY Do STATES ENDORSE A POLICY OF INDEFINITE
D ETENTION? ....................................... . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . 813
B. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON INDEFINITE DETENTION. 819
i. Indefinite Detention As Torture ....................................... 819
2. Specific International Legal Restraints on
Indefinite D etention ............................................................... 823
* LL.L., LL.B., University of Ottawa; LL.M. (International Legal Studies), New York
University; Doctoral Candidate, McGill University Institute of Comparative Law. I acknowledge with
appreciation the financial support provided by McGill University through the McGill Graduate
Studies Fellowship, and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada through
the Canadian Graduate Scholarship. I am indebted to Professor Stephen Toope for his invaluable
insight and guidance. I acknowledge the superb work of the Hastings Law Journal, especially Emily
Cohen and John F. Stanley, for their thoughtful and instructive editorial suggestions. I thank
Professors Eyal Benvenisti and Richard Pildes for educating me on these issues and for challenging my
thinking in this area of the law. I am also grateful to the rest of the staff at the NYU Center on Law
and Security, especially Professors Stephen Holmes and Karen Greenberg, for organizing a
stimulating and thought-provoking colloquium on law and security in the post-9/ II era. More
generally, I thank Professors Mark Geistfeld and Benedict Kingsbury for their helpful advice. Finally,
my deep appreciation goes to Professor Aaron A. Dhir and Mdlissa Landel for constantly engaging the
human rights project and for their interest in discussing post-9/i i legal issues with me. I dedicate this
piece to Naya Bousmali, whose love and support are a constant source of inspiration. The opinions
expressed in this article are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the persons listed
above. Any omissions or mistakes remain my own. I am available to further discuss these issues at
vinjo@'nyu.edu.
[8oi]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
a. The Distinction Between POWs and
Protected Persons ............................................................ 823
b. The Fair Trial Requirement ........................................... 828
c. Em ergency Situations ...................................................... 832
3. Differences Between the United States' and
United Kingdom's Approaches ............................................ 834
a. Human Rights As Part of the
Law of the Land: Abbasi ................................................. 834
b. The United States' Approach ......................................... 835
4. The Importance of POW Status and Taliban Detainees ... 838
a. The U.S. Position on POW Status ................................. 838
b. Difficulties with the U.S. Position .................................. 840
c. Presumptive POW Status ................................................ 844
d. Problems Pertaining to Double Standards,
Legitimacy, and Unilateralism ....................................... 848
e. Resisting Protective Parity: Upholding the Rule of
D istinction ........................................................................ 855
5. The Situation of Suspected Al Qaeda Terrorists ................ 859
a. Difficulties with the U.S. Position .................................. 859
b. Resisting the Creation of a Third Category by
Reference to "International Outlaws" and
"Unlawful Combatants". ................................................ 864
c. "Unlawful Combatants" and Judicial Deference in
Post-9/I i U.S. Jurisprudence .......................................... 866
d. Coming Full Circle: Alignment of U.S. and U.K.
Post-9/i i Jurisprudence .................................................. 871
III. TARGETED KILLING OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS .................................... 873
A. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST TARGETED KILLING .................... 875
B. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON TARGETED KILLING ....... 878
i. Targeting Lawful Combatants Versus Non-Combatants... 882
2. Assessing the Legality of Targeted Killing ..................... 885
IV. LIBERTY VS. SECURITY: A QUESTION OF REASONABLENESS ................. 892
A. ADDITIONAL RESTRAINTS AND NEXT STEPS ................................... 892
B. FALLACIES AND INACCURACIES OF THE BALANCING METAPHOR ... 894
C ON CLU SIO N .................................................................................................. 898
INTRODUCTION
Since 9/11, much has been written on the legality of the war on
terror' and, more importantly, on the legal repercussions and changes it
i. For a thoughtful commentary on the legality of the war on terror, see Stacie D. Gorman, In
the Wake of Tragedy: The Citizens Cry Out for War, But Can the United States Legally Declare War on
Terrorism?, 21 PA. ST. INT'L L. REv. 669 (2003); see also Emanuel Gross, The Laws of War Waged
Between Democratic States and Terrorist Organizations: Real or Illusive?, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 389, 394-
404 (2003); Matthew Scott King, The Legality of the United States War on Terror: Is Article 51 a
Legitimate Vehicle for the War in Afghanistan or Just a Blanket to Cover-Up International War
Crimes?, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 457 (2003); Karl M. Meessen, Unilateral Recourse to Military
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has engendered on the international scene. Although there seems to be a
consensus in approving U.S.-led worldwide action against members of
Al-Qaeda, such efforts were not met with comparable enthusiasm in the
case of the Taliban government.2 In addition, the strong international
support gathered in mounting Operation Enduring Freedom has not
carried over to the invasion of Iraq. The United States' rationale of
preemptive action' in Iraq did not generate the expected approval among
Force Against Terrorist Attacks, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 341 (2003); Mary Ellen O'Connell, American
Exceptionalism and the International Law of Self-Defense, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 43 (2002).
Some scholars argue that the United States cannot legally declare war against Al Qaeda. See, e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/I: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325,
326 (2003) [hereinafter Paust, Attacks on the Laws of War].
Contrary to the assertion of President Bush, the United States simply cannot be at war with
bin Laden and al Qaeda as such, nor would it be in the overall interest of the United States
for the status of war to apply merely to conflicts between the United States and al Qaeda.
Bin Laden was never the leader or member of a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent
group (as those entities are understood in international law) that was at war with the United
States. Armed attacks by such non-state, non-nation, non-belligerent, non-insurgent actors
like bin Laden and members of al Qaeda can trigger the right of selective and proportionate
self-defense under the United Nations Charter against those directly involved in an armed
attack, but even the use of military force by the United States merely against bin Laden and
al Qaeda in foreign territory would not create a state of war between the United States and
al Qaeda.
Id. (citation omitted). But cf Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/u Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and
Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process
in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1344 (2004) [hereinafter, Paust, Post-9/1i
Overreaction].
Use of force against al Qaeda in Afghanistan was justified, and justifiable, as self-defense
against ongoing nonstate actor armed attacks by members of al Qaeda on the United States
and its nationals .... Both the U.N. Security Council and NATO recognized the propriety
of "self-defense" against such nonstate actor attacks, but it should be recalled that
permissible self-defense actions against nonstate actors within another state that are not
directed at the state itself or its military or general population do not create a state of
"war."
Id.
On the legal implications of invoking self-defense against non-state actors, see Jordan J. Paust,
Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533,
533-44 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After ri
September, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 408 (2002); Paust, Post-9/il Overreaction, supra note I, at 1344
("[Ulse of force against the Taliban regime was highly problematic under international law.... [I]t
should be recalled that permissible self-defense actions against nonstate actors within another state
that are not directed at the state itself or its military or general population do not create a state of
'war."').
3. The concept of preemptive self-defense is a thorny one, which extends beyond the scope of
this article. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 539, 546-49 (2oo2); Christopher
Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, iI-18 (2O03); Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a
Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L.
151, 179-85 (2002); Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 599 (2003); Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 513,
528-45 (2003); William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003).
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the international community, especially within the UN Security Council
framework.' Support for the U.S.-led effort has continued to wane. One
criticism consistently voiced is that the global counter-terrorism
campaign is subverting crucial categories in international law.
It is no secret that both terrorism and counter-terrorism do not fit
neatly within the "crime" or "war" paradigms.' In addition, security has
pervaded legal rhetoric and political speech since 9/I1, often in a way
that subsumes legally distinct concepts, such as state responsibility or use
of force, within one confused framework.6 Well-established legal
standards are being distorted or contorted to serve the purposes of the
"war on terror," or to cater to certain political objectives, while
fundamental protections of international law are being eroded in a
fashion that the global legal order cannot countenance. As a
consequence, we are witnessing a widening of the gap between Western
and Arab societies,7 while the margin for tolerance and harmony is
rapidly narrowing across the globe.
In analyzing the legal, social and political realities of the "war on
terror" one must bear in mind that the whole campaign translates into an
4. The United States pursued a United Nations Security Council first resolution before invading
Iraq. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/I44i (2002). However, a consensus
has emerged stating that a second United Nations Security Council resolution was required, although
France had expressed its intent to veto such a resolution. See, e.g., Hal Blanchard, Vengeance and
Empire: The Leftist Case for War in Iraq, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2062, 2082 (2004) ("Although
Resolution 1441 was passed by a vote of 15-o on November 8, 2002, the deliberate ambiguity of its
phrasing was meant to appease the reservations of more reticent Council Members like France, which
insisted that any response to Iraqi noncompliance be worked out in a second resolution.") (citation
omitted).
5. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'y 457
(2002).
6. Many commentators have sharply criticized post-9/i I U.S. policy, maintaining that the current
administration is, in fact, merging distinct legal concepts into one unpalatable approach. See, e.g., Jutta
Brunnde & Stephen J. Toope, Canada and the Use of Force: Reclaiming Human Security, 59 INT'L J.
247, 248, 250 (2004).
Around the globe, the debate over responses to global terrorism has raised hard issues
concerning the interplay of security concerns, human rights, democratic governance and the
use of force. Within the U.S., influential voices are articulating a merging of these concerns
in a way that fundamentally challenges the concepts of state sovereignty, non-intervention
and political independence.... Today, we are confronting a confusion of international legal
norms that threatens to undermine constraints on the use of force in international society.
This confusion occurs when attempts are made to collapse legally distinct categories such as
human rights, refugee protection, and threats to international peace and security into one
super-category of "threat pre-emption," using the other categories simply as examples of
dangers that can be invoked to justify action as defensive, rather than aggressive. This
phenomenon is apparent in the ex post facto justifications for the Iraq War. The contours of
the "threat" that demanded response have become unclear, and categories of justification
are being merged, confused and ultimately disabled.
Id.
7. It is no secret that post-9/iI United States policies have attracted considerable hostility from
Muslim communities. See, e.g., Tom Hundley, Muslim Anger Toward U.S. Intensifies in Post-9/1i Era,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13, 2002, at 16; R.C. Longworth, In Many Nations, Sympathy Has Turned Into
Hostility: Post-9/i Policies Eroding Goodwill, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 2002, at 8.
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8exercise in risk assessment. State sovereignty and individual civil
liberties are truly essential values but remain skewered next to an equally
important set of international ideals, such as the protection of civilian
life,9 a paramount objective in the human rights paradigm.
As a direct consequence of the war on terror, international human
rights of suspected terrorists often take a back seat to more pressing
needs, as required by any emergency situation.'" This reality is further
exacerbated by the legal characterization and treatment of suspected
terrorists espoused by the Bush Administration. In mounting Operation
Enduring Freedom, the United States was adamant in expounding that
Taliban members would be stripped of prisoner of war ("POW") status,
while it also claimed that members of the Al Qaeda network would not
benefit at all from the protection of the Geneva Conventions."
8. I have written abundantly on this point in another article. See Vincent-Joel Proulx,
Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks? 22
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2005).
9. Although not directly on point, The Paquete Habana did make a significant contribution to
this principle, stating that civilian non-combatants, along with their property, should not be targeted in
times of war. See 175 U.S. 677, 7o8 (i9oo). The Court found that this rule belonged to the realm of
customary international law. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTEXT 64-65 (2d ed. 2o00). Steiner and Alston write:
[li]t is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a
poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent states, that
coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and
honestly pursuing their peaceful calling or catching and brining in fresh fish, are exempt
from capture as prize of war.
Id.; see also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Basic Rules of the Geneva Conventions and Their
Additional Protocols (1988); EDWARD KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 39 (1992). The International Court of Justice ("IC")
has also pronounced on the importance of protecting civilian life. Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 8o9, 827 para. 78 (Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996) (categorizing the
non-targeting of civilians as one of the "cardinal principles" of humanitarian law).
to. See, e.g., Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United
States: The Aftermath of September II, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. COM. REG. 1, 15 (2002) ("The United
States has again proved, as it did in 1996, that in times of emergency and crisis, democracy does not
succeed in preserving its values, and human rights are violated in the name of safeguarding national
security."); see also William Rehnquist, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 222
(1998) ("In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper balance between
freedom and order. In wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance shifts in favor of
order-in favor of the government's ability to deal with conditions that threaten the national well-
being."). Cf Steven R. Shapiro, Defending Civil Liberties in the War on Terror: The Role of the Courts
in the War Against Terrorism: A Preliminary Assessment, 29 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 103,
103 (2005) ("Unsurprisingly, many of our nation's most shameful civil liberties violations have
occurred during war or under a perceived threat of war.").
II. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Convention I];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
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The underlying rationale behind the United States' decision to
forego the application of POW status to the Taliban government was, at
best, poorly-justified. To systematically deny this status, and the rights
flowing from it," to Taliban members, which, based on the publicly
available facts, did not participate in the planning or execution of the
9/11 attacks," seems hardly defensible.'4 However, to substantiate this
position through a flimsy application of the Geneva Conventions, namely
by stripping Taliban members of POW status because their black turbans
were not sufficiently visible or distinctive and because they did not
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war,
as the Bush administration did, yields perverse results for the
international human rights framework. 5
[hereinafter Convention IV]. However, in its Fact Sheet of February 7, 2002, the White House did
specify that the detainees in Guantanamo Bay were being treated in conformity with most of
Convention III. See Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.govnews/releases/20020212oo20207-I3.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005)
[hereinafter White House Fact Sheet]. The White House Fact Sheet states that the United States "is
treating and will continue to treat all of the individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and, to the
extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of
the Third Geneva Convention of 1949." Id.
12. Convention III, supra note I I, sets forth a series of rights flowing to the recipients of prisoner-
of-war (POW) status. These rights include, for example, the right of POWs to give limited information
upon interrogation, such as name and rank (Article 17); the right to be quartered under equally
favorable conditions as those for the forces of the detaining state (Article 25); the right to send and
receive correspondence (Article 71); the right to be sentenced only to the penalties provided for with
regard to members of the armed forces of the detaining party who have committed the same acts
(Article 87); the right to be sentenced under the same courts and the same procedures as in the case of
military officials of the detaining party (Article 102); and the right to be released and repatriated after
the cessation of hostilities (Article I t8). The Bush Administration did not apply specific POW rights
to Guantanamo Bay detainees. See White House Fact Sheet, supra note I I ("IT]he detainees will not
receive some of the specific privileges afforded to POWs, including:-access to a canteen to purchase
food, soap, and tobacco-a monthly advance of pay-the ability to have and consult personal financial
accounts-the ability to receive scientific equipment, musical instruments, or sports outfits.").
13. In fact, the United States' condemnation of the Taliban regime did not specifically set out to
demonstrate the involvement of the de facto Afghan government in the planning and execution of the
attacks. It rather hinged on the fact that the Taliban had offered sanctuary and logistical support to
members of Al Qaeda, thereby suggesting a considerable relaxation of the test of attribution in
international law. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4
CHI. J. INT'L L. 83, 89-90 (2003). See generally Proulx, supra note 8. In fact, the Al Qaeda network
actually operated independently of the Taliban regime, while most of its membership comprised non-
Afghan citizens. See Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of
War": The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59,75 (2003).
14. In fact, several commentators have deplored the policy of denying POW status to prisoners
captured in the war on terror. See generally JENNIFER ELSEA, TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES"
IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM r-5 (Novinka Books 2003). However, it is interesting to note that the lack
of direct involvement by the Taliban in the attacks of 9/I does not, prima facie, absolve it from a
possible finding of state responsibility for subsequent endorsement of said attacks. See Proulx, supra
note 8.
15. For a concise statement of the major stakes involved in denying POW status to Taliban
detainees, see Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 353 (2002) ("[T]he denial of POW status brings with it far more
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Similarly, the decision to deny Al Qaeda members the protection
afforded by the Geneva Conventions is equally problematic under
international law. Before the response to 9/1i was deployed,
international human rights discourse had always specifically recognized
two types of individuals in times of turmoil, with no margin for alternate
designations: prisoners of war and protected persons.'6 With regard to Al
Qaeda, the Bush administration created a third category: "international
outlaws."
This action is tantamount to an affront to the current human rights
scheme. While fundamental freedoms have sometimes been curtailed in
times of chaos, 7 human rights proponents should nevertheless voice their
opposition, as a substantial portion of the Geneva Conventions is being
undermined by the war on terror. Although it has sometimes proved
difficult to implement the rule of law in the Middle East, 8 it does not
follow that Western forces should short-circuit the application of well-
established legal principles and capitalize on self-serving and superficial
interpretations of international law in favor of strategic or political gains.
These considerations become even more relevant in light of the
ongoing insurgency in Iraq. In the past year and a half, there has been a
proliferation of kidnappings and beheadings of foreign workers in Iraq.'9
Several guerilla groups, some of whom praise allegiance to Osama bin
serious and relevant deprivations, including such vital protections as exemption from punishment for
lawful acts of war, repatriation at the conclusion of hostilities, and internationally defined fair trial
rights.").
16. See, e.g., KRIANGSAK KrITICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 139 (2001).
[Tihere is no gap between the various Geneva Conventions of 1949-an individual is
entitled to protection as a prisoner of war under GC III, protection against grave breaches
afforded to soldiers under GC I or GC II, or protection under GC IV; there is no
intermediate status. This protection arises ipso facto and ipso jure.
17. For historical examples of this practice and the attitude of United States courts in assessing
civil liberties in times of chaos, see, for example, Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between
Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. I (2004). Issacharoff and Pildes write: "Times of heightened risk to
the physical safety of their citizens inevitably cause democracies to recalibrate their institutions and
processes and to reinterpret existing legal norms, with greater emphasis on security, and less on
individual liberty, than in 'normal' times." Id. at 2; see also STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY
WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 7-10 (2OO2).
18. See, e.g., Muhamad Mugraby, Some Impediments to the Rule of Law in the Middle East and
Beyond, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 771 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Stephen Farrell & Jeremy Page, Europeans Told to Leave as Fear of Kidnap Grows.
THE TIMES, Apr. 14, 2004. Some of the attacks have also targeted members of the Iraqi National
Guard, along with Iraqi security officers. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Dexter Filkins & Khalid W.
Hassan, Scores Are Dead After Violence Spreads In Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2004, at Ai; Karl Vick,
Insurgents Massacre 49 Iraqi Recruits; State Dept. Official Killed in Attack at U.S. Military Base, WASH.
POST, Oct. 25, 2004, at Ai; Edward Wong & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Militants Report Killing it Captive
Iraq Officers and Seizing Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A8.
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Laden's purported follower Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ° have resorted to
systematic abductions of Westerners and non-Westerners in Iraq.
Insurgents have also resorted to murdering humanitarian workers in
Iraq.2' These kidnappers engage in such practices in an attempt to extort
a variety of objectives, including obtaining lucrative ransoms,22 ejecting
the abductees' employers out of Iraq or inducing them to freeze their
operations, 3 forcing states to withdraw troops from the country,24
preventing states from sending troops to Iraq,25 dissuading foreign
companies and contractors from helping to rebuild Iraq,26 punishing
individuals for cooperating with the United States or with the Iraqi
interim authority, 7 obtaining the release of female Iraqi prisoners in Um
Qasr and Abu Ghraib prisons,28 blackmailing France into repealing its
controversial headscarf ban, 9 etc. Others have simply equated the
20. See Dexter Filkins, Wanted Rebel Vows Loyalty To bin Laden, Web Sites Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. I8, 2004, at AIo.
21. See, e.g., Karl Vick, Head of CARE In Iraq Abducted; Veteran Aid Worker Known for Her
Zeal, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2004, at At; Karl Vick, Kidnapped Aid Official Begs Blair To Save Her;
Hassan, on Tape, Urges Britain to Abandon Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2004, at As; Karl Vick, CARE
Official Begs Blair To Save Her by Pulling Out; Sunni Clerics Warn Assault on Fallujah Would Widen
Insurgency, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1 5 . Because of the faltering security situation in Iraq,
several humanitarian organizations have decided to withdraw from Iraq. Aid Group Says It Will Quit
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, A12.
22. Karl Vick, Captors in Iraq Free Italian Aid Workers; Rome Welcomes Pair Held for 3 Weeks;
Some Egyptian Hostages Also Released, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2004, at A2I.
23. Susan Sachs & Sebnem Arsu, Turkish Company Will Accede to Demands of Iraqi Kidnappers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2004, at AiI.
24. Anthony Faiola & Joohee Cho, Hostage Video Ignites Protest in S. Korea; Hundreds
Demonstrate Against Iraq Policy; Mission Sent to Jordan to Negotiate, WASH. POST, June 22, 2004, at
AI; Robert H. Reid, S. Korean, on Video, Pleads for His Life; Hostage Urges Withdrawal from Iraq,
WASH. POST, June 21, 2004, at A16; Jackie Spinner & Anthony Faiola, S. Korean Is Beheaded in Iraq;
In Seoul, Officials Say Hostage's Slaying Will Not Deter Troop Deployment, WASH. POST, June 23,
2004, at At; Daniel Williams, Italians Unite Around Hostages; Opposition Pledges to Cooperate in
Ending Crisis in Iraq, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2004, at Ai8; Edward Wong, Captives, Japanese and
British, Plead for End of Occupation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at AI6; Edward Wong, Hostage Begs
The British to Remove Troops in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at A8.
25. Doug Struck, Egyptian Diplomat Taken Hostage; Insurgents Warn Cairo Not to Send Forces to
Iraq, WASH. POST, July 24, 2004, at A14.
26. Peter Baker, After Abduction, Russia Urges Citizens to Leave Iraq, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2004,
at AI8; Jackie Spinner, Egyptian Engineers Kidnapped in Iraq; 4 Iraqis Seized; Mobile Network
Imperiled, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2004, at AI6; Karl Vick, 12 Nepalese Hostages Are Slain in Iraq; First
Mass Killing Displayed on Web, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2004, at Ai.
27. Pamela Constable, Iraqi Firm Director Kidnapped Rebels; Companies, Countries Try to
Negotiate Releases After Wave of Abductions, WASH. POST, July 25, 2004, at A1S; Edward Wong,
Militants Show the Beheading of3 Kurdish Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2o, 2004, at A14.
28. Steve Fainaru, Group Says It Has Killed Another American Hostage; British Colleague Will Be
Next, Web Site Statement Warns, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2004, at A21; Steve Fainaru, Militants in Iraq
Release Video of U.S. Captive's Beheading, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2004, AI; Edward Wong, Insurgents
Who Beheaded 2 Show Briton in Plea for Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,2004, at A16.
29. John Lichfield, France Gets Extra Day to Lift Headscarf Ban Before Executions, The
Independent, Aug. 31, 2004, at 24; John Lichfield, French Mount Diplomatic Offensive to Show
Headscarf Ban Is Not Anti-Islamic, The Independent, Aug. 31, 2004, at 24; Elaine Sciolino, France
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kidnappings with a century-old tactic, now used by insurgents in Iraq in
an attempt to apply pressure to the U.S.-led coalition and to expel troops
from the country.3"
As a counteraction, it is foreseeable that the military will proceed to
large-scale arrests and detentions of suspected insurgents, al-Zarqawi
accomplices, and Al Qaeda members.' In fact, the United States has
already initiated retaliatory aerial strikes on suspected al-Zarqawi safe
houses in Iraq, namely in Fallujah,32 and on other Iraqi rebel strongholds.
It is appropriate to ask whether this policy of targeted strikes has, to
date, produced more civilian casualties33 than it has eliminated
terrorists.' In responding to these acts of terror, the United States and its
allies will have to exert some level of caution in hunting down al-Zarqawi
and his associates. Otherwise, the military campaign in Iraq, coupled
with the recent abuse and torture scandals at Abu Ghraib prison, will
continue to engender deleterious effects on international law and signal a
blatant disregard for and ultimate failure of the human rights project.
Won't Meet Demand To Stop Ban on Head Scarves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at A7; Elaine Sciolino,
Hostages Urge France to Repeal Its Scarf Ban, N.Y. TIMES. Aug. 31, 2004. at A8.
30. See, e.g., Robin Wright, Abductions in Iraq Reflect New Strategy, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, June
30, 2004, at A14.
31. See Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September ri,
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 44I (2002).
Thus, the most serious questions of human rights will arise not here, but abroad, if we
attempt to export the counter-terrorism costs of extensive searches, electronic surveillance,
coercive interrogation, and limitations on association, detention, and speech. Each of these
measures, controlled or forbidden by the United States Constitution, are likely to be
promising ways of obtaining needed information about terrorists' plans and of otherwise
preventing terrorist initiatives.
Id. at 454. For a detailed discussion of different judicial avenues in prosecuting insurgents in Iraq, see
Nathan A. Canestaro, "Small Wars" and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the Insurgents in Iraq, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (2004).
32. Dexter Filkins & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Intensifying Bombing Attacks On Falluja Sites, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. I6, 2004, at AI.
33. Edward Cody, U.S. Strike In Fallujah Kills 2o; Officers Say Target Was Safe House, WASH.
POST, June 20, 2004, at Ai; Jackie Spinner & Steve Fainaru, U.S. Planes Bomb Suspected Militant
Refuge in Iraq; Strike in Fallujah Kills 20; Ambulance Shelled During Raid, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2004,
at Ai9. While describing the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Marcy
Strauss delivers a poignant statement on this very issue, which could easily be transposed to the
situation in Iraq. See Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 201, 259 (2003-2004) ("To stop
the future threat of terrorism, this country was willing to wage war-a war, which not only killed those
dedicated to harming us, but also, unfortunately, maimed and killed thousands of innocent lives in
Afghanistan.").
A policy of targeted killing of suspected terrorists also carries with it great propensity for
collateral damage and unnecessary death of civilians. This issue is addressed, infra, in Part III. For an
example of collateral damage following an aerial strike, see, for example, Emanuel Gross, Use of
Civilians As Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a
Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 445, 509 (2002).
34. The aerial strikes have r.zvertheless eliminated some members of al-Zarqawi's network. Steve
Fainaru, Airstrike Is Said to Kill Aide To Zarqawi; Fallujah Residents Identify Saudi as Right-Hand
Man, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2004, at A14.
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There are no ideal solutions or courses of action when chasing a
threat as complex and polymorph as terrorist networks. Hence,
mitigation of tensions between competing legal concerns and the
protection of human life remain noble objectives. We must strive to
instill some legitimacy and caution into this international initiative,
namely to make the war on terror a preventive rather than curative
effort. Each competing legal value must be weighed against similar
values with the aim of striking a delicate balance between the objectives
of preventing, deterring, and prosecuting terrorist attacks, and fostering a
multilateral legal system underpinned by reciprocal respect, restraint,
and dignity. Hence, two inextricably linked aspects of the war on terror
must be briefly re-analyzed from a human rights perspective. First, is the
question of indefinite detention of suspected terrorists, and second is the
issue of targeted killing. In addressing the legality of both policies, I
survey some of the major relevant international legal restraints, so as to
explore whether indefinite detention and targeted killing can prove
compatible or, at least, somewhat aligned with the ideals of human rights
law.
The aim of this paper is not to dissect recent Supreme Court
decisions, nor is it to analyze decisions by other courts, both in the
United States and abroad. The purpose of this project is to highlight
some of the more egregious violations of human rights law in the war on
terror over the last three years. This article attempts to establish that the
executive's actions and policies following 9/II are inconsistent with the
current international human rights scheme and are irreconcilable with
the United States' international obligations, regardless of judicial
pronouncements on the matter.
Part I of this article provides a framework for the discussion by
outlining the major international authorities that apply in situations like
the United States faces. Part II discusses the legality of indefinite
detention of suspected terrorists under international law. In addressing
this policy, several arguments ranging from moral perspectives to
international legitimacy pervade the discussion and ultimately lead to the
condemnation of indefinite detention under the extant human rights
scheme. Part III turns to the examination of targeted killing of suspected
terrorists under international law. Again, arguments for and against this
practice are contrasted. Ultimately the article advocates for an absolute
ban on targeted killing. In dealing with these two politically sensitive
issues, the discussion canvasses major international and national legal
restraints on unilateral executive policy. Finally, Part IV delves into the
fallacies and inaccuracies of the balancing metaphor, while exploring the
relationship connecting reasonableness and the equilibrium between
security and liberty.
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I. INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES
To provide a framework for the discussion that follows, I will briefly
outline the major international authorities that apply to the type of
conduct the United States is engaged in and that could potentially limit
its scope of action.35
The conduct of international hostilities, which falls within the ambit
of the laws of war, is governed by an overarching dichotomy. On the one
hand, the scheme of jus ad bellum pertains to the rules governing the
entrance into international armed conflict. This branch of international
law hinges to a large extent on the prohibition of the use of force
contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and on the inherent right of
self-defense afforded states pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Hence, jus ad bellum centers on whether an attacked state may
legitimately invoke its right to self-defense in retaliating against the
aggressor. In invoking this right, proportionality, necessity, and
imminence remain guiding principles. 6 For the purposes of this article, it
is assumed that the United States has engaged combat, or triggered the
application of jus ad bellum, in Afghanistan and in Iraq.37
The scheme of jus in bello, on the other hand, corrals rules and
principles commonly referred to as international humanitarian law,
purporting to regulate the conduct of hostilities and the rules of
engagement. The principal relevant legal texts under jus in bello are the
Geneva Conventions, which govern a variety of war-related dimensions
ranging from the treatment of prisoners of war ("POWs") to treatment
of the sick and wounded on the battlefield. More importantly, the
Geneva Conventions also set out important criteria and definitions in
identifying major stakeholders in armed conflict, such as POWs,
"protected persons," mercenaries, irregular belligerents, etc. A vital
distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants, sometimes referred
to as privileged or unprivileged belligerents, lies at the very heart of
international humanitarian law and will be discussed thoroughly in this
article. Equally important to the framework of jus in bello are the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions"' and the Hague
35. For a recent and concise review of the schemes of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, see David S.
Koller, The Moral Imperative: Toward a Human Rights-Based Law of War, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231,
232-38 (2005).
36. For different views of these principles, see CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 1O5-o6 (2000); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOI. 1, pt. I, at 420 (Sir Robert Jennings &
Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9 th ed., 1992); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 691-92 (3d ed., i99i).
37. For the possible application of the parameters of self-defense to terrorism, see W. Michael
Reisman, International Legal Responses to International Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 3, 41-49
('999).
38. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
UNTS 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
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Regulations,39 which provide further insight into who may be lawfully
targeted on the battlefield, the obligation encumbering upon combatants
to distinguish themselves from civilians, and other modalities underlying
the conduct of warfare, such as the obligation to provide quarter.
International law has always upheld an impermeable chasm between
jus ad bellum and jus in bello.'° As a corollary to this proposition, it
follows that underlying motives for entering into armed conflict become
immaterial once the state of war has been proclaimed and, thus, jus in
bello has been engaged. From that point onward, international
humanitarian law becomes applicable and the principle of reciprocity
pervades the relationships between belligerent nations. In this article,
significant emphasis will be placed on the principles and authorities
encompassed under jus in bello.
Finally, although analytically different from humanitarian law,4"
relevant international human rights treaties are juxtaposed to
international humanitarian law and converge in the analysis.4" The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights43 enshrines key
procedural and substantive individual rights, such as the right to a fair
trial and the inherent right to life. Furthermore, the Convention Against
Torture" promotes essential and fundamental human rights via a
universal ban on torture and inhuman and/or degrading treatment.
Deferential reliance on both of these international treaties, and any
parallel derogation scheme flowing from them, will animate my
discussion and evidence an important symbiosis between international
humanitarian law and human rights standards.
39. Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 19o7,
Annex. art. 23, 36 Stat. 2277, 2302, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 295 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
40. This idea has received wide academic support. See, e.g., Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality
and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 , 392-93 (1993).
41. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 240 (2000).
42. For a contemporary review of international human rights standards in the context of armed
conflict, see Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of
Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 119 (2005). For a seminal account of the
relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights, see Ren6 Provost,
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2002).
43. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. r6, 1966, 999 ART. 7 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter Covenant].
44. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A139/51
(1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
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II. INDEFINITE DETENTION OF ILLEGAL COMBATANTS
A. WHY Do STATES ENDORSE A POLICY OF INDEFINITE DETENTION?
This practice, which predominantly fits under the law enforcement
paradigm,45 raises important questions in the current fight against
terrorism. As a general rule, it is probably fair to say that states detain
suspected terrorists for practical or strategic reasons. We must remember
that custody over an alleged terrorist might provide a gateway into future
arrests,46  access to intellifence-gathering opportunities,47  possible
dismantling of terrorist cells,4 etc. Of all the vivid imagery and language
emanating from 9/I1, the "mosaic" metaphor49 has proved the most
45. For various considerations on the law enforcement paradigm and related issues, see, for
example, Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by
Association Critique, tOt MicH. L. REv. 14o8 (2003) (reviewing DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY,
TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY
(2002); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARD AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR
ON TERROR (2003)); Mary Ellen O'Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror, 35
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 325 (2003); Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42
DUQ. L. REv. 663, 679-83 (2oo4); Symposium, America Fights Back: The Legal Issues, I CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 831, 842-50 (2OO1). With regard to the Guantanamo Bay detainees, consider Joan
Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303,
313 (2002) ("The United States has chosen to abandon the law enforcement paradigm for an armed
conflict theory with respect to the GuantAnamo captives."). Interestingly, Fitzpatrick writes:
"However, it is possible the Bush Administration will ultimately return to the law enforcement model
by repatriating captives to their states of origin for prosecution or by transferring some to the ordinary
courts in the United States." Id. at 313 n.4o.
Within days of the Patriot Act's enactment, the administration undertook a series of steps
that taken together suggest a deliberate decision to abandon the law enforcement paradigm
for government investigations of individuals in the United States and to substitute an
intelligence paradigm that seeks to secretly gather all information that might turn out to be
useful.
Kate Martin, Intelligence, Terrorism, and Civil Liberties, 29 HUMAN RIGHTS 5, 7 (2002)
46. For a thoughtful review of post-9/1I police powers and Miranda rights of suspected terrorists
in the United States, see William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, I I I YALE L.J. 2137 (2002).
47. It is no secret that intelligence-gathering has proved difficult after 9/i1, thereby raising the
need to question or to re-evaluate law enforcement procedures. See, e.g., Walter Pincus, Silence of 4
Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma for FBI, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2OO, at A6. See generally PHILIP
B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA I I I (1998).
48. As most experts on terrorism will argue, infiltrating complex terrorist cells is extremely
difficult. Some commentators expound that the key to dismantling terrorist cells lies in the
interrogation and detention of suspected terrorists. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 46, at 2161-62. Stuntz
writes:
Only a very small group of people could penetrate the relevant terrorist networks (or be
recruited from within such networks), and finding them is a hard, time-consuming process.
The best source of information is likely to be the suspects themselves. If these suspects
decide not to talk, agents are likely to want to induce them to change their minds.
Id.
49. Although dealing with restricting access to deportation hearings in special interest cases, one
aspect of Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3 d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), seems apposite here. In fact, the
government affirms that the restriction of certain liberties in the fight against terror is "akin to the
construction of a mosaic," each individual piece of information being important to the investigation.
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recurrent in this context. For example, the United States and some of its
allies" will deny freedom to a suspected terrorist because the exercise of
administrative captivity might assist them in elucidating other cases or in
making further arrests, irrespective of whether criminal charges are
ultimately laid on the individual in question.' Since investigating
terrorism is akin to the construction of a mosaic, "seemingly innocent
facts might at some future time turn out to indicate culpability." 2 The
argument claiming the existence of terrorist sleeper cells across the globe
has also surfaced in the modern war on terror and is rapidly acquiring
credence in law enforcement circles:53 "the fact that a suspicious person
has done nothing illegal only underscores his dangerousness; Al Qaeda is
said to have 'sleeper' cells around the world, groups of individuals living
Id. at 706 (citations omitted). See also the declaration of FBI Executive Assistant Director Dale
Watson in N.J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 218 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Even minor pieces of
evidence that might appear innocuous to us would provide valuable clues to a person within the
terrorist network, clues that may allow them to thwart the government's efforts to investigate and
prevent future acts of violence."). For a policy comment on judicial review in special interest
immigration cases, with some emphasis on the shortcomings of the mosaic metaphor, see Rashad
Hussain, Security With Transparency: Judicial Review in "Special Interest" Immigration Proceedings,
113 YALE L.J. 1333 (2004).
50. This practice of indefinite detention has also been used by the United Kingdom in Northern
Ireland and by Israel as well. See, e.g., David Bonner, United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response
to Terrorism, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 171, 182-83 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D.
Crelinsten eds., 1993); Noemi Gal-Or, Countering Terrorism in Israel, in THE DEADLY SIN OF
TERRORISM: ITS EFFECT ON DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY 154 (David A. Chart ed., 1994).
51. In the context of enemy combatants, the case of Yaser Hamdi constitutes a salient illustration
of this practice. After being captured in the company of Taliban fighters in 2001, Hamdi was detained
for three years by the United States. He was recently released without any criminal charges having
been filed. As part of his release agreement, he had to renounce his American citizenship. For more
background on the case of Hamdi, see Joel Brinkley, From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via
Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A4; Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-
American It Had Captured in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at At5;.
The facts surrounding the detention of John Walker Lindh are somewhat similar. In fact, Robert
H. Bork speaks to this point after briefly summarizing the United States policy of indefinite detention:
The government's policy is as follows: if a captured unlawful enemy combatant is believed
to have further information about terrorism, he can be held without access to legal counsel
and without charges being filed. Once the government is satisfied that it has all the relevant
information it can obtain, the captive can be held until the end of hostilities, or be released,
or be brought up on charges before a criminal court.
The government chose one of these options when it charge John Lindh, an American
citizen who fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan .... Lindh entered into a plea
agreement under which he was sentence to twenty years in prison.
Robert H. Bork, Civil Liberties After 9/11, COMMENTARY, July 2003, at 32.
On the policy of indefinite detention, absent any corresponding criminal conviction or charge, see
generally Thomas F. Powers, When to Hold 'Em: The U.S. Should Detain Suspected Terrorists-Even
if It Can't Make a Case Against Them in Court, LEGAL AFF., Sept./Oct. 2004, at 21. Powers writes that
"[p]reventive detention means the holding of American citizens against their will, precisely because
authorities do not have sufficient evidence to prove in a court of law that the citizens have committed
a crime." Id.
52. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 963 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, "Sleeper Cells" of Al Qaeda are Next Target; U.S. to Focus on
Terror Threat as Afghan Effort Winds Down, WASH. POST, Dec. 3,2001, at As.
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quiet and law-abiding lives, but ready and willing to commit terrorist
attacks once they get the call., 54 This position has essentially been
juxtaposed to the mosaic rationale in supporting U.S. policy on
Guantanamo Bay. In tandem, both arguments have served as an
attractive justification for the executive in sustaining preventive
detention of suspected terrorists or collaborators.5 In sum, governments
will use indefinite detention of a particular detainee as a "piece of jigsaw
puzzle" in order to paint the bigger picture. This type of policy might be
difficult to defend from a strictly moral perspective.'
It is no secret that the current war on terror is akin to an exercise in
risk assessment and that the questions it raises might be philosophically
adjacent to some tenets of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Whether seen
through the lens of torture57 or detention of suspected terrorists, human
54. Cole, supra note 52, at 963 (citation omitted); see also Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and Security
After September11, 25 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'y 399, 400-01 (2002).
55. See Cole, supra note 52, at 963.
These and other cases suggest that the Justice Department policy has been to lock up first,
ask questions later, and presume that an alien is dangerous until the FBI has a chance to
assure itself that the individual is not. The government has justified its actions with a liberal
combination of the "mosaic" argument noted above and the "sleeper" theory.... Taken
together, the "mosaic" and "sleeper" theories suggest that the absence of evidence of illegal
conduct is not a reason to release a "suspicious" person. In practice, they appear to have
justified tremendously overbroad detention policies.
id.
56. Some scholars even express the view that preventive detention without ensuing criminal
charges would be justified by the mere endorsement of a terrorist attack. See, e.g., Heymann, supra
note 31, at 442 ("We must try to increase our security against major terrorist attacks by some mix of
the following ways to prevent attack in the first place ... (4) detaining, without criminal convictions,
those who are more likely to support an act of terrorism.").
57. In his seminal article, Eyal Benvenisti addressed the moral component of a policy of torture
vis-A-vis detained terrorists. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Role of National Courts in Preventing Torture of
Suspected Terrorists, 8 EUR. J. INrr'L L., no. 4, I (1997). In discussing the ticking bomb paradigm, he
raised the human rights-based approach to using human beings as tools for the well-being of others,
which might be labeled an absolutist stance on balancing human lives.
One position opposes subjecting detainees to physical or mental suffering in order to make
them speak because the detainees are then being used as objects to save others from harm.
Sacrificing the well-being of some to protect the well-being of others contradicts the basic
concept of human dignity, which precludes a utilitarian calculation of net gain in human
lives. One person's life cannot be endangered to save another's life, neither can one life be
traded for the lives of many others: no person may be used as a means to the well-being of
other persons. It follows that no person may be subject to torture even in a ticking bomb
situation.
Id. at 3-4. This position obviously aligns with an absolute (and universal) ban on torture.
Such a ban has been recognized by international judiciaries. See, e.g., Selmouni v. France, 19 9 9-V
Eur. Ct. H.R. 149. 181. The universal ban on torture has also received wide support in legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and
Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1486-87 (2004): Strauss, supra note 33. Yet, after
declaring that the General Security Service's methods of aggressive interrogation were unlawful, and
while still invoking the ticking bomb paradigm, the Supreme Court of Israel declared that
interrogators could, under specific circumstances, exculpate themselves ex post facto for acts of
torture, via a defense of necessity. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 53(4)
P.D. 817, paras. 33-38. For more background information on the case, see Jason S. Greenberg, Torture
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rights proponents can easily challenge the utilitarian use of human beings
for the well-being of others at the outset." To detain individuals solely
for the purpose of advancing other cases, or simply to appease the
population, 9 might be difficult to countenance morally but is certainly
of Terrorists in Israel: The United Nations and the Supreme Court of Israel Pave the Way for Human
Rights to Trump Communitarianism, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 539 (2001). Some commentators
subscribe, in one way or another, to the essence of the court's ruling. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWrrZ,
WHY TERRORISM WORKS 131-63 (2002); Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to
Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCn. L. REv. 275, 277-79 (2003-2004); John T. Parry & Welsh S. White,
Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 743 (2002)
(asserting that torture should "remain illegal" but that government officials accused in a criminal trial
should be permitted a "necessity defense"); Alan M. Dershowitz, Commentary: Is there a Torturous
Road to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,2001, at Bs9.
Others have criticized the rationale of necessity as a means to exonerate the use of torture during
interrogations, while placing significant emphasis on its incompatibility with international law. A first
and obvious concern lies in the so-called "slippery slope" argument, as this model seems ripe for
abuse. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented by the Compelling,
Heartwrenching Case, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1121, 1144-45 (1998); Matthew G. St. Amand,
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel et al: Landmark Human Rights
Decision By the Israeli High Court of Justice or Status Quo Maintained?, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM.
REG. 655 (2000); Strauss, supra note 33; Joel Greenberg, Israel is Permitting Harsher Interrogation of
Muslim Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1994, at A6. For a thoughtful review of constitutional
constraints on the use of torture in the war on terror, see Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and
the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003).
58. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals with Critical Essays 52 (Robert
Paul Wolff ed., Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969) (785). Kant wrote:
Now, I say, man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not
merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. In all his actions, whether they
are directed to himself or to other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same
time as an end.
The practical imperative, therefore, is the following: Act so that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means
only.
Id. at 52-54. Some commentators invoke this moral principle, in some way, shape or form, against
using human beings as tools for the collective well-being.
Among the most fundamental of all moral principles is the principle of shared humanity:
that every human life has a distinct and equal inherent value. This principle is the
indispensable premise of the idea of human rights, that is, the rights people have just in
virtue of being human, and it is therefore an indispensable premise of an international
moral order.
Ronald Dworkin, Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Nov. 6, 2003, at 37.
The principle requires respect for the rights of all persons to the necessary conditions of
human action, and this includes respect for the persons themselves as having the rational
capacity to reflect on their purposes and to control their behaviour in the light of such
reflection. The principle hence prohibits using any person merely as a means to the well-
being of other persons.
Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights?, 31 PHIL. Q., No. 122, Jan. i98i, at 9.
59. See, e.g., David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113
YALE L.J. 1753, 1797 (2004). Cole writes:
But incarcerating people without any objective evidence of suspicion simply to make the
public feel better can be justified, if at all, only on the crudest utilitarian grounds. That
justification would violate Kant's Categorical Imperative, by condoning official treatment of
human beings as means rather than ends in themselves. It would also violate more
sophisticated versions of utilitarianism, as John Rawls has shown.
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not a novel phenomenon nor a practice exclusively linked to the war on
terror." However, both from strategic and moral standpoints, indefinite
detention might be easier to distinguish from torture and, ultimately,
easier to substantiate legally in the context of a new war where the
terrorists themselves do not distinguish between civilian and military
targets. In fact, certain states such as Israel have implemented a system
of administrative detention of suspected terrorists, under which the
executive branch can detain individuals for preventive purposes,6' absent
any judicial order permitting the detention. 2 The practical problem with
such arrangements is that certain individuals are sometimes detained for
purposes of diplomatic or political leverage, thereby evoking the tension
between combating terrorism efficiently and respecting inherent human
dignity.63 Moreover, a policy of indefinite detention, coupled with judicial
Id.
60. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note I7.
61. It has also been argued that the United States executive has been engaging in indefinite
detention of suspected terrorists for preventive purposes. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 51, at 33 (stating
that "detention is not punishment; its purpose, rather, is to prevent members of enemy forces from
causing harm while hostilities are in progress"); Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84
INT'L REv. RED CROSS, 571, 572 (2002) ("[C]aptivity in war is 'neither revenge, nor punishment, but
solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further
participation in the war."') (citation omitted).
62. The case of Israel is a salient example of this practice. The Israeli legislative scheme contains
a procedure under which judicial review of the preventive detention must be conducted by the
president of a district court within 48 hours of the initial arrest. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law,
1979, 33 L.S.I. 89 (1978-1979), arts. 4 & 5. Subsequent reviews of the detention are conducted every
three months. This legislative scheme has been discussed in legal scholarship vis-A-vis counter-
terrorism. See, e.g., Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Administrative Detention in Israel and its Employment
As A Means of Combating Political Extremism, N.Y. INT'L L. REv., Summer 1996, at I; Jonathan
Grebinar, Responding to Terrorism: How Must a Democracy Do It? A Comparison of Israeli and
American Law?, 31 FORDHAM URa. L.J. 261 (2003); Emanuel Gross, Human Rights in Administrative
Proceedings: A Quest for Appropriate Evidentiary Standards, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215 (2oot);
Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does
a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists As Bargaining Chips?, I8 AIz. J. I, r'L & CoMp. L. 721
(2OO1); Gross, supra note 1o, at 70-71.
63. For example, certain suspected Lebanese terrorists were arrested under the administrative
detention scheme of the Israeli Emergency Powers (Detention) Law. However, the facts later revealed
that the Lebanese prisoners were being detained as bargaining chips to secure the liberation of Israeli
soldiers held captive by terrorist organizations. Although the court concluded that the detention was
lawful for reasons of national security, its decision was deplored as being inconsonant with existing
rules of international law. See Orna Ben-Naftali & Sean S. Gleichgevitch, Missing in Legal Action:
Lebanese Hostage in Israel, 4 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185 (2000). The decision was later overturned and the
term "state security" was analyzed through the lens of a judicial test balancing human dignity and
national security. See Cr.A. 7048/97 Anonymous v. Minister of Def. 54(I) P.D. 721, 741. Conversely,
another Israeli judicial decision went the other way, arguing that the detention of two of the Lebanese
prisoners would serve the interests of national security. See H.C. 794/98, Sheikh Abd AI-Karim Ubeid
v. Minister of Defense, 55(5) P.D. 769. Systematic searches and arrests were also performed in the
West Bank in the aftermath of the Israel Defense Force's "Protective Wall" operation. For more
details on this account, see Yuval Shany, Israeli Counter Terrorism Measures: Are They "Kosher"
Under International Law?, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 96, 110-14 (Michael N. Schmitt &
Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2002). The detention of these suspected terrorists has been criticized as being
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inaction, muzzled activism, and sometimes-blind deference to the
executive, also raises serious concerns regarding the strength and
sustainability of the human rights scheme.6
Furthermore, the most important reason for the existence and
application of a policy of indefinite detention is readily identifiable:
incommunicado and indefinite detention is an effective tool to break
cases and to gather intelligence. For instance, in the Padilla case,5 in
which an individual was precluded from petitioning the Court because he
was being held as an "enemy combatant" for alleged ties with terrorism,
the United States expressly recognized that long-term detention without
access to counsel or outside contact amounts to an effective means of
interrogation. 6 Therefore, states resort to indefinite detention because it
provides them with a practical advantage in advancing investigations,
along with effective control over suspects, a sort of neutralizing effect.
In addition, the policy of indefinite detention, coupled with the
restriction on access to counsel,6 also purports to assist the detaining
state in diluting the detainees' obdurate will or in dissuading them from
withholding valuable information."
We must bear in mind that this situation is guided by an overarching
tension. On one hand, states feel they need to prosecute alleged
terrorists. On the other hand, states are concerned with divulging the
evidence adduced in the course of investigations or may lack sufficient
inconsistent with international law. See, e.g., DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE 129-30
(2002). On the legitimacy of detaining suspected terrorists as "bargaining chips," see Gross, supra note
so, at 70-71.
64. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503 (20O3).
65. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), overruled and remanded by 542 U.S. 426
(2004).
66. In a separate opinion, concurring in part, dissenting in part, Judge Wesley wrote:
Sadly, the majority's resolution of this matter fails to address the real weakness of the
government's appeal. Padilla presses to have his day in court to rebut the government's
factual assertions that he falls within the authority of the Joint Resolution. The government
contends that Mr. Padilla can be held incommunicado for I8 months with no serious
opportunity to put the government to its proof by an appropriate standard. The government
fears that to do otherwise would compromise its ability both to gather important
information from Mr. Padilla and to prevent him from communicating with other al Qaeda
operatives in the United States.
Id.
67. For a concise review of major legal considerations pertaining to the restriction on access to
counsel after 9/It, see Schulhofer, supra note 17, at 23-28.
68. Philip B. Heymann speaks to this point:
The detention may be for purposes of interrogation pending trial or simply to incapacitate
those individuals for a sustained period of time. The decision of the Attorney General, at
least occasionally, to deny detainees private access even to lawyers is a further effort to
incapacitate the group. Similar tactics were used by the West German government in the
1970's in an effort to reduce terrorism by the leftist terrorist group, the Red Army Faction,
many of whose leaders were already in prison.
Heymann, supra note 31, at 448-49.
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proof to establish their case persuasively. It must be noted immediately
at the outset that a policy of large-scale arrests and detentions without
access to counsel might not be a popular option for the executive
branch. 69 It will almost invariably lead to a significant outcry by civil
libertarians and to increased support or sympathy for the targeted
groups, while also alienating a vast portion of the targeted communities."
For instance, recent events in Iraq have solidified support of local
insurgents.7 ' In order to better ascertain whether such a policy conforms
to human rights norms, it is imperative to scrutinize some of the
strategies employed in the war on terror by briefly reviewing the major
international legal restraints on indefinite detention.
B. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON INDEFINITE DETENTION
I. Indefinite Detention As Torture
Before enumerating the legal restraints on indefinite detention in
international law, a few introductory remarks are relevant. It must be
noted that the question of detention is inextricably connected with the
issue of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. Several human
rights treaty bodies assert that indefinite or long-term detention, without
judicial review or communication, is tantamount to inhuman and/or
degrading treatment. This proposition will translate into a crucial
concern underlying my discussion: to what extent does indefinite
detention, without communication, amount to torture72 or inhuman
and/or degrading treatment, thereby violating Article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,73 the Geneva
Conventions," and the Convention Against Torture?" Under the
Covenant, state-parties may derogate from providing certain civil
69. See generally CHRISTOPHER HEwrrr, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES (1984).
For a thoughtful summary of the United States' policy on detention and prosecution of foreign
nationals in the war on terror, see K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, The Executive Policy Toward Detention
and Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 662 (2003).
70. See Heymann, supra note 31, at 449. He writes:
The detention strategy itself may be deeply flawed.... Such detentions have sometimes
proved effective, but they have always had the effect of alienating a much larger group than
were originally sympathetic to the terrorists. The additional step of denying private access
to lawyers proved the cause of major disruption in Germany, with large numbers of those
concerned with civil liberties withdrawing support from government measures against
terrorists.
Id.
71. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Talk to the Insurgents, WASH. POST, June 29, 2004, at A23.
72. See my comments on Kant, the war on terror, and torture, supra notes 57-59.
73. Covenant, supra note 43. Article 7 reads as follows: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." Id.
74. Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note I I.
75. Convention Against Torture, supra note 44.
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liberties in times of crisis.76 This derogation scheme does not, however,
permit curtailing the prohibition against torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment." Although in recent memory there has been a
broadening inclusion of various practices under the definition of
torture,"5 indefinite detention is not always interpreted as a form of
torture. In this regard, the case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom79 is
rather instructive, as it identifies the difference between torture and
inhuman and/or degrading treatment: "[T]his distinction derives
principally from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted....
Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."' In sum, the rationale
underlying the distinction between both types of treatment is one of
degree. It is no secret that long-term incommunicado detention, in itself,
engenders devastating psychological damage, 8 which, in turn, may be
equated with inhuman and/or degrading treatment .s Similarly, the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Services' Guidelines provide that torture
may include prolonged isolation, as long as the suffering inflicted or
resulting from the isolation is severe."
76. See Covenant, supra note 43, arts. 4.1 & 4.2; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 50
(2002) ("On the other hand the formulation of international human rights takes into account
emergency situations in which the State of nationality may be placed, in particular through the facility
of the State to derogate from certain rights in time of public emergency.").
77. The Convention Against Torture does not allow any derogation in times of crisis. See supra
note 75, art. 2 ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of
torture.").
78. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 E.H.R.R 413, para. III (1996) (enumerating arbitrary
arrests, disappearances, custodial deaths, and fake encounters resulting in killings); see also Dawn J.
Miller, Holding States to their Convention Obligations: The United Nations Convention Against Torture
and the Need for a Broad Interpretation of State Action, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 302 (2003) (listing
mental torture, sexual violence, and other forms of torture).
79. Ireland v. United Kingdom, No. 531o/71, s Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978).
80. Id. para. 167 (citing Art. I, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 3oth Sess. (1975)).
81. See, e.g., Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia's Internal Security Act, 26
FOROHAM INT'L L.J. 1345, 1430 (2003) (discussing the repercussions of indefinite detention under the
Malaysian system: "Yet, the prospect of indefinite detention, of not knowing when or if they will be
released, of years of similarly impoverished routine, works unimaginable psychological hardship."). It
is also interesting to note that, in adopting the Convention Against Torture, the United States drew
particular attention on the issue of mental torture. See, e.g., DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN
THE UNITED STATES 215 (3d ed. 1999). After their release, some of the Guantanamo detainees held in
solitary confinement have come forward to discuss the devastating mental, emotional and social
consequences of incommunicado detention. See, e.g., Brendan O'Neill, After Guantanamo, BBC NEWS
(UK Ed.), Jan. 25, 2005.
82. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantanamo
and Beyond, 25 Loy. L.A. ITrr'L & COMp. L. REV. 457, 480 (2003) ("Indefinite incommunicado
detention itself may contravene human rights norms because of the debilitating psychological
effects.").
83. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 78, at 302, nn.20-22. The proposition that prolonged isolation is
tantamount to torture has received academic support. See, e.g., J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS,
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The determination that Guantanamo Bay detainees and other
suspected terrorists detained by the United States are subject to torture,• 85
based solely on their indefinite detent4on, is difficult to make .5
However, a clear and compelling case that these individuals are subject
to inhuman and/or degrading treatment can be established, hinging on
two factors. On one hand, "anxiety of the Guantinamo detainees about
the uncertainty of their own situation may also be considered as a form
of inhuman and degrading treatment."86 This reality has been confirmed
by an acute number of suicide attempts by detainees within the naval
base, namely 32 in eighteen months."' This factor clearly demonstrates a
high level of mental and emotional stress among inmates, more than
probably induced by the uncertainty of their fate." Such mental stress
may also originate from the realization that detention without trial and
access to family members might preclude the detainees' loved ones from
undertaking legal or political initiatives on their behalf. 9 On the other
hand, the prospect of being sentenced to death, following the
circumvention of procedural safeguards usually attributed to a fair trial,
will engender considerable mental and emotional hardship. This reality
also militates in favor of a determination that Guantanamo detainees are
subject to inhuman and/or degrading treatment.' This factor could also
be deemed to violate Article 6(I) of the Covenant, which consecrates the
THE UNrED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMANE AND DEGRADING TREATMENT I i8 (1988).
84. Some authors expound that specific conditions in detention and treatment carried out at
Guantanamo, such as some physical characteristics of the holding cells, hooding, and involuntary head
shaving of prisoners, should be characterized as inhuman and degrading treatment. See, e.g., Daryl A.
Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 320, 325 (2002); see also Luigi Condorelli & Pasquale De Sena, The Relevance of the
Obligations Flowing From the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to U.S. Courts Dealing with
Guantanamo Detainees, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. io7, it6 n.34 (2oo4). For a detailed review of the
logistical and human situation within the Guantanamo Bay naval base, see Joseph Lelyveld, "The
Least Worst Place". Life in Guantdnamo, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 100-27 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
85. This issue has been raised in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Condorelli & De Sena, supra note 84,
at 114 ("Third, there is the issue of whether the treatment of the Guantgnamo detainees could be
characterized as a breach of the prohibition against torture, and inhumane or degrading treatment
(Article 7 of the ICCPR)."); see also id. at 116.
86. Id. at 117 (axing their reasoning on Quinteros v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983, Comm. 107/I98I,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/I9/D/IO7/I98I).
87. Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Criticizes Indefinite Detention In Guantdnamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 2003, at AT; see also Neil Lewis, Detainees From the Afghan War Remain in a Legal Limbo in
Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,2003, at AI; O'Neill, supra note 8i.
88. See Condorelli & De Sena, supra note 84, at 116 ("Likewise, it is certain that the conditions of
total psychological uncertainty brought about by the attitude of the U.S. authorities has led to a very
high number of attempted suicides among detainees.").
89. See, e.g., Fritz & Flaherty, supra note 81, at 1422 (discussing the repercussions of indefinite
detention under the Malaysian system). The authors also discuss the consequences of indefinite
detention on the detainees' health. Id.
9o. Condorelli & De Sena, supra note 84, at 117.
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"inherent right to life."9' In fact, the European Court of Human Rights
has recently held that the imposition of the death sentence following an
unfair trial will bring about mental anguish, thereby subjecting the
sentenced individual to undue inhuman treatment.92 It becomes clear that
the foregoing considerations may be integrally transposed to the
detainees at Guantanamo.
Aside from the separate issue of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment, one cannot over-emphasize the human rights/due process
paradigm, as the distinction between a "prisoner of war" (POW) and a
"protected person" will undoubtedly inform the analysis on the level of
protection afforded suspected terrorists. It is helpful to note that a
distinction between different types of preventive law enforcement
activities will also prove necessary in distinguishing between the United
States' and United Kingdom's attitudes' vis-a-vis custody over alleged
terrorists. In light of current trends and practices in detaining suspected
terrorists, three types of situations will prove instrumental to the debate
at hand: the detention of non-citizens abroad,94 the detention of citizens
91. Covenant, supra note 43, art. 6(1) ("1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."); see also Condorelli &
De Sena, supra note 84, at I; Fitzpatrick, supra note 15, at 351-52.
92. Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, 125 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), para. 207.
In the Court's view, to impose a death sentence on a person after an unfair trial is to subject
that person wrongfully to the fear that he will be executed. The fear and uncertainty as to
the future generated by a sentence of death, in circumstances where there exists a real
possibility that the sentence will be enforced, must give rise to a significant degree of human
anguish. Such anguish cannot be dissociated from the unfairness of the proceedings
underlying the sentence which, given that human life is at stake, becomes unlawful under
the Convention. Having regard to the rejection by the Contracting Parties of capital
punishment, which is no longer seen as having any legitimate place in a democratic society,
the imposition of a capital sentence in such circumstances must be considered, in itself, to
amount to a form of inhuman treatment.
Id.
93. For a thoughtful review of British and American post-9/i i emergency powers, with particular
emphasis on governance issues and legislation, see Philip A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-Terrorist
Powers, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1193 (2003).
94. See Heymann, supra note 31, at 454 ("Even when American intelligence, law enforcement, or
national security officials are deeply involved in requesting an action, non-Americans living abroad do
not enjoy the protections of U.S. law.") In fact, this reasoning, coupled with the holding in Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), has been the driving force behind some judicial reviews of
Guantanamo Bay detentions. For example, the court in Coalition of Clergy v. Bush expressed that:
In all key respects, the Guantanamo detainees are like the petitioners in Johnson: They are
aliens; they were enemy combatants; they were captured in combat; they were abroad when
captured; they are abroad now; since their capture, they have been under the control of the
military; they have not stepped foot on American soil; and there are no legal or judicial
precedents entitling them to pursue a write of habeas corpus in an American civilian court.
Coalition of Clergy v. Bush (Coalition of Clergy 1), 189 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2002). However,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside that reasoning in Coalition of Clergy I
judging that the case should be resolved exclusively on the issue of standing. Coalition of Clergy v.
Bush (Coalition of Clergy 11), 3io F.3d 1153, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002). In Rasul v. Bush, the court alluded
to Eisentrager and invoked reasoning similar to that of Coalition of Clergy i. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.
Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom., Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd
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abroad,95 and the detention of non-citizens inside the territory.
96
2. Specific International Legal Restraints on Indefinite Detention
a. The Distinction Between POWs and Protected Persons
In terms of international restraints on indefinite detention, the
Geneva Conventions act as a first point of reference, as they reflect
customary international law.' Under Article 5 of Convention III, when a
doubt arises as to the status of a prisoner, there is a presumption of POW
status until a competent tribunal has .determined the status of said
suspect9 The main advantage of POW status lies in immunity against
sub nom., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) ("Rather, Eisentrager broadly applies to prevent aliens
detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States from invoking a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus."). In Al Odah v. United States, the court also relied on Eisentrager in stating that the
Guantanamo detainees
have much in common with the German prisoners in Eisentrager. They too are aliens, they
too were captured during military operations, they were in a foreign country when
captured, they are now abroad, they are in custody of the American military, and they have
never had any presence in the United States.
321 F.3d at 14o.
Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d io64 (C.D. Cal. 2003), also warrants consideration. After
expressing its concern over the long-term detention of Guantanamo detainees without access to
counsel, the court relied on Eisentrager in deferring to the executive, but not without some regret. Id.
at 1073 ("Unfortunately, unless Johnson and the other authorities cited above are either disregarded
or rejected, this court lacks the power and the right to provide such a remedy. Perhaps a higher court
will find a principled way to do so."). The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal, Gherebi v. Bush, 374
F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004), and remanded the decision to the District Court of the District of Columbia,
which determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition. Gherebi v. Bush, 338 F. Supp. 2d
91 (D.D.C. 2004). For a thoughtful review of the relevant legal issues pertaining to the detention of
non-citizens at Guantanamo Bay, see Dahlstrom, supra note 69.
95. On the applicable legal regime to U.S. agents, including individuals illegally captured, see
generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (990).
96. It is almost implicit that the treatment afforded to illegal aliens within the U.S. will be
considerably harsher than with regard to lawful citizens inside the territory. Philip B. Heymann speaks
to this point. "The powers over the many who are not legally in the United States are far greater still.
They are automatically subject to arrest pending removal proceedings. Release pending departure can
be denied. Detention of many months is a result generally available to the government." Heymann,
supra note 31, at 449-5o. For thoughtful comments on the U.S.' treatment of American citizens in the
war on terror, see Irma Alicia Cabrera Ramirez, Unequal Treatment of United States Citizens: Eroding
the Constitutional Safeguards, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 207 (2003); Melysa H. Sperber, John
Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi: Closing the Loophole in International Humanitarian Law for
American Nationals Captured Abroad While Fighting with Enemy Forces, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159
(2003).
97. For support of this proposition, see Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-i (ICTY App.
Ch., 2 Oct. 1995), paras. 79-85.
98. Article 5 of Convention III, supra note I I, reads as follows:
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time
they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in
Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time
as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
See also Luisa Vierucci, Prisoners of War or Protected Persons Qua Unlawfid Combatants? The
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prosecution for acts committed in combat, the so-called "combatant
immunity,"' but this immunity does not cover crimes falling outside the
ambit of the Geneva Conventions. In other words, a military official who
clearly disregards the regular chain of command-or goes AWOL-and
commits systematic acts of terror or violence against civilian targets will,
presumably, not be afforded the protection of POW status. Hence, in the
case of Taliban detainees, the benefits of POW status would in no way
preclude or jeopardize genuine national prosecutions. "If a few of them
are guilty of war crimes or crimes against humanity, they could be
prosecuted while remaining POWs."'" It inevitably follows from this
proposition that "[t]hose who commit war crimes should be punished,
but their crimes should not be used as an excuse to deprive others of the
protections due POWs."'.
This rule also stems from a cardinal principle in the laws of war
paradigm, namely that military personnel should always distinguish
themselves from civilians.' Should they cease to form part of the official
military apparatus, whether by blending in with the civilian population to
conduct operations or simply by way of civilian disguise, they will
subtract themselves from the benefits of POW status.' 3  This
Judicial Safeguards to Which Guantanamo Bay Detainees Are Entitled, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 284, 300
(2003) ("This provision creates a sort of 'temporary protection', equal to that enjoyed by POWs, for all
persons who have committed a belligerent act and have fallen into the enemy's hands in case factual
evidence leaves doubt as to their belonging to one of the categories of Article 4 GCIII.").
99. See, e.g., Waldemar A. Solf & Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 205, 212 (977);
see also Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367, 376 n.38
(2004).
oo. George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96
AM. J. IN'L L. 891 , 896 (2002).
IoI. Id.
IO2. This crucial distinction was set forth in Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed
forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nationals and also between those who are
lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.
Id; see also "Basic Principles for the Protection of the Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts," GA
Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. (i97o), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/
ares25.htm.
103. Robert Kogod Goldman offers a thoughtful interpretation of this principle in the context of
Iraq.
In my opinion, therefore, the mere use of civilian disguise by a combatant is not a war
crime, but, as previously noted, could deprive irregular combatants of POW status.
Similarly, the use of the enemy's uniform to penetrate the enemy's lines is permissible, but
fighting in that uniform would be illegal. An enemy combatant, clearly identifiable as such,
who undertakes a suicide mission against the adversary does not violate the law. However, a
combatant disguised as a civilian would be engaging in an illegal attack. While the
intentional use of civilians to shield military objectives and operations would be a war
crime, responding to enemy fire in self-defense from within crowds of civilians could be
lawful.
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international obligation, found at Article 4 of Convention III, is also
mirrored at Article 43 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions." Conversely, "protected persons," defined at Article 4 of
Convention IV, °5 are afforded a different protection than POWs.
Pursuant to Article 5 of Convention IV, they do not enjoy immunity from
prosecution for belligerent actions and may forfeit their right to
communication when they are suspected of having participated in
activities hostile to the security of the state. The fundamental distinction
between these two categories of prisoners lies in the length of their
detention, a significant detail in the analysis. POWs are released once the
hostilities have ceased I 6 while "protected persons" may be detained i) as
long as they constitute a threat to national security or ii) while they are
still serving their sentence following proper prosecution and conviction.
From a legal perspective, the practical problem lies in the novel and
indeterminate character of the war on terror. In certain circumstances,
the temporal modalities pertaining to the detention of POWs and
"protected persons" will be, for all intended purposes, collapsed into one
single regime. For example, it is easy to contend that the war on terror is
an ongoing effort, given the polymorph and novel threats posed by
terrorist networks.7 As a corollary to that proposition, it may be difficult
The Legal Status of Iraqi and Foreign Combatants Captures by Coalition Armed Forces, CRIMES OF
WAR PROJECT (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/news-iraq4.html,
under the heading "How the Laws Apply in Iraq"; see also INGRID DETrER, THE LAW OF WAR XvII-xVIII
136 (2000).
04. Additional Protocol, supra note 38; see also THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INSTITtITONS 281 (Oxford 1995) ("The provision reiterates that, to qualify for combatant
protected status, combatants 'are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population' while
preparing for or engaging in an attack.").
1o5. Protected persons are defined in Articles 13, 24, 25, and 26 of Convention 1, supra note iI;
Articles 13, 36, and 37 of Convention I1, supra note I I; Article 4 of Convention III, supra note tI; and
Articles 4, 13, and 20 of Convention IV, supra note I I.
io6. Article 118 of Convention III, supra note i1, states that POWs "shall be released and
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." It is also interesting to note that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that even American citizens could be designated as
POWs. The Court seemed more sympathetic to POW status and, essentially, held that an enemy
combatant will benefit from POW status, provided that the individual is not a spy or disguised as a
civilian. This position clearly represents a militating factor in favor of the protective scheme and rule
of distinction found under the Geneva Conventions. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946)
("[A]II persons who are active in opposing an army in war may be captured and except for spies and
other non-uniformed plotters and actors for the enemy are prisoners of war.").
107. On the complex cellular structure of Al Qaeda, see ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA:
GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 72-112 (Berkeley 2002). Other commentators have also addressed the
so-called "virtual" dimension of the Al Qaeda network.
Al Qaeda seems to have learned that in order to evade detection in the West, it must adopt
some of the qualities of a "virtual network": a style of organization used by American right-
wing extremists for operating in environments (such as the United States) that have
effective law enforcement agencies. American antigovernment groups refer to this style as
"leaderless resistance."... The internet has also greatly facilitated the spread of "virtual"
subcultures and has substantially increased the capacity of loosely networked terrorist
organizations.... Islamist Web sites also offer on-line training courses in the production of
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or even impossible to pinpoint the exact cessation of hostilities in such a
war."" Based on that rationale, it then becomes justifiable to detain
POWs indefinitely'-so long as military operations and personnel are
being deployed to thwart terrorist activities around the globe-even
though the laws of war traditionally required the detention of POWs to
expire at the end of a relatively well-delineated international armed
conflict. In that light, the distinction between POWs and "protected
persons," as envisioned by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions,
becomes somewhat blurred. The repercussions on the human rights
scheme are nonetheless deleterious and signal a considerable erosion of
the protection regime specifically tailored for POWs.' ° The ramifications
of U.S. policy on indefinite detention have had such an impact on
preexisting legal schemes that some are labeling Guantanamo a parallel
explosives and urge visitors to take action on their own. The "encyclopedia of jihad," parts
of which are available on-line, provides instructions for creating "clandestine activity cells,"
with units for intelligence, supply, planning and preparation, and implementation.... And
according to U.S. government officials, al Qaeda now uses chat rooms to recruit Latino
Muslims with U.S. passports, in the belief that they will arouse less suspicion as operatives
than would Arab-Americans.
Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, 82 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 27, 33-35 (2003).
io8. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human
Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 241, 25 1-52 (2003).
1O9. This strategy, along with the possible conducting of more aggressive interrogation techniques
vis-A-vis detainees, has been highlighted as a potential red-flag in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Steven W.
Becker, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... ": Assessing the Aftermath of September iith, 37 VAL. U. L.
REV. 563, 571-72 (2003).
Combatants are entitled to POW status, which means that the prisoners have to be released
when the conflict ends. This is, in part, why the Administration argues that the Taliban
soldiers are not POWs, so that they do not have to be released after the conflict in
Afghanistan ends. But probably more important is that under the Geneva Conventions,
POWs are only required to give name, rank, serial number (if it exists), and date of birth.
This would have defeated the purpose of U.S. interrogation, and that is why it was argued
that they were not POWs.
Id.; see also Jinks, supra note 99, at 371-72 nn.19 & 20. The granting of POW status has traditionally
been construed as an impediment or, at the very least, as an important restriction on the interrogation
of detainees. See, e.g., Convention IH, supra note I I, arts. 21, 95, 97, 98.
Ito. The policy of indefinite detention also raises a serious concern relating to the presumption of
innocence of suspected terrorists. In H.C. 3239/02, Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, 57(2)
P.D. 349, para. I9 [hereinafter Marab], the Israeli Supreme Court spoke to this point, stating that
prisoners detained for preventive purposes should still benefit from the presumption of innocence.
The Court added that "a person should not be detained merely because he has been detained during
warfare." Id. para. 23. The Court further concluded that:
The circumstances of his detention must be such that they raise the suspicion that he-he
individually and no one else-presents a danger to security. Such a suspicion may be raised
because he was detained in an area of warfare while he was actively fighting or carrying out
terrorist activities, or because he is suspect of being involved in warfare or terrorism.
Id. para 23. This proposition, namely that suspected terrorists are entitled to benefit from the
presumption of innocence, has received support in international legal scholarship. See, e.g., Emanuel
Gross, Trying Terrorists-Justification for Differing Trial Rules: The Balance Between Security
Considerations and Human Rights, 13 IND. INT'L & ComP. L. REV. 1 (2002). It is also important to note
that the concept of presumption of innocence is mirrored in international human rights treaties,
namely at Article 14(2) of the Covenant, supra note 43.
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justice system: "In response to these threats, a 'parallel system' of justice
has developed wherein the government has claimed the authority to
detain indefinitely individuals suspected of terrorist activity, including
U.S. citizens, as 'enemy combatants" .....
The "prisoner of war" banner primarily purports to differentiate
between lawful combatants, or individuals who raise a doubt as to their
legal status, and the remainder of the population. By detaining POWs
indefinitely based on the indeterminate character of the war on terror,
the U.S. government is, in fact, subsuming a very specific category of
lawful combatants, along with "protected persons," under one single
legal matrix."2 Like "protected persons" in times of war, the POWs
under U.S. custody are actually detained as long as they constitute a
threat to national (or international) security: they have essentially been
stripped of the benefits of POW status and the very purpose of this area
of the laws of war appears to be defeated.
It is also helpful to mention, in passing, that affording POW status to
prisoners that are reasonably entitled to such protection-or that raise a
doubt as to their legal status-does not, in any way, protect them from
prosecution for war crimes or acts that fall outside the ambit of the
Geneva Conventions."3 For example, a member of the Taliban found of
having participated or perpetrated acts of terrorism on civilian targets
will not be able to rely on his POW status to exculpate himself, provided
such protection is granted to him in the first place. If POW status is not
afforded to such individual, the whole inquiry becomes somewhat futile
or circular, as a "protected person," such as this particular Taliban
member, will never be absolved from prosecution for acts perpetrated in
times of war. Hence, the whole object of "combatant immunity" is
subverted and the distinction between lawful actions committed during
hostilities and war crimes starts to blur indelibly."4 To follow this course
i I i. Thomas J. Lepri, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for Procedural Protections For
U.S. Citizens Detained As Enemy Combatants Under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2565
(2003). Influential voices in the U.S. have also suggested building a prison facility, dubbed "Camp 6,"
where the executive would hold prisoners that no longer have any information to share. This plan has
been sharply criticized as unconstitutional, primarily because the detentions could last a lifetime. See,
e.g., Lugar Condemns Plan To Jail Detainees for Life, REUTERS, Jan. 3, 2005, at A2.
112. Some commentators express the view that the gaps between protective schemes granted to
POWs and protected persons, respectively, are in fact narrowing. In the same spirit, some also argue
that a protective parity now permeates Geneva Law and that the differences between the protection
afforded POWs and protected persons are, for all intended purposes, trifling. See, e.g., Jinks, supra
note 99.
113. See Goldman, supra note 103, under heading "The Right to Be a Prisoner of War"
("Although members of regular armed forces are expected to comply with the laws of war, they do not
forfeit their right to POW status upon capture even if they commit war crimes. They can, however, be
tried and punished for such crimes by their captor.").
114. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 51, at 2i ("Or when aliens detained outside the United States are
involved, it means the holding of individuals neither as POWs nor as war criminals, the two categories
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of action vis-h-vis Taliban members, who did form the de facto
government of the attacked country,"5 Afghanistan, has the effect of
short-circuiting the whole rationale of POW protection. Hence, it
becomes evident why the U.S. policy of denying POW status to Taliban
members has been sharply criticized." 6 1 will take issue with more specific
unpalatable aspects of this policy in Part II(B)( 4).
b. The Fair Trial Requirement
The most important provision for my discussion is found at Article 9
of the Covenant, which protects suspected terrorists against arbitrary
detention and, similarly to Article 5 of Convention IV, grants them the
right to'a fair trial."7 In this context, it is imperative to consider the
wording of Article 2 of the Covenant, which determines the scope of the
treaty and reads as follows:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
' 8
Taking the Guantanamo Bay situation, a first reading of Article 2 of
the Covenant would suggest that the military base, while not under U.S.
sovereignty, does fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, the territorial scope
of the Covenant would extend to those detainees, thereby affording them
the protection of Article 9. The claim underlying this argument is that
of wartime detention recognized under international law.").
115. See, e.g., Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 13, at 81, 83-85; O'Connell, supra note 45, at 327.
i 16. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt,
and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1, 1o n.24 (2002).
1 17. Article 9 of the Covenant, supra 43, is crucial to my discussion and clearly sets forth a
requirement of a fair trial within a reasonable period of time under existing human rights law. It reads
as follows:
i. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a
judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to
appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise,
for execution of the judgment.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable
right to compensation.
Article 9, Covenant, supra 43 (emphasis added).
118. Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
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the United States has effective control over Guantanamo Bay because it
exercises some of its usual public powers and, consequently, jurisdiction
over the area." 9 Conversely, a second reading of the same provision
implies a dual requirement of both "sovereignty" and "jurisdiction,"
which would entail the non-application of the Covenant to the
Guantanamo Bay prisoners. ' It is useful to note that, while placing
significant emphasis on the Eisentrager decision, the post-9/Ii lower
court case law has categorically articulated that the Guantanamo naval
base falls outside U.S. sovereignty. I"' As Part II.B.5.c infra discusses,
recent Supreme Court decisions have overturned this line of cases.
However, setting all judicial pronouncements aside for the moment, it is
not so certain whether the Geneva Conventions, for example, would not
apply to the Guantanamo Bay situation. In fact, as some authors have
i19. It is interesting to note that the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence has equated
the terms "within their jurisdiction" with "effective control." See, e.g., Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No.
522o7/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Loizidou v. Turkey, No. 15318/89, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996). For
academic support of this proposition, see, for example, Anthea Roberts, Righting Wrongs or Wronging
Rights? The United States and Human Rights Post-September it, 15 EuR. J. INi'L L. 721, 746 (2004)
("And the European Court of Human Rights has held that extra-territorial jurisdiction may exist
where a state, 'through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad...
exercises some of the public powers normally to be exercised by' the government of that territory.")
(citing both Bankovic and Loizidou). See also Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law: Are There Some Individuals Bereft of All Legal Protection? 98 AM. Soc'v INrr'L L.
PROC. 353, 353 (2oo4); Dominic McGoldrick, The Interface Between Public Emergency Powers and
International Law, 2 INT'L J. CoNsT. L. 38o, 402-03 (2004). For a critique of the Bankovic case, as
transposed to the situation in Iraq, see Dr. Kerem Altiparmak, Bankovic: An Obstacle to the
Application of the European Convention on Human Rights in Iraq?, 9 J . CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 213
(2004). For an analysis of the disadvantages of applying human rights restrictively under the European
Convention of Human Rights, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human
Rights Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L.
529 (2003).
I2o. For instance, we know from Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
rev'd sub nom., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), that Guantanamo Bay does not fall under U.S.
sovereignty. As Part II.B.5.c infra highlights, recent Supreme Court decisions have overturned this line
of reasoning. It is helpful to note that, at the time of drafting, the intent behind Article 2(1) of the
Covenant, supra note 43, was to expand responsibility of signatory states. For support of this
proposition, see Antonio Cassese, Are International Human Rights Treaties and Customary Rules on
Torture Binding Upon U.S. Troops in Iraq?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 872, 874 (2004) ("The Human
Rights Committee has consistently held that, pursuant to Article 2(t) of the Covenant, the rights
enshrined in the Covenant must be respected by each Contracting Party in any place (whether or not
under their sovereignty), where they wield effective authority and control over individuals.") (citing
abundant Human Rights Committee jurisprudence); see also Timothy D. Rudy, Did We Treaty Away
Ker-Frisbie?, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 791, 833 n.276 (1995) ("In line with this, it would be unconscionable to
so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate
violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate
on its own territory.") (citing the Human Rights Committee).
121. See Coalition of Clergy I, supra note 94, at lO48; Coalition of Clergy 2, supra note 94, at 1164;
Rasul, supra note 94, at 68; Gherebi, supra note 94, at to65; Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1143 (distinguishing
the notion of control from the principle of sovereignty, which, in the language of the Court, is
tantamount to "supreme dominion exercised by a nation"). As Part II.B.5.c infra discusses, recent
Supreme Court decisions have reversed this line of cases.
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hypothesized,'2 a case could be made that Cuba is actually a party to the
conflict, and perhaps even a co-belligerent state, thereby confirming the
application of Geneva law to foreign detainees. More importantly,
influential scholarly voices opine that a state cannot exempt itself from
international human rights obligations merely by encroaching upon those
rights on another state's territory.'
2 3
From the perspective of international law, it is unclear whether the
rights of protected persons under Convention IV and the Covenant would
be violated if they were deprived of communication and access to
counsel'24 during detention. The essential and pivotal element in making
this determination will depend on whether or not these individuals are
actually prosecuted. Moreover, the U.S. military is detaining prisoners in
Guantanamo Bay, based on the Military Order of November 13, 2001. 125
On its face, the military order does not contravene the Geneva
Conventions or human rights standards, provided the detainees are
ultimately tried."'6 International human rights standards impose a
requirement of a fair trial within a reasonable time but remain taciturn as
to the independence of the deciding court,"7 the presence of a jury, the
122. See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 99, at 420-21.
123. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78,
8o-8i (1995).
In view of the purposes and objects of human rights treaties, there is no a priori reason to
limit a state's obligation to respect human rights to its national territory. Where agents of
the state, whether military or civilian, exercise power and authority (jurisdiction, or de facto
jurisdiction) over persons outside national territory, the presumption should be that the
state's obligation to respect the pertinent human rights continues. That presumption could
be rebutted only when the nature and the content of a particular right or treaty language
suggest otherwise.
Id.; see also supra note i2o.
124. Many States have implemented restrictions on access to counsel during the detention of
suspected terrorists. For example, the Supreme Court of Israel pronounced on the legality of a military
order precluding a detainee from communicating with his attorney for a period of thirty-four days,
judging that the restriction was reasonable. See Marab, supra note iso.
125. See Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism § 3, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834-35 (Nov. 13, 2001). This proposition has received
wide support in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 268 (2004); Mundis, supra note 84; Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of
Stress, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 455, 455 (2003).
126. Some commentators endorse this proposition, stating that, even before the implementation of
the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, constitutional guarantees were being curtailed for the
purposes of national security.
According to civil libertarians, the constitutional safeguards that normally protect
individuals suspected of criminal activity have been destroyed in the case of persons
suspected of links with terrorism. This accusation reflects an ignorance both of the
Constitution and of long-established limits on the criminal-justice system. Prior to 1978, and
dating back at least to World War II, attorneys general of the United States routinely
authorized warrantless FBI surveillance, wiretaps, and break-ins for national-security
purposes.
Bork, supra note 51, at 31.
127. For example, U.S. military tribunals have been used frequently to prosecute suspected
criminals in times of war. For a concise review of this practice, see id. at 33.
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applicable rules of evidence, access to counsel, etc. This uncertainty has
sometimes been partially redressed in domestic military guidelines. For
example, the U.S. Field Manual"' specifies that a "competent tribunal"
for the purposes of determining POW status of a given prisoner "is a
board of not less than three officers acting according to such procedure
as may be described for tribunals of this nature..''[9
This crucial procedural safeguard, namely that international human
rights solely require a trial within a reasonable period, might be further
hindered by delays and unforeseen complications, 3 ' as engendered by
any state of war or international emergency. Similarly, Convention IV
explicitly recognizes that protected persons actively engaged in
operations hostile to the security of the detaining state, such as Al Qaeda
detainees who have avowed intent of attacking the United States if
released, may be deemed to have forfeited their right to
communication. 3' Nevertheless, the same treaty, coupled with Article 9
of the Covenant,32 also protects the sanctity of the fair trial requirement
under human rights law and ensures that prosecution of protected
persons must ensue within a reasonable period of time following capture
and detention.'33 When taking the situation of someone like Hamdi,'3
i28. See FM 27-i0 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE,
Chapter 3 (1956) [hereinafter U.S. FIELD MANUAL], available at http://www.osc.army.mil/others/Gca/
files/FM27-io.pdf.
129. Id. art. 7i.c.
13o. For example, Israel was confronted with logistical problems following its "Protective Wall"
operation. Due to the large-scale arrests and detentions of suspected terrorists conducted during that
operation, it was argued that prompt interrogations could not be administered because of the
staggering amount of prisoners and the lack of interrogators. See, e.g., H.C. 3278/02, Center for
Defense of the Individual v. IDF Commander, 57(0) P.D. 385, para. 6, [hereinafter Center for Defense
of the Individual]; Marab, supra note I io, para. 48. However, the Court rejected this position, judging
that humanitarian standards had been disregarded. See, e.g., H.C. 5591/02, Halel Yassin v. Commander
of Kziot Military Camp, 57(0) P.D. 403, para. 14; Center for Defense of the Individual, para. 26. The
compliance with human rights norms will obviously entail an estimation of the costs involved, such as
having more judges to conduct frequent reviews of long-term detentions. This reality and the need for
more professional interrogators in order to ensure speedy detention reviews were expressly
acknowledged in Marab, supra note Io, paras. 35 and 48.
131. See Convention IV, Art. 5, supra note ii.
Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied than an individual
protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of
the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges
under the present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person,
be prejudicial to the security of such State. Where in occupied territory an individual
protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of
activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases
where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of
communication under the present Convention....
Id.
132. For the full text of the provision, see supra note I I7.
133. Convention IV, art. 5, supra note 1i.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and, in case of trial,
shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present
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namely where an individual was detained during a period of three years
without being ultimately charged, it is difficult to contend that the United
States has been complying with the international fair trial requirement.
Although Hamdi's original citizenship in the United States might have
barred the application of international human rights treaties, the very
fact that he was American should generate even more outrage in light of
his lengthy detention without criminal charge. In addition, several non-
American individuals are facing the same situation as Hamdi, as they are
being displaced, forcibly transported, and detained at Guantanamo Bay
or elsewhere under U.S. custody.
c. Emergency Situations
It is no secret that governments tend to curtail fundamental
freedoms'35 and engage in arbitrary detentions in times of turmoil.':6 In
fact, "a complex derogation jurisprudence has developed to balance
rights against the imperative needs of security,'. namely under the aegis
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Under Article
15 of the ECHR, state-parties may suspend the protection against
arbitrary detention and the right to a fair trial in times of national
Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person
under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or
Occupying Power, as the case may be.
Id.; see also Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants," 85 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 45, 64-66 (2003) (confirming that the right to humane treatment and the right to a fair
and regular trial may not be derogated from).
134. See supra note 51. For more background on the Hamdi saga, along with a review of the recent
Supreme Court decision, see Jared Perkins, Habeas Corpus in the War Against Terrorism: Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld and Citizen Enemy Combatants, i9 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 437 (2005).
135. Some scholars argue that situations of social or political upheaval usually trigger an over-
reaction by the executive in deploying counter-crisis initiatives. For a thoughtful review of the reasons
why executive branches sometimes misgauge the security threat at hand, see Oren Gross, Chaos and
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional? 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1022-42
(203).
136. One might think of the 1970 October Crisis in Canada where Prime Minister Trudeau
instituted the War Measures Act, thereby permitting the military to suspend civil rights and to proceed
to large-scale arrests. For more background on the October crisis, the Front de Libdration du Qu6bec
(FLQ), and the War Measures Act, see SeAn Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of
Ethnopolitical Conflict in Northern Ireland and Quebec, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMMP. L. 741, 758-59
(2002); Edward T. Canuel, Nationalism, Self-Determination, and Nationalist Movements: Exploring the
Palestinian and Quebec Drives for Independence, 2o B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 85, 109-10 (1997);
Grant H. Carlton, When Reality Sets In: Why Quebec Could Not Exist as an Independent Nation, 7 J.
INT'L L. & PRAC. 468,472-76 (1998); Jeffrey J. Cole, Canadian Discord Over the Charlottetown Accord:
The Constitutional War to Win Quebec, i DICK J. INT'L L. 627, 632-33 (1993); Donald L. Revell,
Authoring Bilingual Laws: The Importance of Process, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1085, 1092 n.25 (2004).
137. Fitzpatrick, supra note so8, at 243. It should be noted, however, that this derogation scheme
carries with it the potential for parliamentary supremacy. See Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial
Review and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
813, 827 n.56 (2003) (invoking the British government's adoption of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and
Security Act, 2001 c.24 (Eng.), and questioning whether British Courts or the European Court of
Human Rights could review the legality of the derogation contained therein).
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emergencies or political strife.' The problem with transposing this
framework to the current war on terror hinges on two particularities of
the ECHR. On one hand, most of its derogation jurisprudence tackled
internal armed conflict but it "rarely addressed the peculiarities of
international armed conflict, real or imagined.' ' 39 On the other hand,
while the European Court of Human Rights has equated the term "other
public emergency threatening the life of the nation" with "an exceptional
situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and
constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the
State is composed,"'4 much confusion still surrounds those terms. 4 ' In
circumscribing the concept of "public emergency," the European Court
of Human Rights allotted a wide margin of deference to executive organs
in determining a state of public emergency and, correspondingly, in
derogating from protections found under the ECHR.'42 Regardless of the
outcome of this conflict in transposing regional human rights precedents
to the war on terror, detainees are nonetheless entitled to procedural
guarantees in the context of criminal proceedings. 
4 3
Some commentators express the view that the war on terror may
operate outside the existing legal boundaries, provided a review of
executive action takes place after the cessation of the state of
emergency,'" while other scholars opine that counter-terrorism should be
consistent with the law.'45 If we were to endorse the first view, detainees
designated as POWs may not know when they will be released, as the
war on terror is in itself, and similarly to the detention of many suspected
138. See generally Daniel Wilsher, The Administrative Detention of Non-Nationals Pursuant to
Immigration Control: International and Constitutional Law Perspectives, 53 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 897
(2004).
139. Fitzpatrick, supra note lO8, at 252.
14o. Lawless v. Ireland (1979-198o), i Eur. H.R. Rep. i, at para 28.
141. See, e.g., McGoldrick, supra note 19, at 392-95.
142. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom (1979-198o) 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25. For more details on
judicial review of the discretion afforded states in times of public emergency, see, for example, F. Ni.
Aolain, The Emergency of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. IO (1995); Oren Gross & F. Ni Aolain, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of
the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 625 (2O01).
143. For support of this proposition, see, for example, FRans KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINrS ON THE
WAGING OF WAR 58-59 (1987).
144. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 135.
145. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 125. Judiciaries around the globe have also endorsed this
proposition, namely that executive branches should subordinate the war on terror to the rule of law.
See, e.g., H.C. 3451/o2, Almadani v. The Minister of Defence, 56(3) P.D. 30, para. 9; H.C. 7015/02,
Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, 56(6) P.D. 352, para. 41. In the same spirit, it has also
been argued that, given the fact that terrorism is an international problem, international standards
should govern domestic counter-terrorism adjudication, be they related to human rights or national
security. Amnon Reichman, "When We Sit To Judge We Are Being Judged"- The Israeli GSS Case, Ex
Parte Pinochet And DomesticGlobal Deliberation, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41 (20OI).
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terrorists, indefinite in character. 46 However, the whole human cry about
Guantanamo detainees being held in a legal black hole'47 may be much
ado about nothing, provided that the detained individuals are duly tried
or, in the case of POWs, released within a period relatively equivalent to
the cessation of major hostilities. Only time will tell if these detentions
are carried out in accordance with international human rights law. So far,
cases like Hamdi's are far from encouraging and reflect a profound
disregard for human rights standards.
3. Differences Between the United States' and United Kingdom's
Approaches
In order to better understand the judicial thrust of lower courts in
the greater part of the war on terror, it is helpful to briefly contrast the
U.S. approach to indefinite detention with the British treatment of
human rights vis-A-vis suspected terrorists.
a. Human Rights As Part of the Law of the Land: Abbasi
When contrasting a case like Al Odah'4 with the Abbasi'49 decision, a
clear difference between U.S. and British legal cultures on what is or
should be the proper balance between security and human rights
emerges. This difference may appear significant at first sight, as concerns
for liberty and democracy permeate British judicial rhetoric. However,
upon closer inspection, the difference in legal cultures that drove the
initial chasm between U.S. and U.K. attitudes will turn out to be skin-
deep. In Abbasi, the British court was willing to include international
human rights standards in British law, even though the Covenant is not
part of the law of the land. In fact, it must be recalled that the court "was
solely concerned with Abbasi's rights under the domestic law of the
United Kingdom."'' s Nevertheless, it attributed considerable importance
to Article 9 of the Covenant in assessing Abbasi's detention.'5 ' In the
146. See supra note lo8--9 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF
GLOBAL RULES 143-173 (2005); George P. Flechter, Black Hole in Guantanamo Bay, 2 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 121 (2004); David Luban, The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, 22 PHIL. & PUB.
POL'Y Q. 9, 9-14 (2002); Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
1 (2004). In assessing the legality of Guantanamo Bay, other commentators have explored ways to
safeguard the reputation of the United States on the international scene. See Gerald L. Neuman,
Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 5o LOYOLA L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (arguing that "[w]hatever legitimate
purposes detention at Guantanamo serves should be attainable in a manner less damaging to the
image and the conscience of the United States").
148. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom., Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004).
149. Abbasi v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs & Secretary of State for
the Home Department, [2o021 EWCA Civ. 1598.
150. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relevance of Paragraph 25 of the ICI's Advisory Opinion on
Nuclear Weapons, 98 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 358, 358 n.I (2004).
151. Abbasi, para. 63 ("Of the many source documents to which we have been referred, it is
enough to cite the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, to which the United Kingdom
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court's view, when a state signs on to an international treaty, it creates
expectations in the general public. The claimants even expounded that,
under certain circumstances, international law might give rise to
individual rights.'52 The court furthered this reasoning by including some
of the above concerns in the "legitimate expectations doctrine" under
judicial review.'53 In delivering its judgment, the court inferred that the
prisoners in Abbasi's situation held at Guantanamo Bay were detained in
a legal black hole'54 and, therefore, embraced a human rights/due process
approach, premised on the fact that the detainees had not yet been
brought to trial. 5  In sum, the court seemed more preoccupied with the
misidentification of innocent people as terrorists 56 than with the actual
terrorists, thereby affirming that human rights obligations encompass
Guantanamo Bay.
b. The United States' Approach
This commitment to human rights is almost antipodal to the U.S.
position 57 and illustrates the tension between the human rights paradigm
and the United States are parties. Article 9, which affirms 'the right to liberty and security of person'
..... ). For the text of Article 9 of the Covenant, see supra note I 17.
152. Abbasi, para. 39.
Mr Blake embarked with fervour on the task of persuading us that there were good reasons
why the court should extend the boundaries of judicial review to embrace decisions as to
the exercise of diplomacy where fundamental rights of British subjects were threatened in a
foreign country. Public international law governed relations between states. It could not be
expected to be in the van in imposing duties on individual States to protect their own
subjects against violation of their human rights. There was, however, a growing recognition
that international law could and should give rise to individual rights. This country should
take the lead in recognising that the government owed a duty to British citizens to take
appropriate steps to protect them against violation of their fundamental human rights by
other countries.
Id.
153. Id. paras. 81-io6.
154. Id. para. 64 ("For these reasons we do not find it possible to approach this claim for judicial
review other than on the basis that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles recognised by
both jurisdictions and by international law, Mr Abbasi is at present arbitrarily detained in a 'legal
black-hole."').
155. Id. para. 66 ("What appears to us to be objectionable is that Mr Abbasi should be subject to
indefinite detention in territory over which the United States has exclusive control with no
opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of his detention before any court or tribunal.").
156. This concern is readily understandable when one considers Britain's record of indefinite
detention, especially in the context of Northern Ireland. For instance, it once proceeded to large-scale
detentions of members of the Irish Republican Army when the actual instigators and perpetrators of
the terrorist violence under scrutiny belonged to factions of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.
For more details on this account, see Bonner, supra note 5o, at 174-75.
157. It should be noted, however, that the Court in Abbasi ultimately rejected the claimants'
application for relief. In doing so, it deferred to the American judiciary, especially in light of Rasul v.
Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55,68 (D.D.C. 2002) (since reversed, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)), and declared that the
United Kingdom's commitment to human rights is aligned with that of the United States.
The position of detainees at Guantanamo Bay is to be considered further by the appellate
courts in the United States. It may be that the anxiety that we have expressed will be drawn
to their attention. We wish to make it clear that we are only expressing an anxiety that we
believe was felt by the court in Rasul. As is clear from our judgment, we believe that the
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and the civil rights paradigm. 58 For example, some scholars expound
that, since the Geneva Conventions are non-self-executing treaties, "the
President has the sole executive authority to interpret and apply the
Geneva Conventions on behalf of the nation." ' 9 This rationale also
guided part of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Hamdi: 6° it was argued that
the benefits of Article 5 of Convention III, which create a presumption of
POW status until a competent tribunal has pronounced on the issue,
should flow to Guantanamo detainees. The court rejected the argument,
judging that Convention III was not self-executing and, impliedly, no
private right of action could accrue to Hamdi.'
6
'
As a direct consequence of the tension between human rights and
civil rights, the United States does not attribute protection to human
rights standards, which it tends to see as international treaty-derived
rights. 62 Instead, the executive favors civil liberties under the U.S.
Constitution rather than recognizing human rights. However, one caveat
seems apposite here: these constitutional protections apply differently to
non-citizen suspects inside the territory, as opposed to U.S. citizens
United States courts have the same respect for human rights as our own.
Abbasi, para. io7-iii.
158. On the reluctance of the U.S. in implementing and promoting human rights through
multilateral instruments, and on human rights culture in the U.S., generally, see Harold Hongju Koh,
A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21St Century, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293 (2oo2); Catherine
Powell, United States Human Rights Policy in the 21st Century in an Age of Multilateralism, 46 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 421 (2002).
159. John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NoTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1183, 1227 (2004); see also
John Yoo, Politics as Laws?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty
Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (200I); John Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of
Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002). Other commentators have sharply criticized this view, judging
that the President is bound by the Geneva Conventions and that, given the breadth of Congress'
Article I powers, he lacks constitutional authority to breach such treaties. See generally Derek Jinks &
David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions? 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004).
I6o. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3 d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004).
161. Id. at 468-70.
162. Consequently, it is not unusual for an international treaty, such as the Covenant, supra note
43, to be ratified by the U.S. but deemed not self-executing. For an application of this principle, see
Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2001). It follows that a considerable tension
between promoting human rights and maintaining national security often permeates legal and political
discourse.
Since the birth of the human rights movement in the mid-twentieth century, the promotion
of human rights has been seen as competing with or even compromising core issues of
national security. Promoting human rights has long been viewed as a luxury, to be pursued
when the government has spare diplomatic capacity and national security is not being
jeopardized. In the words of a former member of Congress, there is a deeply held belief
within the U.S. government that "there will always be a tension between our foreign policy
as classically defined in terms of the United States' economic, political, and strategic
interests and our human rights interests."
See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation, 17
HARVARD HUM. RTs. J. 249, 251 (2004).
[Vol. 56:8oi
May 2005] INDEFINITE DETENTION & TARGETED KILLING 837
inside the territory.' Moreover, the D.C. Circuit in Al Odah confirmed
that the U.S. Constitution does not apply to the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay.'64 It is fair to say that the due process commitment to
aliens within U.S. territory is significantly different than the protection
afforded to any individual under the human rights system, which tends to
lean toward robustness 65 and sustainability of rights. Although some
American courts have been sympathetic to the situation of Guantanamo
detainees,' 66 whether in reviewing the length of the detention itself or in
163. For a thoughtful review of these issues, see David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the
Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367 (2003). One can invoke the case
of United States v. McVeigh, 955 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Colo. 1997), where a non-alien terrorist was
afforded all of the guarantees provided for in the Constitution. In that case, it is doubtful whether the
court would have been as expedient in denying access to the press because such a permission would
not play a positive role for the public, as it did in N.J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 218
(3d Cir. zoo2). For a thoughtful review of the current administration's tendency to exclude the media
from proceedings pertaining to the war on terror, see John F. Stacks, Watchdogs on a Leash: Closing
Doors on the Media, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 237-55
(Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., Public Affairs 2003).
On a related topic, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), a pre-9/I I case, confirms that there is
a distinction between aliens within the U.S. and aliens outside the U.S., and that the level of protection
accorded in each case will depend on the circumstances. It is no secret that different legal and
constitutional treatments are afforded illegal aliens within the U.S., as opposed to the constitutional
safeguards afforded American citizens and legitimate aliens within the territory. Based on that
rationale, it inevitably follows that the margin of intelligence-gathering operation will be wider when
detaining illegal aliens within the U.S.
There are potentially effective measures for gathering information that may be critical to
prevention or punishment which we, nonetheless, would regard as improper to apply to
U.S. citizens and to others legitimately in the United States. We have, and will maintain,
strict limits on interrogation, protective requirements for searches or electronic surveillance,
and strong protections against any seizure of an individual without probable cause and any
subsequent detention that goes beyond a very limited period of minutes.
Heymann, supra note 3 1, at 453.
164. After stating that the detainees under review were not to be designated as "enemy aliens," the
D.C. Circuit concluded that they were not entitled to due process, hinging its reasoning on the fact that
the prisoners were in an Eisentrager-like situation. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-43
(D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see also supra notes 120-21 and
accompanying text. Some scholars have rejected this reasoning, stating that Guantanamo detainees are
not automatically stripped of procedural guarantees because the Guantanamo naval base extends
beyond U.S. sovereignty. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1479, 1510 (2003). On the non-application of the U.S. Constitution to Guantanamo Bay
detainees, see Akash R. Desai, How We Should Think About the Constitutional Status of the Suspected
Terrorist Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Examining Theories that Interpret the Constitution's Scope, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1579 (2003).
165. See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 99, at 374 ("In fact, careful analysis of the text, structure and
history of the Geneva Conventions demonstrates that the Conventions provide a robust rights regime
for all war detainees.").
166. Some U.S. courts have been sympathetic to the situation of foreign detainees post-9/II. For
instance, we can probably explain the outcome in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.
2002), being opposite from the outcome in N.J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 3o8 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002), by recognizing that the court embraced a model closer to the human rights paradigm. In fact, it
appeared sensitive to the situation of the detainees but was left with limited constitutional language to
express its sympathy. Instead, it elected to indirectly protect the remaining rights of the aliens before
it, namely by upholding the right of free press.
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addressing ancillary concerns, such as access to counsel, the general
tendency in the United States has been to defer to the executive. For
example, after declaring that "the prospect of the Guantanamo captives
being detained indefinitely without access to counsel, without formal
notice of charges, and without trial is deeply troubling," ' 67 the court in
Gherebi v. Bush '6' specified that it was bound by the Eisentrager decision
and a philosophically adjacent line of cases.'" Therefore, like other U.S.
judicial decisions, it refrained from interfering with the executive's policy
of indefinite and incommunicado detention.
4. The Importance of POW Status and Taliban Detainees
a. The U.S. Position on POW Status
In assessing the legal situation of Guantanamo Bay detainees, the
United States denies POW status to members of the Taliban because
they didn't wear distinctive signs and make them visible so as to
distinguish themselves from civilians, and because they failed to comply
with the laws of war.' 70 At the outset, this posture seems somewhat
reminiscent of certain positions or mentalities espoused following the
adoption of the Additional Protocol: in that context, some commentators
expounded that the Additional Protocol would actually serve rather than
impede international terrorism,' 7' while other scholars sharply criticized
this view.72  Influential voices within the Reagan administration
167. Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d lO64, io66 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The court further expressed:
"Putting aside whether these captives have a right to be heard in a federal civilian court-indeed,
especially because it appears they have no such right -this lengthy delay is not consistent with some of
the most basic values our legal system has long embodied." Id. at 1073.
168. It should be recalled that, in this case, the brother of a non-U.S. citizen detained
incommunicado at Guantanamo Bay filed a petition of habeas corpus before the court. The court
ultimately declined the petition, judging that it lacked jurisdiction to intervene in military custody
outside U.S. territory. The Ninth Circuit later reversed the dismissal, Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727
(9th Cir. 2004), and remanded the decision to the District Court of the District of Columbia, which
determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition. Gherebi v. Bush, 338 F. Supp. 2d 91
(D.D.C. 2004).
169. See supra note 94, at io66-69.
170. See White House Fact Sheet, supra note Is ("The Taliban have not effectively distinguished
themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not conducted their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Instead, they have knowingly adopted and
provided support to the unlawful terrorist objectives of al Qaeda.").
171. See, e.g., Douglas J. Feith, Law in the Service of Terror- The Strange Case of the Additional
Protocol, THE NAT'L INT. 36 (Fall 1985); Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case
Against Ratification of Additional Protocol 1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. IO9 (1985); Abraham D. Sofaer,
Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 901 (1986); William Safire, Rights for Terrorists? A 1977
Treaty Would Grant Them, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1984, at A3I. For a description of similar reasoning
under the Reagan administration vis-5-vis Article 1(4) of the Additional Protocol, see THOMAS
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGrIIMACY AMONG NATIONS 70-71 (1990).
172. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (199i) [hereinafter, Aldrich, Prospects for
Protocol f]; George H. Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms of
the 1977 Geneva Protocol 1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 693 (1986); Hans-Peter Gasser, An Appeal for
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articulated concerns that the Additional Protocol would "let too many
terrorists slip through the net", expounding that making "killing,
hostage-taking, or hijacking acceptable when done for a 'good' cause
would send the international rule system down a slippery slope. The rules
would lose their determinacy. Every criminal could justify resort[ing] to
violence by claiming political, economic, or social grievances."'73
Furthermore, the Additional Protocol recognizes some situations where
the nature of the hostilities make it impossible for combatants to clearly
distinguish themselves.'74 Nevertheless, such individuals are entitled to
privileged combatant status, as long as they carry their arms openly
during each military engagement.'75 This rationale would certainly extend
to a majority of insurgents in the current Iraqi conflict and, possibly, to
some suspected Al Qaeda members. It is not surprising that the
"extension of humanitarian protection to guerillas was among the
reasons cited by the United States Government in refusing to ratify the
Protocol.",
6
Regardless of these two schools of thought, it must be reiterated that
Article 4 .A(2) of Convention III clearly sets out 4 distinct requirements
that must be fulfilled by members of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, in
order to attract POW status. In short, such individuals must be: i)
"commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;" ii) "having a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;" iii) "carrying arms
openly;" and iv) "conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war."' 77 The fact that the U.S. administration has
single-handedly characterized all Taliban detainees as not entitled to
Ratification by the United States, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1987): Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to
Douglas J. Feith's Law in the Service of Terror- The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 20
AKRON L. REV. 261 (1986).
173. FRANCK, supra note 171, at 71. Franck takes issue with this reasoning, invoking once again a
double standard in U.S. foreign policy. "The trouble with this analysis is that it is not borne out by
reality. The Reagan administration, itself, felt little pull to comply with its own clear rules against aid
to irregular combatants in such places as Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Angola." Id.
174. Article 44(3) states:
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities,
combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing,
however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a
combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: (a) During each
military engagement, and (b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to
participate. Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be
considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1(c).
Additional Protocol, supra note 38.
175. Id.; see also FRANCK, supra note 504, at 281.
176. FRANCK, supra note 104, at 281.
177. Convention III, supra note i i, art. 4.A(2).
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POW status, with absolutely no margin for interpretation, is difficult to
countenance. 78 Accordingly, two aspects of this legal characterization,
which has been labeled "cryptic" by some,'79 seem troubling.
b. Difficulties with the U.S. Position
A first and obvious concern lies in the actual interpretation and
application of Article 4.A(2) of Convention III, which clearly requires
four distinct elements to be analyzed thoroughly. It is unclear from the
White House Fact Sheet' s how the United States proceeded to strip
Taliban detainees of POW status and why, exactly, it decided to hinge its
legal characterization solely on two of the four requirements. No
accompanying rationale for this selective application of Article 4.A(2)
was offered.' As mentioned previously, the public record establishes
that the Taliban government, at best, provided logistical support to the
Al Qaeda network.Is Although morally reprehensible, this posture is
insufficient in and of itself to infer that the Taliban has failed to conduct
its operations in accordance with the laws of war. More importantly, it
does not support the legal imposition of a blanket denial of POW status
to all captured Taliban individuals. It follows that "[a] nation that assists
an aggressor thereby commits a wrong, but its armed forces should not,
as a consequence, lose their entitlement, if captured, to POW status."' '8
In addition, to assert that Taliban members did not arbor distinctive
insignia so as to distinguish themselves from civilians -when a case could
be made that their beards, black turbans, and clothes satisfy this
requirement' -unnecessarily engages the legal community in a fruitless
178. For example, Aldrich says:
Without a doubt, the most difficult element to defend of the decisions made by President
Bush in February with respect to the status of prisoners taken in Afghanistan is the blanket
nature of the decision to deny POW status to the Taliban prisoners. By one sweeping
determination, the president ruled that not a single Taliban soldier, presumably not even
the army commander, could qualify for POW status under the Geneva Convention. While
armed forces in the past doubtless made some decisions related to army units or other
groups as a whole, one cannot help but question the all-encompassing nature of this one.
Can it possibly exclude any doubt? Moreover, can it legitimately preclude any contest by an
individual prisoner?
Aldrich, supra note too, at 897.
179. Id. at 894.
18o. Supra note ii.
I81. Aldrich states:
I would suggest that a necessary first step would be for the United States to make public
both the basis and the reason for denying POW status to all Taliban prisoners, not simply
by asserting that the Taliban armed forces neither distinguished themselves adequately
from the civilian population nor conducted their military operations in accordance with the
laws of war, but by documenting such assertions and accompanying this evidence with a
convincing explanation of the gravity of these matters and some elaboration of the
evidently felt need to deprive them of POW status.
Aldrich, supra note too, at 896.
182. See also Proulx, supra note 8, at nn.113, 238, and accompanying text.
183. Aldrich, supra note Ioo, at 895.
184. For example, Aldrich also says:
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debate, 5' especially in light of the surrounding circumstances which
plausibly command the extension of POW status to Taliban detainees.'
86
Furthermore, the argument that the Taliban did not conduct its
operations in accordance with the laws of war should be discredited on
two grounds. On one hand, when faced with members of a party to the
conflict, making combatant immunity or POW status unconditionally
dependent on the observance of the rules contained at Article 4.A(2)
could seriously hinder or endanger armed forces of that party. On the
other hand, sustaining such a claim in the present context would signal
that we are, in fact, oblivious or willfully blind to several historical
accounts where the laws of war were not completely followed by
legitimate armed forces.'8
A second and more intractable legal aspect of U.S. policy lies in its
decision to invoke Article 4.A(2) of Convention III vis-A-vis Taliban
detainees. Although it is evident that some Al Qaeda terrorists would
not attract POW status when duly subjected to the legal test of Article
4.A(2),' 8' applying the same provision to Taliban detainees is not equally
While I certainly do not know whether or not some or all of the members of the Taliban's
armed forces were distinguishable from civilians, either by wearing black turbans or by
some other visible sign, it seems insufficient for the United States merely to assert an
absence of distinction without adducing evidence, and it appears most unlikely in any event
that all units of the Taliban's armed forces were indistinguishable from civilians.
Id.
185. The resolution of this debate would undoubtedly turn on the degree of visibility required by
international law, namely to what extent did Taliban members make their distinctive insignia visible to
the enemy. Ultimately, the solution would also hinge on the question of intent, namely to what degree
did Taliban members intend on differentiating themselves from the civilian population. This is
certainly a complex issue and involves careful and thorough consideration of various elements. For a
thoughtful account of the issues involved in this debate in the context of Operation Enduring
Freedom, including vis-A-vis U.S. and coalition special forces, see W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear
of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 Cs. J. INT'L L. 493 (2003).
186. A certain consensus has emerged that Taliban members would likely be entitled to POW
status following hearings on the issue. See, e.g., John Mintz, On Detainees, U.S. Faces Legal Quandary,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A22.
187. For support of both propositions:
There are good reasons to view the Taliban as belonging to the latter category. Requiring
from regular armed forces respect of the laws of war as a precondition to obtaining
combatant and prisoner of war status could endanger such forces. In all armed conflicts, the
enemy is accused of not complying with IHL, and such accusations are all too often
accurate. If accusations of IHL violations by regular armed forces were permitted to
deprive all their members of their prisoner of war status, independently of whether the
individual member to be classified complied with the laws of war, prisoner of war status
could frequently have little or no protective effect. Historically, the United States never
invoked such an argument concerning the German Wehrmacht, which cannot be claimed to
have regularly complied with the laws of war.
Marco Sassbli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22 LAW & INEQ. 195, 204-
05 (2004) [hereinafter Sassbli, Use and Abuse]; see also Marco Sassbli, The Status of Persons Held in
Guantanamo Under International Humanitarian Law, 2 J. INr'L CRIM. JUST. 96, I00-02 (2004).
188. It is important to note that the Bush Administration eluded the question whether some Al
Qaeda members were actually fighting alongside the Taliban army. Scan D. Murphy, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in
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conclusive. In fact, a different provision altogether should have driven
the legal characterization of Taliban detainees, as they simply do not
amount to "other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements"'" Although the
United States and the U.N. Security Council did not recognize the
Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan on several
occasions,'" it still remained the de facto governing entity throughout
most of the country.'9I In addition, Afghanistan being a party to the
conflict at hand and a contracting party to the Geneva Conventions, the
fact that the United States did not recognize the Taliban as a legitimate
government in no way relieved it from the legal implications of its
adherence to international humanitarian law.'92 Afghanistan, through the
Afghanistan As POWs, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 478 (2002) ("The White House statement did not
provide details about whether there were any Al Qaeda forces that were integrated into the regular
Taliban army that should also be regarded as covered by the Third Geneva Convention.").
189. Convention III, supra note I I.
19o. See, e.g., the following UN Security Council Resolutions: S/RES/1193 of 28 August 1998,
S/RES/1214 of 8 December 1998, S/RES/1I267 of 15 Oct. 1999, S/RES/1333 of 19 December 2000, and
S/RES/1363 of 30 July 2001.
191. For support of this proposition:
As the leaders of Al Qaeda and a large part of its membership and facilities were located
within the territory of Afghanistan, the Taliban, who controlled all but a small part of that
country and were consequently its effective government, were requested to assist in this
effort. The Taliban refused to do so and made clear that they would continue to give
sanctuary to Al Qaeda .... The Taliban, as the effective government of Afghanistan,
refused all requests to expel Al Qaeda and instead gave it sanctuary.
Aldrich, supra note ioo, at 891-93. Davis Brown also supports this proposition:
[I]t must first be understood that despite the international community's non-recognition of
the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, the Taliban was from 1995 to late
2001 the de facto government of that state. Any act, therefore, of the Taliban regime during
that period was properly considered in international law to be an act of the Afghan state,
making Afghanistan responsible for the Taliban's actions.
David Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September itnh: State Responsibility, Self-Defense
and Other Responses, I1 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. I, 6 (2003); see also RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT
TERROR WAR 101 (2003); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal
Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 999 (2001); Christopher Greenwood,
International Law and the "'War Against Terrorism," 78 INT'L AFF. 301, 314 (2002); supra text
accompanying notes 13 and 115. But see John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA.
J. INT'L L. 207, 218-20 (2003). Others conclude that the resistance underlying the refusal to recognize
the Taliban as a legitimate government pertained more to a profound disdain vis-A-vis the Taliban's
oppressive reign rather than a manifestation of doubtful concerns about who actually controlled the
Afghan territory. See, e.g., Lawrence Azubuike, Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers: Another
Viewpoint, I9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 131-34 (2003). It is no secret that the U.S. has, in the past, utilized
the non-recognition of foreign governments as a means to denounce non-democratic or repressive
regimes in international fora.
192. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 429 (1991); PETER
MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-88 (7th ed. 1997). This
statement is also consistent with Judge Taft's arbitral decision in the Tinoco Arbitration (G.B. v. Costa
Rica), I R.I.A.A. 375 (1923). For a thoughtful review of the concept of recognition in international law
generally, see Robert D. Sloane, The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case
Study of Tibet 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 107, 107-29 (2002). Some scholars argue that Afghanistan was
no longer a functioning state at the time of the invasion and that the non-recognition of the Taliban
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vehicle of its de facto government, was legally bound to uphold the
protective scheme of the Geneva Conventions and to refrain from using
force against other states.93
In this light, it becomes apparent that the situation of Taliban
members should have been analyzed through the lens of another
provision, possibly as "Members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict, as well as members or volunteer corps forming part of such
armed forces".'94 Although there has been some controversy over the
scope of this provision,'95 Taliban members would likely surmount its
threshold, as they constituted the controlling socio-political entity
throughout most of Afghanistan and, consequently, would be assimilated
to the armed forces of a party to the conflict. 96Based on the foregoing
considerations, it would have been justified to afford Taliban detainees
POW status for the purpose of safeguarding Geneva law alone:
"Certainly, the protections of the Convention would be eroded if it were
accepted that the armed forces of a government in effective control of a
state's territory need not be accorded those protections by another state
regime by the U.S. actually permitted it to subtract Guantanamo detainees from the protection of
Convention III. In sum, this view posits that Afghanistan was no longer a contracting party to
Convention III. This was one of the positions espoused in the controversial and incendiary Yoo-
Delahunty memo, which was subsequently endorsed by the Bush administration in laying out its policy
on Guantanamo detainees. See Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to William J. Haynes II,
General Counsel, Department of Defense (Jan. 9, 2002).
193. See Brown, supra note 191, at 6 ("The non-recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate
government of Afghanistan had no effect on the duty of the Taliban regime to fulfill the obligations of
the state of Afghanistan").
194. Convention HI, supra note II, art. 4.A(I). For support of this proposition, see Aldrich, supra
note ioo, at 894-96; Leah E. Kraft, The Judiciary's Opportunity to Protect International Human Rights:
Applying the U.S. Constitution Extraterritorially, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 1073, 1076-77 (2004); Roberts,
supra note i 19, at 742; Vierucci, supra note 98, at 291. However, the Bush Administration obviously
rejected this characterization. See No POW Rights for Cuba Prisoners, BBC NEws ONLINE, Jan. 27,
2002, at http:l/news.bbc.co.uk/i/hi/worldlamericas/I 784700.stm (Oct. 24, 2004).
195. A first reading of Article 4.A(I) of Convention III reveals that the four criteria found at
Article 4.A(2) might be "implicitly embedded" in the text of Article 4.A(I). A second reading of the
same provision rather suggests that the four criteria found at Article 4.A(2) are immaterial in
surmounting the threshold of protection found at Article 4.A(I). See Jinks, supra note 99, at 372 n.24.
Other scholars expound that the four requirements found at Article 4.A(2) should inherently apply to
a state's regular armed forces. See, e.g., ALLAN RoSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 328
(i976); W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants Under
the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 39, 44-48 (1977);
Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328, 335 (2002);
cf Michael J. Matheson, U.S. Military Commissions: One of Several Options. 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 354,
355 (2002) (inferring that the four requirements do not apply to regular state armed forces).
196. See George H. Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 764, 768-69 (i981)
(stating that only certain "irregular" forces, or guerrilla factions, would be subject to the discipline of
Article 4.A(2), while regular and uniformed military forces would be entitled to combatant immunity);
see also Goldman, supra note 103, under heading "The Right to Be a Prisoner of War" ("This article
effectively holds members of independent irregular groups to higher standards than those required of
members of regular armed forces.").
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that declines to recognize that government's legitimacy."'"
Even though its requirements have been characterized by some as
"unworkable conditions",' 98 the discussion surrounding the application of
Article 4.A(2) is somewhat academic at this juncture. Affording Taliban
detainees, suspected Al Qaeda members, and Iraqi insurgents POW
status would yield little or no impact on the United States' ability to
prosecute such individuals subsequently for war crimes. Terrorism, in all
its shapes and forms, ostensibly extends beyond the scope of
humanitarian protection and may be prosecuted. Yet, widespread
concerns that terrorists may find refuge in multilateral instruments have
acquired credence in certain political circles. This line of argument has
been advanced before in the context of the possible ratification of the
Additional Protocol by the United States, especially vis-A-vis Articles
I (4)'" and 44 . "0 As one commentator notes, it is inaccurate, and possibly
erroneous, to maintain that terrorists can seek shelter from punishment
under the auspices of international humanitarian law:
Finally, it should be obvious that neither the provisions of Article i,
paragraph 4, nor those of Article 44, nor those of the two in
combination provide any solace or support for terrorists. Failure by
combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population
throughout their military operations is a punishable offense. Terrorist
acts are all punishable crimes, including attacks on civilians, the taking
of hostages, and disguised, perfidious attacks on military personnel,
whether committed by combatants or by noncombatants, and whether
the perpetrator is entitled to POW status or not. Assertions that
ratification of Protocol I would give aid to, or enhance the status of,
the PLO or of any terrorist group are totally unfounded. That such
assertions should have been made by a President of the United States
and those who advised him is regrettable."'
Granting suspected terrorists fundamental human rights and due
process guarantees does not, in any way, afford them the benefits of
impunity in targeting, murdering, or kidnapping civilians. Warranted
prosecution for egregious violations of the laws of war will ensue,
regardless of the perpetrator's status under the scheme of jus in bello.
c. Presumptive POW Status
The case for affording POW status to Taliban detainees becomes
particularly compelling when one considers Article 5(2) of Convention
111.2"2 The relevance and importance of this provision cannot be over-
emphasized, as it clearly creates a presumption of POW status and must
197. Aldrich, supra note too, at 895.
198. Aldrich, Prospects for Protocol !, supra note 172, at IO.
199. See supra notes 171-72.
200. See supra note 174.
2o. Aldrich, Prospects for Protocol 1, supra note 172, at io.
202. For the text of the provision, see supra note 98.
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be constructed accordingly. 3 In short, when combatants are captured
during hostilities under somewhat nebulous circumstances, or when their
legal status remains undetermined, they are entitled to a presumption of
POW status until otherwise held by a competent tribunal."a Under this
regime, whenever an individual is caught in the line of fire during
wartime, and the surrounding events cast a doubt as to whether this
person is legitimately fighting under the aegis of a party to the conflict,
the assumption is that this individual is entitled to the protections
generally afforded POWs, a protection that is triggered automatically by
the application of international humanitarian law. It is interesting to note
that this legal device is also mirrored in the U.S. Field Manual,'
according to which the mere claim of entitlement to POW status by a
prisoner sets in motion the presumption of Article 5(2)6 However, the
United States has remained adamant that the situation of Al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees does not warrant further examination, as their legal
status raises no doubts.2"7
This presumptive provision is essential in upholding the credibility
and legitimacy of the underlying tenets of jus in bello. Moreover, it also
militates in favor of a sharp distinction between "protected persons" and
POWs, at least in terms of semantics and philosophy, °8 thereby rejecting
203. See supra note 98.
204. Some commentators infer from Article 5(2) of Convention III that an individual who raises
doubt as to his legal status, "is not a prisoner of war in the interim, but he is to be treated as if he
were." G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerilla Warfare, i9"/ BRrr.
Y.B. ITrr'L L. 198. For a review of the legal issues pertaining to the use of military commissions in
wartime, see CURTIS BRADLEY & JACK GOLDSMITH, FEDERAL RELATIONS LAW 225-46 (2003). On the
historical treatment of detainees during wartime, including the use of military commissions, see
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 17. For a comparative study of checks and balances during wartime,
see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli Experiences,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (2004).
205. Article 71.a of the U.S. Field Manual, supra note 128, mirrors Article 5 of Convention III,
supra note I I, which reads as follows:
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time
they fall into power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation. Should any
doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into
the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status
has been determined by a competent tribunal.
206. U.S. Field Manual, supra note 128, Article 71.b reads:
The foregoing provision applies to any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner-of-
war status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in aid of
the armed forces and who asserts that he is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war or
concerning whom any other doubt of a like nature exists.
Pursuant to Article 73 of the U.S. Field Manual if a prisoner does not fall within any of the POW
categories found under Article 4 of Convention III then that prisoner is entitled to "protected person"
status.
207. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.'s, Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A6.
208. Contrast with COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 4-5 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958), which suggests that the legal regime applicable
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the theory of protective parity advocated by certain scholars.2" In other
words, Convention III has a built-in mechanism for sorting out POWs
from protected persons, another facet of customary international law
expressly transposed in U.S. military law."' When analyzed through the
lens of the current war on terror, the distinction between POWs and
"protected persons"' remains the linchpin of international humanitarian
law and animates the legal debate pertaining to Article 5 of Convention
III. In fact, in its ruling of March 12, 2002, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights cautioned the United States to re-align its
policy with the objectives of Article 5 and implored it to "take the urgent
measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal"....
Article 45 of the Additional Protocol, also creates a presumption of
POW status.2 While some scholars argue that this provision now reflects
customary international law,213 it essentially compels signatories of the
Additional Protocol to afford Taliban detainees POW status until a
competent tribunal can pronounce on their legal status. 4
The argument for initial presumptive POW status is particularly
to "protected persons" is essentially similar to the protection afforded POWs. However, we must
remember that modern warfare and the reality of terrorism also shape international law. Now more
than ever, we require a clear and principled system of distinction between lawful combatants and the
remainder of the belligerent population. Any other arrangement would have deleterious consequences
on the laws of war. Most importantly, it would, in certain circumstances, place lawful combatants and
terrorists on an equal footing for the purposes of establishing the legality of particular hostilities. As
Lord Denning declared in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, i Q.B. 529, 554 (I977)
(CA), international law is anything from static. Courts must recognize its propensity to evolve and to
adapt to current realities. See also Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse, i Q.B. 629, 721 (i98o)
(CA).
209. See Jinks, supra note 99; see also Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2004).
21o. Article 6o of the U.S. Field Manual, supra note 128, also adopts the traditional classification of
combatants in wartime, namely by recognizing the two categories of persons found in human rights
discourse: POWs and "protected persons."
2HI. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-Pertinent Parts of Decision on
Request for Precautionary Measures, Mar. 12, 2002, available at http://www.photius.com/
rogue-nations/guantanamo.html.
212. Article 45 of Protocol 1, supra note 38, reads as follows:
A person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be
presumed to be a prisoner of war, and therefore shall be protected by the Third
Convention, if he claims the status of prisoner of war, or if he appears to be entitled to such
status, or if the Party on which he depends claims such status on his behalf by notification to
the detaining Power or to the Protecting Power. Should any doubt arise as to whether any
such person is entitled to the status of prisoner of war, he shall continue to have such status
and, therefore, to be protected by the Third Convention and this Protocol until such time as
his status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
213. Aldrich, supra note ioo, at 898.
214. Id. ("I should point out that, when the armed forces of countries that are parties to the
Geneva Protocol capture Taliban soldiers, they will obviously be required by Article 45, paragraph i
to give them POW status until a tribunal decides otherwise.").
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poignant when one reads Article 71 of the U.S. Field Manual,"5 which
also mirrors the application of presumptive POW status until a
competent tribunal has pronounced on the issue. In fact, the mere claim
by a prisoner that he or she is entitled to POW status is sufficient to
trigger the application of presumptive POW status.'Y6 In addition, it
should be noted that the United States' refusal to grant POW status to
Taliban detainees might considerably impede multilateral law
enforcement cooperation."7 For example, even though history has long
recognized that countries may transfer POWs to neutral or co-belligerent
states,"' foreign states might be reluctant to turn over captured Al Qaeda
or Taliban members to the United States in light of its policy on POW
status.219
In the context of the modern war on terror, it becomes apparent that
the rule embodied in Article 5 of Convention III should become a point
of reference or a sort of minimal threshold, as the situations on the
ground abroad become increasingly convoluted in light of the
participation of insurgents and politically or religiously-driven resistance
movements. The line of demarcation between POWs and "protected
persons" is not always limpid and, when considering the Afghan
experience, for example, where northern rebel groups, terrorists,
civilians, and military personnel converged into one battleground, the
categorical distinction between two classes of combatants becomes
somewhat elusive at first sight. To resolve this discrepancy and to
prevent the ever-so-important line of demarcation from fading
completely, it is imperative to allow Article 5 to regulate these
situations.22 °
215. For the full text of the provision, see supra notes 205-06.
216. See supra note 206.
217. Reference Article 12 of Convention I11, supra note I I:
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a
party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness
and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are
transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention
rests on the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.
218. WILLIAM E.S. FLORY, PRISONERS OF WAR: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 44-45 (1942).
219. See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 99, at 371 n.15.
Because international cooperation is crucial to the effectiveness of U.S. antiterrorism
policies, transnational disagreements about the treatment of detainees assume enormous
importance. Routine aspects of transnational law enforcement have been complicated by
the controversy. For example, some states are reluctant to extradite suspected Al Qaeda (or
Taliban) fighters to the United States without assurances that they will not be held at
Guantanamo.
Id.
22o. Goldman references this under heading "How the Law Applies in Iraq":
In light of the array of tactics employed by combatants on the Iraqi side, confusion will
inevitably surround the precise legal status of many Iraqi and foreign combatants captured
by U.S. and other Coalition forces. Because denial of POW status entails potentially serious
consequences for combatants, such determinations must strictly comply with the dictates of
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In sum, states forming part of the U.S.-led coalition should approach
this legal issue with considerable caution and restraint, while enabling
Article 5 of Convention III to fulfill its intended purpose. From the
perspective of international law and order, generally, the automatic
application of Article 5 in doubtful cases, such as the situation of Taliban
detainees, would constitute a welcomed alternative to the naked and
blind pursuit of unilateral legal policies. In fact, implementing a policy of
indefinite detention and flat-out denial of POW status to detainees not
only endangers U.S. military officials stationed across the globe but also
significantly hinders the United States' capability to form reliable
alliances."'
d. Problems Pertaining to Double Standards, Legitimacy, and
Unilateralism
The issue of unilateralism2. is a crucial one in understanding the
present debate over POW status. The current administration has
certainly been under trenchant criticism for curtailing fundamental
freedoms in an unprecedented fashion. 23 The United States has in fact
imposed severe restrictions on civil liberties within its own borders. Even
before 9/11, the executive asserted its intent to disregard multilateral
initiatives as a means to promote and vindicate U.S. interests. 4 In fact, it
the Third Convention. In this regard, Article 5 of that treaty creates a presumption that a
captured combatant is a POW unless a competent tribunal determines otherwise on an
individual basis. During the 1992 Gulf War and the Vietnam conflict the U.S. convened
such tribunals to verify the status of detainees, something that the U.S. did not do-and for
which it was justifiably criticized both at home and abroad-in denying POW status to all
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in the Afghan conflict.
Goldman, supra note 103. It should also be noted that "[iun early July 2003, the Bush Administration
designated six of the Guantanamo detainees as eligible to be tried before military commissions." Note
on Detention of Enemy Combatants After September iith, in CURTIS BRADLEY & JACK GOLDSMrIH,
FEDERAL RELATIONS LAW (Supp. 2003); see also Neil A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: The Tribunals;
Six Detainees Soon May Face Military Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2003, at As.
221. See, e.g., Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 13, at 9o ("The United States also has an interest in not
alienating its battlefield allies through high-handed, unilateralist decision-making and selective
compliance with international law. If the rules of war can be capriciously suspended at any time, our
ability to form solid and lasting alliances will be seriously undermined.").
222. For a thoughtful account on American exceptionalism, especially in the context of post 9/11
policies, see Koh, supra note 164.
223. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at Io.
The national security measures adopted since September I I avoid many of the civil liberties
restrictions imposed in earlier emergencies. In several respects, however, the September i I
initiatives compromise important freedoms in ways that previous presidents never
attempted, even in the midst of formally declared wars. And important changes in the law
have been adopted by the Department of Justice unilaterally, without public input or
congressional approval. Open discussion of the wisdom and legality of new limitations on
liberty, considered normal in previous wartime situations, is long overdue now.
Id.
224. Richard A. Falk writes:
Again, before September I Ith, the Bush administration made it the signature of its foreign
policy that it would not accept this multilateral way of pursuing American interests in the
world. The Bush administration immediately began separating itself from the approach to
international problem-solving favored by its traditional allies, especially the countries of
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is probably fair to say that, over the past thirty years or so, the United
States has often shunned multilateral channels to pursue its own
interests.225 However, we must recall that the war on terror is a truly
global campaign, an exercise that can only be conducted successfully
through multilateral channels.22 6 It follows that "[t]he United States may
be the world's only superpower, but even a superpower cannot fight
terrorism alone. The increasingly transnational nature of terrorism
means that it can only be tackled transnationally, requiring the
cooperation of many states, all of whom jealously guard their national
sovereignty."2 '7 Even though the United States may be the world's sole
superpower, it still often repuires the support of other important states in
advancing its own agenda.2
The United States' stance on denying POW status to detainees
seems far removed from its original reaction to the attacks of 9/Ii, which
has been described as "rhetorically bellicose, but practically cautious1
22 9
in generating international support and legitimacy. In fact, its initial
reaction stemmed from the need to build a viable coalition and to
increase and foster multilateral cooperation in combating terrorism.3
When observed through this lens, it becomes clear that unilateral legal
policies have far-reaching effects at home and abroad. The rationale
behind the Uniked States' application of the Geneva Conventions may
garner approval in a domestic political setting, albeit sometimes through
Europe. And so this spirit and practice of unilateralism was being provocatively coupled
with this American position as preeminent power. Such an American posture troubled most
of the rest of the world.
Richard A. Falk, Rediscovering International Law After September iith, 16 TEMP. INT'L & CoM'. L.J.
359, 362 (2002).
225. See, e.g., Stephen Toope, Powerful but Unpersuasive? The Role of the United States in the
Evolution of Customary International Law, in UNrrED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 287, 291-96 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003).
226. Id. at 291-92; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A
Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 93-96 (2002); Jonathan F. Lenzner, From a
Pakistani Stationhouse to the Federal Courthouse: A Confession's Uncertain Journey in the U.S.-Led
War on Terror, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 297, 297-300 (2004); Proulx, supra note 8, at n.234,
246, 264, and accompanying text; see also Andreas Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of
International Law: Hegemony or Pluralism? 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 68i, 721 (2004) (expounding that "the
future of multilateralism may well depend on the realization by the U.S. government that truly
multilateral decision-making will be more successful in the long run than the ad hoc remedy of
'coalitions of the willing' that do not last longer than the willingness of the contributors."). National
judiciaries have also acknowledged that terrorism is a serious transnational problem, which spans over
numerous borders, and requires a concerted, unified response. See, for example, the Supreme Court of
Canada in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.R. i, 1 87-88.
227. Dov Waxman, Terrorism: The War of the Future, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 201, 205 (1999).
228. S. Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 35, 36 (1999).
229. Toope, supra note 225, at 291-92. Similar comments may be applied to the early stages of the
Iraq crisis. See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 226, at 719 ("The Iraq example shows that even the United
States favored, at first, the exploration of multilateral avenues.").
230. See, e.g., Patrick E. Tyler & Jane Perlez, World Leaders List Conditions on Cooperation, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at At.
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partisan manifestations of support, but it remains untenable in the
international arena where ideologically opposed states must coexist, and
the sanctity of human rights protection must be, to the extent possible,
upheld in the interests of peace. In fact, there exists a symbiotic
relationship between democracy, human rights, and peace.2" For that
reason, international human rights law dictates that the status of
prisoners-such as Taliban detainees-must be ascertained through a
judicial mechanism rather than by a unilateral presidential
characterization. 3 It is interesting to note that, historically, American
courts have addressed threats analogous to terrorism through a
"democratic deliberation-reinforcing approach," '33 according to which
"the constitutionality of executive action turns on whether the Court
concludes there is sufficient congressional authorization for the executive
action in question." '234
More importantly, the policy of denying Taliban members POW
status not only undermines the objectives of the laws of war but also
significantly places the United States, and its allies, at risk. Even though
it is fair to state that the legal justification of this practice is flawed, we
must also recall that the United States has military personnel stationed
all over the world. By foregoing the application of POW protection to
the prisoners in its custody, the United States is in fact endangering its
own military corps and civilians, as they become increasingly more
vulnerable to attack.235 This problem, which is a thorny one, actually
231. For a thought-provoking discussion of these issues, see FRANCK, supra note IO4, at 136.
232. See, e.g., Mundis, supra note 84, at 325.
Article 5 of the Convention provides that persons captured during an international armed
conflict are entitled to the protections of the treaty even if their identity as POWs as defined
by Article 4 is in doubt, until a competent tribunal has determined their status. Thus, the
text of the treaty leads to the conclusion that a competent tribunal -and not the president
of the United States acting unilaterally-must determine whether or not anyone captured is
a lawful combatant.
Id. While invoking the American Constitution, certain commentators ask whether
Article I, Section 8, Clause 12, which vests Congress with the authority to "raise and
support Armies," and Clause 14, which vests it with power to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," might also be thought to confer
on Congress the power to promulgate prisoner of war policy.
John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, supra note 159, at 1202. Other scholars assert that, given the scope
of Congress' Article I powers, the President is not entitled to violate the Geneva Conventions on a
unilateral basis. See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 159.
233. Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L.
REV. 28,36 n.43 (2004).
234. Id. For a thoughtful review of this practice, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Emergency Contexts Without Emergency Powers: The United States' Constitutional Approach to Rights
During Wartime, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296 (2004).
235. To systematically deny POW status to prisoners also engenders deleterious consequences for
all prisoners captured in the global fight against terrorism. Ever since the inception of the Geneva
Conventions, commentators have expounded that foregoing POW status places prisoners "at the
power of the enemy." See, e.g., Richard R. Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies,
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 1951 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 328.
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hinges on a double standard.236 On one hand, the United States refuses to
grant POW status to Taliban members and prisoners who raise a doubt
as to their legal status. On the other hand, it is foreseeable that American
soldiers will be captured abroad. In fact, American citizens and soldiers
have already been captured and executed in Iraq.
It is fair to assume that the American executive will expect its own
nationals to be treated in accordance with fundamental principles of
humanitarian law. However, this position is hard to countenance when
the United States, itself, does not extend the logic of POW status vis-A-
vis detainees in its own custody. 37 In addition, there is something deeply
arrogant and perhaps even unsettling about the United States' posture
regarding the Geneva Conventions: one would be hard pressed to
demand exemplary POW treatment of captured Americans abroad when
the United States is treating Iraqi prisoners as criminals and, often worse,
stripping them of rudimentary human dignity.23 8 In light of the poor
treatment afforded Taliban detainees, it becomes paradoxical to fathom
deploying concerted efforts to ensure that American citizens captured in
Iraq or elsewhere receive POW prerogatives.239
236. See Becker, supra note l09, at 572.
Although this position is legally erroneous and demonstrates the Administration's lack of
sensitivity to the international rule of law, it is placing U.S. military personnel abroad in
danger, as we have troops in many parts of the world, and it is reasonable to assume that at
some time some of them may be captured. If the same treatment is applied to them, we
would be hard put to argue otherwise. Also, significantly, the double standard that we apply
to "us" and to "them" has been one of the main reasons why so many in the world oppose
our actions.
Id.
237. The administration apparently caught on to this reality and feared retaliation against its own
soldiers captured abroad. In what probably amounts to a political artifice, President Bush did indicate
that Taliban members might be afforded POW status, while Al Qaeda detainees would not benefit
from such protections. See, e.g., Mike Allen & John Mintz, Bush Makes Decision on Detainees: Geneva
Convention Applies to Afghan Taliban Fighters, Not al Qaeda, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 2002, at Ai; John
Mintz & Mike Allen, Bush Shifts Position on Detainees; Geneva Conventions to Cover Taliban, but not
al Qaeda, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at As; John Mintz, Debate Continues on Legal Status of Detainees,
WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at AIS. It must be noted, however, that these political statements were
induced by significant pressure from outside groups and influential voices within the executive.
238. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 147, at 12-13.
To declare that Americans can fight enemies with the latitude of warriors, but if the
enemies fight back they are not warriors but criminals, amounts to a kind of heads-I-win-
tails-you-lose international morality in which whatever it takes to reduce American risk, no
matter what the cost to others, turns out to be justified.
Id. For more accounts on the presence of double standards in U.S. foreign policy, see Jamie Fellner,
Double Standards, INTr'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 31, 2003; Amnesty International, United States of
America: The Threat of a Bad Example: Undermining International Standards as "War on Terror"
Detentions Continue (Aug. 19,2003).
239. See Roberts, supra note i 19, at 735.
U.S. attempts to protect the rights of its citizens abroad sometimes result in palpable double
standards. For example, the United States insisted that Iraq honour the Geneva
Conventions and complained that televised displays of captured American soldiers violated
the laws of war because states are not meant to parade or humiliate prisoners of war. Yet
the United States refused to apply the Geneva Conventions to the Guantanamo Bay
HA STINGS LA W JO URNA L
This reality is further exacerbated by the recent abuse and torture
scandals perpetrated by U.S. military officials at Abu Ghraib prison."4
These abuses, among other things, certainly cast a doubtful light on the
United States' claim that it is treating all detainees at Guantanamo Bay
"humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949. ''24I In fact, one of the main lessons gleaned from the
situation in Northern Ireland is that long-term and incommunicado
detention is potentially ripe for abuse, while offering no possibility of
monitoring the detainees' condition and treatment.2 42 When taken in the
detainees and even released pictures of them arriving wearing handcuffs, blacked out
goggles and surgical masks. More recently, the United States showed pictures of Saddam
Hussein being checked for lice and having his DNA sampled.
Id.; Koh, supra note 164, at 1509 ("even while the United States has been holding Taliban detainees in
the exceptional legal category of 'enemy combatants' without Geneva Convention hearings, it has
been ferociously protesting the denial of Geneva Convention rights to American prisoners of war
captured during the Iraq war"). It is interesting to note that, prior to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal,
allegations of double standards were proclaimed in the print media. See, e.g., President Bush Is Right
to Condemn Iraq's Treatment of Captured Soldiers-But His Outrage Rings Hollow, THE
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 25, 2003, at 20.
24o. For a detailed account of human rights violations surrounding the Abu Ghraib prison scandal,
see Amnesty International, United States of America: Human Dignity Denied: Torture and
Accountability in the "War on Terror" (Nov. 3, 2004); see also Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Abuse of Iraqi
Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (2004); Tim Reid, Abuse of Prisoners
"Widespread," THE TIMES, May 27, 2004. For an application of relevant human rights norms to the
recent torture scandal in Iraq, see Cassese, supra note 12O. Other sources indicate that, in some cases,
the United States' treatment of prisoners led to the death of inmates. See, e.g., Tim Golden et al., In
U.S. Report, Brutal Details Of 2 Afghan Inmates' Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at At.
241. White House Fact Sheet, supra note Is; see also Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee
Abuse in Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 30, 2004, at AI; Roberts, supra note 159, at 741 ("However,
such treatment would be given as a matter of discretion rather than as a matter of right, and the recent
controversy over prisoner abuse in Iraq has caused many to question whether the United States is
complying with such standards in practice."). On the questionable treatment afforded prisoners in the
war on terror, see generally Sands, supra note 147, at 204-22. It is interesting to note that certain
prisoners released from Guantanamo Bay have come forward to denounce the perpetration of
inhumane treatment and torture by American authorities on the military base. Raymond Bonner,
Detainee Says He Was Tortured While in U.S. Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at At; Rod
McGuirk, Aussie Terror Suspect Says He Was Beaten, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 13, 2005.
242. See Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting Burned by
the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1657, 1734-35
(2003).
One of the concerns with the incommunicado nature of their detention revolves around the
recently raised specter of employing coercive interrogation techniques and torture. Because
there is no way to monitor the treatment these citizens are receiving, there is no way to
ensure that talk has not turned into improper action in this area. In Northern Ireland, the
rules permitting detention and denial of counsel led to flagrant abuse by the police force.
Studies on this issue in Northern Ireland have concluded that "[an essential safeguard in
preventing the use of torture of persons in detention is for lawyers to have immediate access
to their client, including during any period of interrogation." There is nothing to suggest this
safeguard is any less essential in the United States.
Id. In the context of Northern Ireland, a policy of internment was also implemented, a policy that
shared many similar characteristics with the situation at Guantanamo Bay. See, e.g., Mark Elliott,
United Kingdom, I INT'L J. CONST. L. 334, 337 (2003); Ela Grdinic, Application of the Elements of
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aggregate, these continuous breaches of international humanitarian law
and human rights law will place the United States at a significant
disadvantage, both in terms of national and individual security, and also
from the perspective of legitimate international relations. Sovereign
states usually "comply with humanitarian law primarily because of
expectations of reciprocity. '243 This logic of reciprocity also permeates
the broader scheme of jus ad bellum,24 while the "tit for tat" principle
animates most of the debates surrounding the modern use of force in
international law.245 No pretension of reciprocity may be asserted here:
the United States has exempted itself from applying protections it has
vehemently defended for the past fifty years.46 In addition to exhibiting a
flagrant double standard in the treatment of prisoners, a reality that
breeds contempt and attracts disapproval from around the globe, the
United States has also significantly eroded its own reputation and
Torture and Other Forms of Ill-Treatment, as Defined by the European Court and Commission of
Human Rights, to the Incidents of Domestic Violence, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 217, 222
(2000). This policy of internment was eventually rejected as being incongruent with the ECHR in
Ireland v. United Kingdom, No. (5310/7I), I Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978); see also supra note 5o. Certain critics
argue that indefinite detentions being carried out in the U.K., based on immigration policy, are similar
in nature and scope to internment. Christopher Harding, International Terrorism: The British
Response, 2002 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 16 n.17 (2002).
243. Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime
Governing Atrocities in International Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 369 (i999); see also Sands, supra
note 147, at 205 (arguing for the principle of reciprocity through the lens of torture: "There are two
sets of international rules governing torture and interrogation practices: a first set prohibits torture; a
second set provides that torture cannot be used against terrorists, whether they are combatants or
criminals. The governing principle must be: do unto others as you would have them do unto you.")
(emphasis added).
244. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian
Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 403 (1999) (speaking of the Geneva
Conventions in the context of international conflict: "This reciprocity continues ex post when states
have the power, if not the legal authority, to withdraw protections in tit-for-tat response to their
opponent's breaches."). For a thoughtful background discussion on the concept of reciprocity, see
Provost, supra note 42, at 121-238.
245. See Abbott, supra note 243, at 370; Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 244, at 403; cf. Richard
A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention? 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 594 (2003)
("International law in the area of the use of force cannot by itself induce consistent compliance
because of sovereignty-oriented political attitudes combined with the gross disparities in power that
prevent the logic of reciprocity and the benefits of mutuality from operating with respect to the
security agenda of states.").
246. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture Transnational Legal Process After
September jith, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 337, 348-49 (2004):
Turning to the United States, the final member of the "axis of disobedience," our greatest
surprise should be how quickly after September iith we turned the story from the non-
compliance of others with international law, to our own non-compliance. Examples abound
•.. second, the U.S. attitude towards the Geneva Conventions-including its actions in Abu
Ghraib, its decision to create zones in Guantanamo in which people are being held without
Geneva Convention rights as well as to designate certain U.S. citizens within the United
States as enemy combatants .... What we are witnessing is nothing less than an assault by
our government on the transnational legal process that we created after World War II in
our own perceived national interest.
See also Sands, supra note 147, at 21-22.
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legitimacy on the international scene."7 Only in aligning its policies with
accepted human rights standards will the United States attract a
warranted and, hopefully, reciprocal protection of its own citizens.24
In the same spirit of unilateralism, it is obvious that the United
States has created a sort of temporary legal vacuum at Guantanamo
Bay,249 which has generated criticism and concern from organizations
such as Amnesty International25 and the Organization of American
States. 5 ' However, it is not so clear whether the United States would
emphatically approve a similar policy if it were to emanate from a
foreign state. 52 Similarly, even though its own policy of incommunicado
247. Koh describes the Bush Administration's shift to a policy of "Strategic Unilateralism and
Tactical Multilateralism":
If this is the emerging approach, what is wrong with it? First, instead of promoting universal
values, the United States has promoted double standards by which other nations are held
accountable to human rights standards from which the United States exempts itself. The
recent horrors at Abu Ghraib show that the United States is now reaping the whirlwind of
its strategy of condoning wide-scale departures from traditional prisoner-of-war protections.
By treating these legal regimes as a nuisance to be disregarded in the war against terrorism,
the Bush administration forgot the critical role that these legal protections play both in
protecting our troops from violations and in protecting our country from needless
humiliation by conduct that most Americans find abhorrent. Second, by engaging in this
unilateralism, the United States has diminished its standing in the international regimes in
which it takes part, limiting its "soft power" or its power to persuade in the global arena.
We see this diminished standing in our mounting incapacity to mobilize other countries to
help us in the daunting task of rebuilding Iraq. Third and most sadly, this strategy has
converted us from the major supporter of the post-war global legal exoskeleton into the
most visible outlier trying to break free of the very legal framework we created and
supported for half a century.
Id. at 350-51. For a thoughtful discussion of the concept of legitimacy in international law, see FRANCK,
supra note 171, at 16-17, 19, 24.
248. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 52, at 1004.
As a pragmatic matter, reliance on double standards reduces the legitimacy of our struggle,
and that legitimacy may be our most valuable asset, both at home and abroad. To
paraphrase John Ashcroft himself: "To those who pit Americans against immigrants and
citizens against non-citizens... my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorism." And as
a matter of self-interest, what we do to aliens today may well pave the way for what will be
done to citizens tomorrow. In the end, however, it is principle that should drive us: the
justice of our response should be judged by how we treat those who have no voice in the
political process. Thus far, we have performed predictably, but not well.
Id.
249. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note io8, at 242.
The attacks of September i i and the ensuing "war against terrorism" test the limits of the
legalist approach, leaving human rights advocates baffled and marginalized. Governments
that style themselves as champions of the rule of law against the absolutism or nihilism of
terrorists have, at least temporarily, constructed "rights-free zones".
Id.
250. Amnesty International, AI Calls on the U.S.A. to End Legal Limbo of Guantanamo Prisoners
(Jan. i8, 2002) [hereinafter Amnesty International, Al Calls on U.S.].
251. See, e.g., John Mintz, U.S. Told to Rule on Detainees' Status, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2002, at
A12.
252. Harold Hongju Koh speaks to this point, supra note 164, at 1509 ("Although the United
States may want its own exceptional 'rights-free zone' on Guantanamo, it surely does not want the
Russians to create a similar offshore facility for their Chechen terrorists or the Chinese to erect
offshore prisons for their Uighur Muslims.").
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and long-term detention of suspected terrorists is highly problematic
constitutionally, the United States would certainly deplore any identical
foreign practice as constituting an affront to human rights law. '53 Such
postures, which are ostensibly grounded in double standards,254 are
difficult to reconcile with the objectives of international humanitarian
law and human rights protections.
e. Resisting Protective Parity: Upholding the Rule of
Distinction
Throughout this Article, ample reference has been made to the
deleterious effects of U.S. policy on the laws of war and human rights,
generally. Some commentators, including myself, expound that the
current policy of indefinite detention of suspected terrorists not only
undermines international humanitarian law, but also places the United
States and its allies at a significant risk abroad.5 Conversely, some
authors argue that the gap between the protections afforded POWs and
"protected persons" is, in fact, narrowing, and that legal policies
pertaining to the war on terror underscore a paradigmatic shift towards
protective parity between both classes of traditional subjects under
Geneva law. 56 Many arguments have been advanced in assessing the
253. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances: Discarding Bedrock Constitutional
Principles, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 97 (Richard C.
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
But we cannot completely rule out the possibility that after many months (or years) of
isolation, a suspect might eventually reveal something useful. The problem with that
argument is the Constitution-not just its fine points but the very idea of a government
under law. If the mere possibility of a useful interrogation is enough to support indefinite
detention incommunicado, then no rights and no checks and balances are available at all,
except when the executive chooses to grant them. If a ruler in any other country claimed
unilateral powers of this sort, Americans would be quick to recognize the affront to the
most basic of human rights.
Id.
254. On the issue of double standards in the war on terror, see generally David Cole, Their
Liberties, Our Security Democracy and Double Standards, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 290 (2003).
255. See, e.g., Mofidi & Eckert, supra note 13, at 9o.
Not only does the U.S. Administration's conduct fall outside the guidelines of the Geneva
Conventions, but it also establishes a dangerous precedent. Every time the community of
nations is forced to contend with flagrant aggression, such as that unleashed by the 9/1I
attacks, the de facto response leaves normative (de jure) footprints in its wake.
Interpolating unrecognized exceptions into the contours of prisoner of war status,
particularly when done by the world's leading military superpower, undermines the Geneva
Conventions as a whole. That would hardly be in the interest of the United States, for it is
all too easy to imagine how that precedent will boomerang to haunt U.S. or allied forces:
enemy forces that might detain U.S. or allied troops would undoubtedly follow the U.S.
lead and devise equally creative reasons for denying prisoner of war status. By flaunting
international law at home, the United States risks undermining its own authority to demand
implementation of international law abroad.
Id.
256. For instance, Professor Derek Jinks delivered a provocative account on this issue. See Jinks,
supra note 99, at 375 ("Moreover, several recent developments in humanitarian law and policy suggest
that this minimal protective gap is closing. The trajectory of international humanitarian law reflects an
emerging "protective parity" across combatant status categories. This protective parity recasts debates
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United States' treatment and detention of suspected terrorists. The most
persuasive and influential concern voiced by human rights proponents is
readily identifiable: the United States should be a leader in upholding
well-established principles of human rights rather than disregarding
fundamental legal protections in wartime and short-circuiting the
application of the Geneva Conventions. In sum, it should rely upon its
economic and political influence to disseminate the ideology of liberal
democracies.257
The U.S. policy places the United States and its allies in a precarious
situation at home and abroad, as anti-West sentiments grow stronger by
the minute."' Some have argued that denying POW status to suspected
terrorists or supporters of terrorist activities is tantamount to depriving
human beings of fundamental human protection. Others, through more
nuanced interpretations of international human rights standards, have
inferred that the official characterization of Guantanamo and Iraqi
detainees yields no practical difference with the protection afforded
POWs. The objective here is not to resolve the academic debate
surrounding the current POW controversy.59 Nor is it to engage in
minute legal contortions relating to the laws of war so as to subscribe to
one of the two possible theories pertaining to detainees in the war on
terror. The purpose of this article is animated by a simple, yet resolute
stance on detaining suspected terrorists, an approach that is grounded in
principle.
Even though security has permeated legal rhetoric and political
speech since 9/1I, we must resist the merger of human rights by the
human and national security agendas.2'6 Surely, the case for denying
suspected terrorists POW status seems more attractive when one
considers that terrorists themselves do not differentiate between civilian
and military targets in carrying out their operations. However, isn't it
also true that the war on terror is a war of principle, an exercise in
affirming human dignity, a clear demarcation between good and evil,
about the legal status of unlawful combatants."); see also Jinks, supra note 209.
257. Gross, supra note I, at 480.
There is no doubt that one source of the hatred felt towards the West is the gloomy
economic situation prevailing in most of the Islamic states, ensuing from the nature of their
regimes. Accordingly, in the long term, the West will also have to deal with this by
disseminating the ideology of liberal democracies.
Id.
258. See, e.g., id.
259. It should also be noted that the U.S.' refusal to engage in the worldwide debate over the
status of prisoners caught in the war on terror has been sharply criticized. Roberts, supra note i I9, at
741 ("The status of the Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees is the subject of debate around the world, yet
the United States has refused to engage in this debate.").
260. Similar arguments have been made in the sphere of international trade law. See, e.g., Philip
Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann,
13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815 (2002).
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and, most importantly, the rule of law? The truth is that nothing in the
international legal order is so simple, forthright, and limpid. Several
conflicting variables and unknowns cloud the equation. All we can hope
and fight for is the promotion of human rights, which have an impact on
our own societies at home and abroad. If the war on terror is truly an
international campaign, punctuated by "make no mistake about it"s and
concerted efforts to forestall future terrorist actions, then we must also
weigh human dignity and respect equally in the balance. The reign of
"security" as a god-like, overarching, and overriding concept,
irrespective of other equally relevant considerations, significantly
threatens to erode and supplant essential cleavages in international law,
such as reciprocity, the promotion of equality, the protection of civilian
life, etc. 6 The war on terror certainly must take a step forward in
redefining international law in light of current events. However, for
every successful step forward, it must also avoid taking two steps
backwards by subtracting human beings from fundamental legal
protections.
I maintain that the war on terrorism, now more than ever, requires a
sharp distinction between "protected persons" and POWs. An opposite
stance would signal a failure of the human rights project,6' and, most
importantly, indicate that we, as allied nations and united military fronts,
sink down to the level of common terrorists by repudiating all that is
noble and human about human rights law.263 Reciprocity is still the
guiding principle here: the United States will still have to entertain and
cultivate legal and political relationships with state entities, irrespective
of whether a war can legally be waged against an international terrorist
organization. ' 64 The argument reaches further than simple legal or
political rhetoric: it relies on a question of principle and legitimacy. How
can we substantiate an international crusade against destroyers and
oppressors of freedom by unconditionally curtailing the very liberties we
are seeking to promote?
It becomes apparent from the foregoing considerations that POW
status carries with it an inherent badge of honor. A combatant caught in
261. For a discussion of the omnipresence of security concerns in post-9/ii U.S. legal policy, see
Brunde & Toope, supra note 6, at 248, 249, 258-60; Fr~drric Mrgret, "War"? Legal Semantics and the
Move to Violence, i3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 361, 367-68 (2002).
262. For a discussion of human rights as a matter of international concern, see PETER MALANCZUK,
AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTrON TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 220-21 (7th rev. ed., Routledge 1997).
263. A similar argument can be made in the context of targeted killing of suspected terrorists,
which is addressed infra Part III; see also Matthew C. Wiebe, Comment, Assassination in Domestic and
International Law: The Central Intelligence Agency, State-Sponsored Terrorism, and the Right of Self-
Defense, ii TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 363. 402-03 (2003) ("When the United States assassinates
individuals before they stand trial and hides to avoid responsibility, there is no difference between the
United States and the terrorists.").
264. On the legality of the war on terror, see supra note I.
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the crossfire who is afforded POW status is entitled to make a powerful,
yet simple claim: "I fight by the rules." The importance of such a claim
cannot be over-emphasized in an era where rules are being disregarded
and subverted by terrorists. There is certainly something deeply
oxymoronic about the expression "laws of war," namely the idea of
upholding rules in a context where destruction of enemy targets remains
a primary objective. Yet, rules and order are what distinguish us from
primitive beings. Legal and military symmetry will never be attained in
international conflict: the best objective is to provide detainees under our
own custody with the treatment we would expect vis-A-vis our own
nationals, should they fall in the arms of the enemy. It is evident that
upholding a firm scheme of human rights protection generates the right
impetus for inducing governments to play by the rules. However,
barbaric actions emanating from terrorist factions do not give us a blank
check to adopt similar tactics:
No military force will ever conduct its operations in perfect concord
with IHL-quite simply, there are "limits to the amount of
humanitarian observance that desperately fighting flesh and blood can
stand," and no soldier or state in extremis is ever likely to privilege
compliance with IHL over survival. Nonetheless, the general
observance of IHL by honorable soldiers fighting in defense of
civilization is the behavioral variable which most clearly distinguishes
civilized peoples from modern-day barbarians, a venal and intractable
assemblage hors de loi ("outside the law") that inhabits an utterly
incompatible moral universe and that, by deliberately targeting
innocent civilians permanently dislocates itself, along with its
barbarian, piratical, and outlawed progenitors, from the ranks of the
civilized. One need not embrace the ancient ordination of territory into
civilized and barbarian spheres to defend the assertions that morality,
even during war, should march in step with law, that the premeditated
murder of innocents is ethically and juridically distinct from their
unintentional killing, and that rather than accord terrorists enhanced
status under the law defenders of civilization should withdraw the
protections of the law they shun. Nor need one lump all enemies
together under the barbarian rubric: simply stated, barbarians are
those who deliberately attack civilians to advance the destruction of a
civilization based upon liberty, law, and respect for individual human
rights and dignity.
2 65
It is clear that human rights proponents are not fighting for the right
of Guantanamo detainees to purchase soap and cigarettes at the prison
canteen. Moderate observers understand and agree that certain
precautionary measures should be implemented in times of crisis. In the
process, certain freedoms we take for granted will be slightly curtailed or
momentarily suspended.26 The widespread objection to Guantanamo
265. William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September rith Proposal to Rationalize the
Laws of War, 73 Miss. L.J. 639, 875-77 (2004).
266. This reality has also been acknowledged by British courts. See, e.g., Lord Denning in Reg. v.
[Vol. 56:8oi
May 2005] INDEFINITE DETENTION & TARGETED KILLING 859
Bay does not purport to vindicate every single rule and right in the book.
Rather, it aims at safeguarding the validity and legitimacy of
international human rights; it promotes important values and principles.
When an individual is detained for a period of three years without access
to counsel or outside communication, the system has failed. The so-called
"war" on terror becomes a blanket to arrest and detain indiscriminately,
and human beings become means to the collective well-being, much to
the dismay of Kant. Therefore, we must uphold this distinction between
POWs and "protected persons" so as to ensure a uniform and, to the
extent possible, just application of the Geneva Conventions and of the
Covenant.
In addition, ample reference has already been made to the fact that
contemporary battlefields harbor theaters of large-scale violence,
unconventional weaponry, and convoluted scenarios of situational
fighting. It is no easy task to differentiate lawful combatants from
unprivileged combatants at first sight and, for all intended purposes, such
an endeavor should not be undertaken until a formal military tribunal
has been convened, pursuant to Article 5 of Convention III. In fact, this
provision may be the last bastion available to detainees in challenging
their detention,267 as international humanitarian law does not offer a
panoply of avenues of recourse and appeal vis-A-vis state action.
Consequently, until an official determination of illegality has been
pronounced by a competent tribunal, the presumption of POW status
should accrue to prisoners, along with all of the benefits and immunities
thereunto appertaining.
5. The Situation of Suspected Al Qaeda Terrorists
A few considerations on the status of suspected Al Qaeda members
also warrant consideration.
a. Difficulties with the U.S. Position
With regard to members of Al Qaeda, the United States entertains a
more radical claim, namely that they are not entitled to any protection
Home Sec'y, ex. Parte Hosenball, I W.L.R. 766, 778 (1977) ("It is a case in which national security is
involved; and our history shows that, when the state itself is endangered, our cherished freedoms may
have to take second place."). For an application of this notion to modem reality, see Conor Gearty,
Reflections on Human Rights and Civil Liberties in Light of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act
1998, 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 17 (2ooi).
267. See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note too, at 897.
In my view, international humanitarian law provides all too few opportunities for
individuals to challenge state action, but one of those few is the right of access to a tribunal
granted by Article 5. It would be regrettable if in practice this right proves to have been
effectively negated for Taliban prisoners.
Id.
268. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, Individuals as Subjects of International Humanitarian Law, in
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 851, 855-56 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
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under the Geneva Conventions because they are international outlaws.
This assertion hinges on the fact that the Al Qaeda network is not a
signatory to the Geneva Conventions and, in the view of the executive,
eludes the protection of Geneva law. 69  In crafting this legal
characterization, the United States effectively suggests that there exists a
third category of persons in international law, thereby eroding the
distinction between POW and "protected person". Before the response
to 9/11, international human rights discourse had only entertained and
recognized two categories of persons under the protective scheme of the
Geneva Conventions: POWs and protected persons.27 Furthermore,
international humanitarian law has always protected unconventional
fighters through the mechanism of Convention IV, even in its treatment
of unlawful or unprivileged combatants, such as current suspected Al
Qaeda members. 7 ' Even the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia has recognized that unprivileged combatants are
entitled to protection.272 It should be recalled that "protected person"
status is a mechanism activated ipso facto and ipso jure.73 It follows that
"it is not even necessary for the adversary in whose hands a protected
person finds himself to recognize that the person is entitled to the
protection." '74 In other words, unprivileged combatants have traditionally
269. For academic support of this proposition, see Paust, Attacks on the Laws of War, supra note I,
at 326-27.
Bin Laden was never the leader or member of a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent
group (as those entities are understood in international law) that was at war with the United
States.
... [A]ny conflict between the United States and al Qaeda as such cannot amount to war
or trigger application of the laws of war. Thus, outside the context of war to which the laws
of war apply, members of al Qaeda who were not otherwise attached to the armed forces of
a belligerent or state cannot be "combatants," much less "enemy" or so-called "unlawful"
combatants, or prisoners of war as those terms and phrases are widely known in both
international and U.S. constitutional law.
Id.; see also Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, supra note 159, at 1226.
270. See supra note 16.
271. See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON
THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 261-63 (1982); HILAIRE
MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF
WARFARE 137 (2d ed. 1998); Aldrich, supra note oo; Baxter, supra note 235, at 328, 344; Dormann,
supra note 133; F. Kalshoven, The Position of Guerrilla Fighters under the Law of War, I I REVUE DE
DROIT PtNAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 55, 70-71 (1972); Esbjorn Rosenblad, Guerrilla
Warfare and International Law, 12 REVUE DE DROIT PINAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 91,
96-98 (973). For more background on the concept of unlawful combatant under international law, see
Lee A. Casey, David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Darin R. Bartram, Unlawful Belligerency and Its Implications
Under International Law, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publicationsfrerrorism/
unlawfulcombatants.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
272. Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2i-T (ICTY Trial .Ch. II, 16 Nov. 1998), para.
271.
273. See supra note 16.
274. Kittichaisaree, supra note 16, at 139 (discussing the protection scheme for protected persons
[Vol. 56:8oi
May 2005] INDEFINITE DETENTION & TARGETED KILLING 861
been afforded the same protection as civilians under Convention IV,
while being denied POW status under Convention III. This argument is
being advanced by different voices in the context of Guantanamo
detainees.75 It logically follows from this proposition that "no one can
fall in between the two Conventions and therefore be protected by
neither of the two. ''276 This statement has also been endorsed by Amnesty
International"77 and Human Rights Watch.7
Aside from signaling a marked departure from the traditional
application of the laws of war, denying suspected Al Qaeda members any
protection under the Geneva Conventions also places all "protected
persons" under Convention IV at a significant risk. Endorsing a policy of
widespread denial of fundamental rights to a group of individuals attracts
a corresponding downward thrust in the protection of all civilians. This
line of argument is reminiscent of the allegations of double standard in
the context of POW status but becomes particularly poignant when
considering the recent torture and abuse scandals in Iraq.
A true and honest understanding of the laws of war centers on the
distinction between POWs and "protected persons":
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered
by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention,
or again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who
is covered by the First Convention. '
It inexorably follows from this idea that every individual not falling
within the ambit of POW protection is, intrinsically, a "protected
person".ri. In tandem, these statements clearly indicate that a "protected
person" could as well be a sophisticated terrorist or an innocent child.
sx
under the Geneva Conventions).
275. See, e.g., Erin Chlopak, Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Humanitarian and
Human Rights Obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 9 HUM. RTS BRIEF 6, 7 (2004); Gabor Rona,
International Law Under Fire: Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from
the "War on Terror", 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 64 (Summer/Fall 2oo3).
276. Sass6li, Use and Abuse, supra note 187, at 207.
277. See Memorandum from Amnesty International to the U.S. Government on the rights of
people in U.S. custody in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay (Apr. I4, 2002); Amnesty International,
AI Calls on U.S., supra note 250.
278. See Human Rights Watch, Background Paper on Geneva Conventions and Persons Held by
U.S. Forces, Human Rights Watch Press Backgrounder, Jan. 29, 2002, available at http://www.hrw.org/
backgrounder/usa/pow-bck.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
279. Sass6li, Use and Abuse, supra note 187, at 207-08.
280. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 104, at 277 ("If they do not qualify as combatants they are
entitled to be treated as protected civilian persons under the Fourth Convention, although this leaves
them liable to punishment for all acts of armed resistance.").
281. For confirmation of this principle, see Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2i-T
(ICTY Trial Ch., I6 Nov. 1998), para. 272 ("This position is confirmed by article 50 of Additional
Protocol I which regards as civilians all persons who are not combatants as defined in article 4(A) (i),
(2), (3) and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention, and article 43 of the Protocol itself.").
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The task of international humanitarian law is not to differentiate or
distinguish them, based on moral or legal considerations. Rather, the
objective of Geneva law is to offer them rudimentary initial protection,
based on one common characteristic: they are both human. While they
are fundamentally different beings, and one has voluntarily engaged in
wrongful acts, the aim of Geneva law is to recognize that human beings,
guilty or innocent, are entitled to initial protection. The subsequent duty
to bring the terrorist to justice will rest with either domestic or
international justice systems, but the Geneva Conventions, or non-
application thereof, should not be invoked to make an initial legal
determination as to the culpability of "protected persons."
In other words, international humanitarian law should not be used as
a mere screening device by the detaining power, so as to take away
human rights from a class of protected persons. The laws of war do not
support the creation of a new category of persons: there "is no
intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.
'2,2
Contemporary war crime tribunals have also confirmed this statement ad
nauseam.2s3 Even unilateral executive characterization of an individual as
an "enemy combatant" cannot subtract that person from the protection
of the Geneva Conventions: "the term 'unlawful combatant' is merely
descriptive and is by no means intended to create a third status between
those of combatant and civilian. ' 2s4 It follows that civilians actively
engaged in hostilities "are 'protected persons' under the Fourth Geneva
Convention but forfeit immunity from attack and become lawful targets
for the duration of their engagement in hostilities. '"2'8  Some
commentators argue that this rule is now part of customary
international law, thereby imposing a binding obligation on all states
involved in international armed conflict, including non parties to the
Additional Protocol."7 This proposition has also been endorsed by the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
282. Sassoli, Use and Abuse, supra note 187, at 208; see International Committee of the Red Cross,
Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, Geneva, 1958, at 51; see also Kittichaisaree, supra note
16, at 139; Marco Sassbli, La "guerre contre le terrorisme", le droit international humanitaire et le statut
deprisonnier de guerre, 39 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 211 (2001).
283. See, e.g., Delalic, Case No. IT-9 6-2i-T, para. 271; Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-
95-14-T (ICTY Trial Ch., 3 Mar. 2ooo), para. 147.
284. Antonio Cassese, Expert Opinion On Whether Israel's Targeted Killings of Palestinian
Terrorists is Consonant with International Humanitarian Law, at p. 3 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author); see also Kittichaisaree, supra note i6.
285. Cassese, supra note 284, at 3.
286. Article 51(3) of the Additional Protocol, supra note 38, at 26 provides that civilians "shall
enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities."
287. George Aldrich, The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 53 (2000) (discussing the
inclusion of Articles 48, 51, and 52 of the Additional Protocol under customary international law).
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Yugoslavia.'8
The protection of belligerent civilians can also be semantically
transposed to domestic criminal law. Although the McVeighs of this
world commit crimes that are inherently repugnant to humanity, they are
nevertheless afforded fundamental due process guarantees: they may
confer with their attorneys and they may present a full defense."" We
grant such individuals those rights because they are human; we do not
first adjudicate their moral fiber and then proceed to granting or denying
them rights. This is consistent with the logic underlying Convention IV.
Based on that rationale, there is no reason to strip human beings of
similar rights on the international scene."9
With this in mind, several commentators assert that fundamental
human rights should not be afforded on the basis of status." ' Yet, by
"applying different standards to citizens and non-citizens, the United
States appears to be endorsing the idea that certain fundamental rights
are tied to one's status as a citizen rather than one's status as a human
being." '92 This very notion challenges the most rudimentary human need,
namely the desire to coexist in a society of law, in a cohesive structure
underpinned by respect and dignity.93
288. Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-oI-42-AR72 (ICTY App. Ch., 22 Nov. 2002), paras.
9-io; Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-oI-4 2-PT (ICTY Trial Ch., 7 June 2002), para. 21;
Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-1i-R6i (ICTY Trial Ch., 8 Mar. 1996), paras. 134-37.
289. See Gross, supra note iIo, at 30-31.
True, terrorists do not respect laws and breach all rules of the game. However, every person
suspected of a criminal offense is suspected of not having respected the law. There are those
who believe that terrorists are different in this regard as, in contrast to other criminals, they
do not respect any law -not the criminal law, not moral law, not the laws of peace and not
the laws of war. They breach all forms of law simultaneously. Does this justify a different
mode of trial for a person suspected of breaking all the rules of the game? Does the fact
that terrorists are always presented as "other," and they chose to be "other" and behave as
"others" means that the state must treat them in another manner and that the terrorists can
only blame themselves for this outcome? Terrorism is essentially no different from any
other criminal offense. It substantively resembles every other criminal offense in the statute
books. The only difference that can be found lies in the perpetrators' motives.
Id.
290. See generally FRANCOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN LAW
291 (Laura Brav ed. & trans., 2002).
291. See, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September ii? American
Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 5, 23-24 (2002).
292. Roberts, supra note I 19, at 722.
293. See, e.g., PHILIP ALLoTr, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 175 (Oxford 2001).
The ultimate human right, which is also an ultimate human need, is to be a member of
societies under the law. In that way only can human beings, endowed with the capacity to
will and act in consciousness, constantly create themselves in accordance with their
purposes. Such a right, and such a need, is the human right and human need in every from
of society, from the society of a particular family to the international society of the whole
human race, and including all intermediate societies.
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b. Resisting the Creation of a Third Category by Reference to
"International Outlaws" and "Unlawful Combatants"
Although the concept of international outlawry is not novel,2" to
apply a blanket label of this kind across a group of individuals not only
significantly decreases the level of protection afforded all "protected
persons," be they terrorists or innocent civilians, but it also frustrates the
very purpose of international humanitarian law. The validity of this legal
characterization must be called into question: "Modern American law
has come a long way since the time when outbreak of war made every
enemy national an outlaw, subject to both public and private slaughter,
cruelty and plunder.""29 Fortunately, we no longer live in the Far West,
where the rule of the quickest draw prevails. We coexist in a system of
nation-states underpinned by the rule of law, where justice systems, and
due process guarantees are tailored to promote the ideals of liberal
democracy. The purpose of the war on terror should not only aim at
deterring and punishing terrorists. Multilateral cooperation on the
suppression of terrorist activities should disseminate democratic ideals
and promote human rights, while also calling into question processes and
policies lacking transparency or legitimacy within our own societies."' To
label suspected Al Qaeda members "international outlaws" is
inconsistent with the second objective. The difficulty with the executive's
unilateral characterization of Al Qaeda members has been eloquently
summarized by a commentator, as follows:
Equally inapt is the frequent analogy to Al Qaeda as "outlaws."
294. For example, Grotius lumped certain wrongdoers, such as pirates, into a category of
international outlaws. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI Ac PACIs LIBRI TRES, ch. 3 (James Brown
Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Carnegie 1964) (1625); see also Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime
of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334 (925). The term "international outlaws" has also been
invoked in more recent legal scholarship and in various contexts. See, e.g., Michal J. Bazyler,
www.Swissbankclaims.com: The Legality and Morality of the Holocaust-Era Settlement with the Swiss
Banks, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 64, 93 n.64 (2ooi); Rupa Bhattacharyya, Establishing a Rule-of-Law
International Criminal Justice System, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 57, 58 (1996); Douglass Cassel, Empowering
United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 35
NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 440 (2OO1); Paul S. Reichler, Holding America to Its Own Best Standards: Abe
Chayes and Nicaragua in the World Court, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 15, 23, 31-32, 43 (2oo1); Andrew J.
Walker, When a Good Idea Is Poorly Implemented: How the International Criminal Court Fails to Be
Insulated From International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process Guarantees, io6 W. VA. L. REV.
245, 256 (2004).
295. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1950).
296. See Makau wa Mutua, Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbiosis, in THE ROLE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 149 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
Although the concept of human rights is not unique to European societies, I argue here that
the specific philosophy on which the current "universal" and "official" human rights corpus
is based is essentially European. This exclusivity and cultural specificity necessarily deny the
concept universality. The fact that human rights are violated in liberal democracies is of
little consequence to my argument and does not distinguish the human rights corpus and the
ideology of Western liberalism; rather, it emphasizes the contradictions and imperfections
of liberalism.
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Outlaws inhabit a twilight space outside the legal order, and they are
subject to being shot at will. The idea of killing enemy soldiers on the
spot is compatible neither with the pursuit of justice nor with the laws
of war. The outlaw is subhuman, undeserving of minimally decent
treatment. I do not think we really want to make that claim about
terrorists. Nor does it make sense to flatter terrorists by associating
them with romantic outlaws who retreat from society to live,
metaphorically, with Robin Hood in Sherwood Forest. The purpose of
thinking legally about the events of September it should be to help
describe the danger we confront and to provide a justification, so far as
possible, for the shared sentiment that the use of force is an acceptable
response. 97
In addition, the historical treatment of the laws of war simply does not
countenance the addition of a third category of persons in times of war.
The legitimacy of this new category is widely debated in legal
scholarship. Some commentators have endorsed it, or, at least have
recognized that terrorists are tantamount to international outlaws or are
not covered by Convention !V,28 while others have questioned its validity
under the existing framework of jus in bello. 9 Others have resolved this
discrepancy by suggesting that the current war against international
terrorists be guided by the rules of "noninternational armed conflicts" so
as to ensure protective parity across the board: under this scheme, enemy
combatants, whether privileged or unlawful, and innocent civilians would
be treated on an equal footing.3" Interestingly enough, it has been argued
that the United States should have adopted a law enforcement posture
vis-A-vis members of Al Qaeda, thereby signaling that suspected
terrorists should be treated as criminals rather than as unlawful
combatants."'
297. George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635, 637 (2002). Daniel Pickard offers an opposite view:
The author suggests that, under international law, modem day terrorists are hostes humani
generis-common enemies of humankind. In the fashion of pirates, who were said by
Vattel, "to be hanged by the first person into whose hands they fell." Equally, terrorists are
international outlaws and must fall within the scope of this universal jurisdiction.
Daniel B. Pickard, Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
International Law, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 21 (2ooI); see also Louis Rene Beres, The United States
and Nuclear Terrorism in a Changing World: A Jurisprudential View, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 327, 356
('994).
298. See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note too, at 898; Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva
Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 1025, io68-7i (2004); Pickard, supra note 297; William B. Wood,
Geography: A Lesson for Diplomats, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 5, 11 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2ooi, at A23; see also Robert Alfert
Jr., Hostes Humani Generis: An Expanded Notion of U.S. Counterterrorist Legislation, 6 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 171 (1992).
299. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note i i9, at 740-42; Sassbli, Use and Abuse, supra note 187.
300. See, e.g., Marco Sassbli, "Unlawful Combatants": The Law and Whether It Needs to Be
Revised, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 196, 196-97 (2003).
301. Leila Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WAsH. U. GLOBAL STUo. L. REV. 135, 146
(2oo4). Compare Mark A. Drumbl, Toward a Criminology of International Crime, 19 OHIO ST. J. Disp.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
c. "Unlawful Combatants" and Judicial Deference in Post-
9/i U.S. Jurisprudence
Under the U.S. civil rights paradigm, it inevitably follows that an
American citizen accused of terrorism should enjoy all of the
constitutional guarantees within the U.S. territory, at least in theory.
However, the current administration considers the possible application
of constitutional safeguards to suspected American terrorists as a
considerable impediment to its counter-terrorism efforts. In fact, even
though he was captured in Afghanistan while carrying an AK-47, Yaser
Esam Hamdi did invoke the benefits of the Constitution, hinging his
petition for habeas corpus on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In
order to respond to this challenge and to justify an indefinite detention in
"John Walker Lindh"-like situations," ' the U.S. government re-
designated the U.S. citizen an "unlawful enemy combatant."3 3 In doing
so, it could then proceed to treat and detain the individual as though he
was an enemy alien, thereby stripping him of significant due process
guarantees. 4
RESOL. 263 (2003). Other commentators argue that the war rhetoric is misplaced, as the U.S. is in fact
facing a temporary state of emergency. See generally Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not A War, 113 YALE
L.J. 1871 (2004).
302. See my comments on the case of John Walker Lindh, supra note 51. It must be noted that the
original presidential order providing for the implementation of military commissions to prosecute
unlawful combatants and suspected terrorists did not purport to encompass American civilians. In fact,
it would appear that the presidential document, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001), only extended to alien
combatants.
These commissions apparently were intended primarily for use in trying so-called unlawful
combatants captured during military operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere abroad. At
least as initially drafted, the order granted no jurisdiction over American citizens, and there
was no attempt to invoke it to divest the civilian courts in the cases of either John Walker
Lindh, an American captured in Afghanistan, or Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national
who is the only alleged September i conspirator so far apprehended in the United States.
SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 4-5.
303. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Mobbs declaration
unequivocally labeled Hamdi an "enemy combatant"), vacated, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004). For different views on the interplay between unlawful combatants and the U.S. Constitution,
see Michael Beattie & Lisa Yonka Stevens, An Open Debate on United States Citizens Designated As
Enemy Combatants: Where Do We From Here? 62 MD. L. REV. 975 (2003); Roberto Iraola, Enemy
Combatants, the Courts, and the Constitution, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 565 (2003); Joseph Kubler, U.S.
Citizens As Enemy Combatants; Indication of a Roll-Back of Civil Liberties or a Sign of Our
Jurisprudential Evolution? 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 631 (2004).
304. This idea stems from the decision in Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1(0942).
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the
consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war.
Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with
its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents
within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.
Id at 37-38; see also Schulhofer, supra note 253, at 96 ("That finding of enemy-combatant status, in
turn, is enough in the administration's view to support detention for the long duration of this conflict,
without any trial at all.").
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In addition, some authors expound that the use of the undefined
term "enemy combatant" allows the United States to forego some
protections found in the Geneva Conventions.3 5 Others argue that the
"rights of political freedom, due process, and equal protection belong to
every person subject to United States legal obligations, irrespective of
citizenship."' ° After detaining Hamdi for a period of three years, the
United States finally released him without laying formal criminal
charges.3"7 As part of his release agreement, Hamdi was compelled to
renounce his American citizenship, a requirement that is highly
problematic under U.S. constitutional principles and, arguably,
unenforceable legally. 8 In sum, the holding in Hamdi indicated that the
President has authority to detain an American citizen on foreign soil
indefinitely, albeit by designating him an enemy combatant.3"
Conversely, in Padilla31 the Court held that the President did not have
authority to detain an American citizen indefinitely as an enemy
combatant on American soil."'
However, it should be noted that labeling someone an "enemy
305. See, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, For "Our" Security: Who Is an "American" and What Is
Protected by Enhanced Law Enforcement and Intelligence Powers?, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 23, 29 n.64
(2003) (citing DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE
WAR ON TERRORISM 39-46 (2003)).
306. Cole, supra note 52, at 1004.
307. For more background on the case of Yaser Hamdi, see supra note 51.
308. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 252-
53 (1980).
Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under
the name of one of its general or implied grants of power. In some instances, loss of
citizenship can mean that a man is left without the protection of citizenship in any country
in the world-as a man without a country. Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a
cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry. The very
nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under
which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their
citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect
every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship,
whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no more than to give to this citizen that
which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he
voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267-68.
In establishing loss of citizenship, the Government must prove an intent to surrender
United States citizenship, not just the voluntary commission of an expatriating act such as
swearing allegiance to a foreign nation. Congress does not have any general power to take
away an American citizen's citizenship without his "assent," which means an intent to
relinquish citizenship, whether the intent is expressed in words or is found as a fair
inference from his conduct.
Vance, 444 U.S. at 252-53. For a thoughtful review of the legal implications vis-A-vis revoking
citizenship after 9/It, see Emanuel Gross, Defensive Democracy: Is It Possible to Revoke the
Citizenship, Deport, or Negate the Civil Rights of a Person Instigating Terrorist Action Against His
Own State? 72 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 51 (2003).
309. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 467-68, 473-76 (4 th Cir. 2002), vacated, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
310. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
311. Id. at 718-24.
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combatant" does not exempt the United States from the application of
the Geneva Conventions to such an individual."2 Furthermore, although
such individual may not qualify under the protective scheme of POW
status, he or she is still entitled to exercise the rights afforded POWs until
convicted of unlawful acts by a military tribunal."3
In the Hamdi case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found Hamdi to be an enemy combatant, thereby triggering a certain
tendency or attitude of deference to executive decision-making in the
war on terror."4 The court expressed the view that such review should be
"deferential" '315 and allow a wide margin of appreciation to the
executive."6 In endorsing the government's characterization of Hamdi as
an "enemy combatant," the court exposed its own reasoning:
The detention of enemy combatants serves at least two vital purposes.
First, detention prevents enemy combatants from rejoining the enemy
and continuing to fight against America and its allies .... In this
respect, "captivity is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,"
but rather "a simple war measure."
Second, detention in lieu of prosecution may relieve the burden on
military commanders of litigating the circumstances of a capture
halfway around the globe .... As the Supreme Court has recognized
[in Johnson v. Eisentrager (1950)], "it would be difficult to devise more
effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies
he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own
civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military
offensive abroad to the legal defense at home."3"7
312. Koh, supra note 164, at 5o9.
313. Schulhofer speaks to this point in the context of the Padilla case.
In principle, the administration should be force to elect whether to treat Padilla as a lawful
or unlawful enemy combatant. A lawful combatant can indeed be detained without trial, as
a prisoner of war, for the duration of hostilities. But prisoners of war must be granted
numerous rights relating to decent treatment, contact with outsiders, and freedom from
interrogation. The Bush administration clearly regards Padilla as an unlawful combatant
entitled to none of those rights. But even an admitted enemy combatant cannot be
considered an unlawful combatant, and cannot be stripped of the rights or an ordinary
prisoner of war, until he is tired by a military tribunal and found guilty of unlawful acts. In
effect the administration seeks to confine Padilla to legal limbo, entitled neither to the
privileges of a prisoner of war, nor to trial as an unlawful combatant.
Schulhofer, supra note 253, at 96.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 , 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2002).
315. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450,465-66 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated by 542 U.S. 507 (2004). The
court reached a similar conclusion in Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 6to
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that "the President is authorized under the Constitution and by law to direct
the military to detain enemy combatants").
316. Some commentators have called into question the indefinite detention of American citizens
after 9/I1. See, e.g., Danielle Tarin, Note, Will an Attack on America Justify an Attack on Americans?:
Congressional and Constitutional Prohibitions on the Executive's Power to Detain U.S. Citizens as
Enemy Combatants, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 1145 (2004).
317. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 465-66. This reasoning seems partially aligned with the holding in In re
Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) ("The object of capture is to prevent the captured individual
from serving the enemy. He is disarmed and from then on he must be removed as completely as
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The effect of the court's characterization of Hamdi as an "enemy
combatant" is clear: the United States can treat him as an alien and strip
him of fundamental constitutional guarantees, although even non-
citizens are supposedly entitled to some basic procedural safeguards. 3' 8
However, it is interesting to note that, in Padilla, the court inferred that
the executive power lacked authority "to detain American citizens seized
on American soil and not actively engaged in combat.""31 It must be
stressed that, historically, both U.S. and U.K. judiciaries have deferred to
the executive vis-A-vis national security matters.320
In sum, the United States has not complied with the Geneva
Conventions or the Covenant with regard to some prisoners: several
Guantanamo Bay detainees have not been brought to trial. In most
cases, they are isolated from family and counsel, although they have
received visits from Red Cross officials3"' and are allowed to have a
Muslim imam 2 within the facility. In addition, military tribunals have
recently been established for detainees in response to the ever-increasing
criticism of U.S. policy on indefinite detention.3 3 According to this
procedure, prisoners are allowed to plead their case before a panel of
three individuals.3 4 Furthermore, certain war crimes trials are being
practicable from the front, treated humanely and in time exchanged, repatriated or otherwise
released."). Compare the holding in Hamdi with Judge Wesley's dissenting opinion in Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 726 (2d Cir. 2003) (arguing that the executive has the power to detain
unlawful combatants in the interest of national security, even if they are American citizens), rev'd, 542
U.S. 426 (2004).
318. See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 31, at 449.
While non-citizens-both resident aliens and visitors from other countries and even illegal
entrants-are entitled to the familiar constitutional protections given to crime suspects by
the Bill of Rights, they remain subject to arrest, detention, and questioning for any violation
of the immigration laws that can lead to removal from the United States (what we used to
call deportation). When held simply for removal, non-citizens do not have a right to be
furnished a lawyer at state expense, and their failure to speak can be used against them.
Id.
319. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 722 (Parker & Pooler, JJ.).
320. The British record is also indicative of this tendency. See, e.g., Rex v. Halliday, [1917] A.C.
26o, 270; Liversidge v. Anderson, [i942] A.C. 206 (H.L. i941).
32i. See, e.g., Saito, supra note 291
, 
at Ii; Elizabeth Becker, Red Cross Man in Guantdnamo: A
"Busybody," but Not Unwelcome, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at AIo. An interesting parallel with the
Israeli experience can be drawn here. As discussed earlier, supra note 63, two suspected Lebanese
terrorists were detained under the Israeli Emergency Powers (Detention) Law by virtue of the same
rationale many Guantanamo detainees are being held captive: they represented a threat to national
security. Based on the same logic of national security, the Lebanese detainees had been systematically
denied visits from Red Cross officials. Stating that the humanitarian interests outweighed national
security, coupled with the length of the detention, the reviewing court decided that the detainees were,
in fact, entitled to have visits from the Red Cross. HC 794198, Sheikh Abed El Karim Ubeid v.
Minister of Defence, 55(5) P.D. 769.
322. See Murphy, supra note I88, at 476, 478.
323. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Disagreement Over Detainees' Legal Rights Simmers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2004, at A15.
324. Neil A. Lewis, Guantdnamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2004, at A5.
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initiated before military commissions, while others have been
postponed.325 Interestingly, at the time of writing, some federal courts are
denouncing the situation in Guantanamo Bay, stating that the
mechanism of military commissions is flawed.326
Such is the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a driver and collaborator
of Osama bin Laden from 1996-2001, who was, up until now, facing war
crimes charges. However, the United States District Court in Washington
halted his war crimes trial, judging among other things that the
application of Article 5 of Convention III had been disregarded, and that
the proceeding before the military commission lacked fundamental
elements of a fair trial." The court ruled that "President Bush had both
overstepped his constitutional bounds and improperly brushed aside the
Geneva Conventions in establishing military commissions to try
detainees at the United States naval base. '328 Nevertheless, and even
despite this warning by the United States District Court, it seems that
U.S. authorities are carrying on with the hearings before military
tribunals."9 This posture is difficult to defend, especially in light of recent
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. Following widespread outrage,
political pressure, and heated debates over the situation at Guantanamo
Bay and, with the input of prominent human rights proponents,33 the
Supreme Court ruled on the legality of indefinite detention following
9/1I. In a series of cases,33" ' the Supreme Court held that American
citizens could not be detained indefinitely by unilateral presidential
325. For example, such was the case of David Hicks, an Australian national detained at
Guantanamo. See Neil Lewis, National Briefing: Washington: War Crimes Trial Postponed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at A23.
326. On this issue, see Neal K. Katyal, & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunals, IIi YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002) (arguing that the "President's Order
establishing military tribunals for the trial of terrorists is flatly unconstitutional"); see also Harold
Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (2002); The Rule of Law
at Gitmo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. so, 2004, at A24. For an opposite view, in support of military commissions,
see Kenneth Anderson, What to Do With bin Laden and al Qaeda Terrorists? A Qualified Defense of
Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 591 (2002). For a similar view, see also Heather Anne Maddox, After the Dust Settles:
Military Tribunal Justice for Terrorists After September iI, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 421
(2002).
327. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 2005 WL 1653046 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
328. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Judge Halts War-Crime Trial at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at
At.
329. Despite Ruling, Tribunals Continue in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at At 7 .
330. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, & Michael H. Posner,
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027).
331. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Padilla, 542 U.S.
426. A British House of Lords decision rejecting indefinite detention without criminal charge or due
process was also rendered recently, thereby signaling that the British judiciary is aligning its view on
indefinite detention with that of the U.S. Supreme Court. See A (FC) and others (FC) v. Sec'y of State
for the Home Dep't, U.K.H.L. 56 (2004).
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order, without access to counsel or judicial review, and that the United
States could not forcibly displace non-American citizens to Guantanamo,
while simultaneously denying them access to U.S. courts to challenge
their detention. It remains to be seen how the executive will respond to
the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the balance of power in this period
of national and international unrest.
d. Coming Full Circle: Alignment of U.S. and U.K. Post-9/II
Jurisprudence
The U.K. proudly brandished the torch of international human
rights on behalf of its own nationals in Guantanamo. In fact, it claimed
that, regardless of the outcome of the debate over the application of the
Geneva Conventions, Guantanamo detainees were certainly protected
under customary international law.332 Unfortunately, we cannot say the
same about the treatment of alien suspects within its territory. In fact, the
A, X and Y decision333 indicates that the U.K.'s domestic situation is far
from human rights oriented. In that decision, the British government
subordinated authority to detain suspected terrorists to the right to expel
aliens from the country.34 The court crafted a somewhat nebulous
distinction between nationals and non-nationals, which may be
summarized as follows: nationals have a right of abode while aliens have
the right not to be deported to countries where they could face torture or
inhuman and/or degrading treatment.335 Hence, based on a logic of
immigration, namely that the state can expel the suspects by virtue of
its inherent sovereign authority, the court held that these aliens could be
detained indefinitely.
In many regards, this decision is similar to the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals' holding in Hamdi, in that the British Court of Appeal
conferred a wide margin of appreciation and decision-making upon the
332. See, e.g., Elena Katselli & Sangeeta Shah, L September it and the UK Response, 52 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 245, 250-51 (2003).
333. A, X and Y v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (A, X and Y), EWCA Civ. 1502
(2oo2).
334- Id. para. 39-
335- Id. paras. 39-64.
336. Heymann, supra note 31, at 448, raises an important and related point when addressing
indefinite detention in the U.S.
[W]e can try to prevent a terrorist attack, especially at a time when we have received some
warning, by detaining aliens illegally in the United States or removable for cause (or on the
basis of the new detention power claimed in President Bush's "military order") who are in
some way associated with those of have been identified in connection with prior terrorist
events. To whatever extent the number detained is adequate to create a significant chance
of interference with the terrorist plan, the tactic will be effective. In each case, the
government would be acting within its ordinary powers to deal with the aliens who may be
removable, although not for the immigration purposes that explain granting the power to
detain an alien illegally in the United States (or someone needed for testimony at a later
trial).
Id. For a thoughtful review of the legal implications of administrative detention, see Wilsher, supra
note 138.
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executive.337 This outcome is difficult to grasp, given the Abbasi decision
on one hand, but also considering Lord Brooke's separate opinion and
particular reliance on Justice Jackson's famous dissent in Shaughnessy v.
United States.3"" In crafting his judgment, Lord Brooke summarized the
impact of international efforts against terrorism on the detention of non-
nationals: while the doctrine of the inherent power of the state to
determine applicable treatment of non-nationals within its territory is
being set aside, considerable emphasis is now placed on international
human rights norms and, therefore, any restriction on individual liberty
must be grounded in law and necessity.339 Proportionality between the
ends and the means also guides the analysis in that the "state's power to
detain must be related to a recognised object and purpose". 4 Finally,
Lord Brooke pointed out that "both customary international law and the
international treaties by which this country is bound expressly reserve
the power of a state in time of war or similar public emergency to detain
aliens on grounds of national security when it would not necessarily
detain its own nationals on those grounds."3" Interestingly enough, the
Court in Abbasi adopted this portion of Lord Brooke's reasoning
verbatim.342
Two conclusions can be drawn from this development in British
jurisprudence. First, the Court's attitude dissimulates a normal and
understandable double standard: it was adamant about having its owns
nationals repatriated from Guantanamo Bay, declaring that the U.S.
naval base was tantamount to a legal black hole. Yet, in the same
sweeping opinion, it also endorsed Lord Brooke's judgment and held
that non-nationals may be held indefinitely. Second, in relying on this
rationale, the Court has in fact ensured that post-9/i i policy on indefinite
detention has come full circle. Hence, it is now fair to assume that U.K.
337. Compare A, X and Y, with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). The court in A,
X and Y stated:
Decisions as to what is required in the interest of national security are self-evidently within
the category of decisions in relation to which the court is required to show considerable
deference to the Secretary of State because he is better qualified to make an assessment as
to what action is called for,
A, X and Y. para. 40.
338. 345 U.S. 205, 218-28 (953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Fortunately it still is startling, in this country, to find a person held indefinitely in executive
custody without accusation of crime or judicial trial. Executive imprisonment has been
considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man
should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land.
Id. at 218. For endorsement of this proposition by Lord Brooke, see A, X and Y, at para. 84.
339. A, X and Y, para. 130.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Abbasi v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs & Secretary of State for
the Home Department, [2oo2] EWCA Civ. t598, para. 65.
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policy on indefinite detention closely mirrors that of the United States,
albeit through different means, channels, and legal justifications.343
III. TARGETED KILLING OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
It is no secret that both the United States and Israel have been
engaging in a policy of targeted killing of terrorists.' This policy has
been sharply criticized as an impediment to peaceful relations and other
initiatives conducive to stability, especially in the case of Israel.345 In 2002,
the High Court of Justice of Israel unanimously refused to intervene in
the state's policy of targeted killing, 46 which it saw as a non-justiciable
issue. 7 Under this policy, the military identifies a particular terrorist and
proceeds to remove that person through an aerial strike"4" or other means
of assassination.49 Because this type of practice is incompatible with
international law, which categorically prohibits extra-judicial executions,
governments often dissimulate their actions." Such is the case in Israel,
343. For support of this proposition and critical differences between U.S. and U.K. policies on
indefinite detention, see Amann, supra note 125, at 343-45; see also supra note 157.
344. See generally William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination:
The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667 (2003); Benjamin A. Gorelick, The Israeli
Response to Palestinian Breach of the Oslo Agreements, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 651, 664-67
(2003); J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: "Targeted Killings" Under International Law,
80 N.C. L. REv. io69 (2002); Joshua Raines, Osama, Augustine, and Assassination: The Just War
Doctrine and Targeted Killings, 12 TRANSNAT'L L & CONTEMP. PROB. 217, 232-33 (2002); Theodore P.
Seto, The Morality of Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1227, 1233, 1238, nn.16, 23 (2oo2). It should also
be noted that the U.S. has lifted a long-held ban precluding the assassination of foreign leaders.
Mdgret, supra note 261, at 368.
345. See, e.g., Greg Myre, Vows of Reprisal as Arabs Mourn Slain Hamas Leader, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
18, 2004, at A8 (describing the aftermath of the targeted killing of Hamas leader Abdel Azis Rantisi).
346. H.C. 5872/01, Barakeh v. Prime Minister, 56(3) P.D. i.
347. For a thoughtful critique against the non-justiciability of the policy of targeted killing, see
Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli. Justice-Ability: A Critique of the Alleged Non-Justiciability of
Israel's Policy of Targeted Killings, I J. INr'L CRI5. JUST. 368 (2003); see also Ralph Ruebner,
Democracy, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in the Age of Terrorism: The Experience of Israel-A
Comparative Perspective, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 535-44 (2oo3). It should also be noted that
the issue of targeted killing is still pending before the Supreme Court of Israel. Leora Bilsky, Suicidal
Terror, Radical Evil, and the Distortion of Politics and Law, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 131, 151-52
n.44 (2004).
348. For an example of this practice via an aerial strike, see Gross, supra note 33, at 509.
349. See, e.g., Steven R. David, Targeted Killing Has Its Place, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at 13.
350. See Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44
HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, io8 (2003).
Israel has for years pursued a policy of assassinating its political opponents. Because
extrajudicial executions are universally condemned, most governments who practice
assassinations surround such actions in secrecy and deny carrying out the killings they may
have ordered. Although the Israeli government prefers to talk about "targeted killings" and
"preventative actions" (or "pinpointed preventative actions") rather than "extrajudicial
executions," members of the Israeli government have confirmed that such killings are a
deliberate government policy carried out under government orders.
Id.; see also Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Israel Must End its Policy of
Assassinations (July 4, 2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/IndexENGMDEI5562oo3
(last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
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where the death sentence has only been judicially imposed once, in the
trial of Adolf Eichmann"' Nevertheless, senior Israeli officials have
admitted that targeted killing is often used to thwart future terrorist
attacks, to punish suspected terrorists, and to deter further terrorist
activity.352 Some scholars argue that Great Britain, too, although not
resorting to capital punishment of suspected terrorists through judicial
channels, might have engaged in extra-judicial execution of individuals
involved in activities hostile to the security of the state.353
The policy of targeted killing shares an intimate connection with the
policy of indefinite detention, in that both practices have a significant
impact on human rights and due process. However, there is one
significant difference between the policies, hinging on the range of
consequences on the international human rights scheme. Under
indefinite detention, the rights of the detainee are suspended
temporarily, while the reintegration of the individual in society is still
possible. Conversely, under the targeted killing practice, such prospect
does not exist: the whole objective of the policy is to assassinate the
target.354  This objective inherently carries with it significant
circumvention of usual due process and constitutional safeguards with no
possibility of appealing the decision nor of presenting a defense against
the adversary's finding of culpability. Aside from the separate issue of
torture, which partially falls under the question of indefinite detention,
these two policies are the most important and troublesome practices in
the war on terror. In assessing their validity, one common thread must
act as a point of reference: international human right standards.
351. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 277 (Israel 1968); see also Thomas
Michael McDonnell, The Death Penalty-An Obstacle to the "War Against Terrorism"?, 37 VAND. J.
TRAN NAT'L L. 353, 402 n.226 (2004).
352. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, Israel Accused of Policy of Murder: Palestinians Say Barak is
Giving the Military a Free Hand for Assassinations, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. is, 2001 ("'I can tell you
unequivocally what the policy is,' the deputy defence minister, Ephraim Sneh, told Israel Radio last
week. 'If anyone has committed or is planning to carry out terrorist attacks, he has to be hit. It is
effective, precise, and just."'). The state of Israel has also claimed responsibility for specific killings.
Chibli Mallat, The Original Sin: "Terrorism" or "Crime Against Humanity"?, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 245, 245 (2002) ("Arab uneasiness is shared by governments and peoples, who hear the current
Prime Minister of Israel rave on the one hand about the self-righteousness of 'targeted killings."').
353. See, e.g., TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA 575-82 (2002); see also For the Sake of Democracy,
Britain's "Dirty War" Must be Investigated, IRISH TIMES, May 21, 2003, at 14.
354. In the context of Israel, it has been advanced that a policy of targeted killing enables the
Israeli military to better control the territory. Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role
for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. I, 21 n.162 (2004). The
issue of control is raised in the following quote by a senior Israeli official regarding the policy of
"targeted killing":
"Targeted killing is not only very valuable," Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, chief of planning and
policy in the Israeli military and one [of] its most senior officers, said in a recent interview.
"If we could not use this method in areas like Gaza, where we do not control the
territory... we could not fight effectively against terrorist groups."
Molly Moore, Israel's Lethal Weapon of Choice, WASH. POST, June 29, 2003, at Ai.
[Vol. 56:8Ol
May 2005] INDEFINITE DETENTION & TARGETED KILLING 875
A. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST TARGETED KILLING
Much has been written on the issue of targeted killing, both in favor
and against such a policy.355 Many compelling arguments have been
advanced in legal scholarship. For example, several commentators
expound that, under certain circumstances, targeted killing may be
interpreted as a legitimate exercise of the inherent right to self-defense
under international law. 6 Although it is fair to assert that targeted
killing can, at best, only be reconciled tenuously with the extant
international framework,"' it has been argued that a logic of anticipatory
self-defense could also justify such practice. 5" In this spirit, it has
sometimes been advocated that targeted killing is the most attractive
remedy in forestalling terrorist activities.359 Even though the conceptual
difference between "targeted killing" and "assassination" has
engendered confusion,36° influential voices argue that killing terrorists is a
lawful exercise of military activity, as opposed to assassination, which
necessarily entails removing civilian political leaders for political
purposes."' In fact, several American presidents have endorsed the idea
of targeted killing and, consequently, enticed the Department of Defense
to develop a guiding policy on this issue.3,2 For instance, President
355. See, e.g., Emanuel Gross, Democracy in the War Against Terrorism- The Israeli Experience,
35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1194-1204 (2002) [hereinafter Gross, Israeli Experience]; Emanuel Gross,
Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defence:
Human Rights Versus the State's Duty to Protect Its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L L. & CoMp. L.J. 195 (2001)
[hereinafter Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts]; Kendall, supra note 344; Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R.
Michaeli, "We Must Not Make A Scarecrow of the Law": A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of
Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233 (2003); Shany, supra note 63, at 103-08.
356. See, e.g., Brenda L. Godfrey, Authorization to Kill Terrorist Leaders and Those Who Harbor
Them: An International Analysis of Defensive Assassination, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 491 (2003); Gross,
Israeli Experience, supra note 355, at 1194-1204; Kendall, supra note 344, at 1o7o; see also David
Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of
Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171 (2005) (arguing that, under human rights law, such practice may be
lawful in forestalling an imminent attack, while, under international humanitarian law, its legality
hinges on the status of the suspected terrorists as "combatants").
357. See generally Chris Downes, "Targeted Killings" in an Age of Terror: The Legality of the
Yemen Strike, 9 J. CONFLICr & SECURrTY L. 277 (2004).
358. See, e.g., Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 344, at 725; Louis Rene Beres, On Assassination
As Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 2o HOFsTRA L. REV. 321 (i99i); Louis Rene Beres,
On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 29-33 (994); Kendall,
supra note 344, at Io7O; see also William C. Bradford, "The Duty to Defend Them": A Natural Law
Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1387 n.8o (2004)
(discussing the pragmatists' interpretation of preemptive self-defense).
359. See, e.g., Louis Rene Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During Peace
and War, 5 TEMP. INT'L L. & COMP. L.J, 231, 249 (1992); Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts, supra note
355, at 229.
360. See, e.g., Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict. 134 MIL. L. REV. 123,
145 (991).
361. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV.
89, 119 (1989).
362. See, e.g., Alan Einisman, Ineffectiveness at Its Best: Fighting Terrorism with Economic
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Clinton reportedly vetted Osama bin Laden's capture or death.363 The
response to 9/11 is no exception.3" After that day, President Bush
apparently authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to "pursue
an intense effort to end bin Laden's leadership of Al Qaeda."' 65
From the foregoing considerations, it is clear that the driving force
behind these arguments is prevention. Traditionally, the main arguments
militating in favor of an acceptable policy of assassination of terrorists
were summarized as follows:
Assassination may preclude greater evil ... produces fewer casualties
than retaliation with conventional weapons ... would be aimed at the
persons directly responsible for terrorist attacks .... Assassination of
terrorist leaders would disrupt terrorist groups more than any other
form of attack; and ... leaves no prisoners to become causes for
further terrorist attacks.36
Interestingly, some authors attempt to discredit the moral argument
against targeted killing, stating that advocating against such a policy is
tantamount to opposing any removal of individuals, be they combatants
or non-combatants, in the context of "traditional" war.36
Conversely, some commentators assert that we must uphold the
existing scheme of jus ad bellum, while placing particular emphasis on
the fact that the Bush Doctrine is subverting the "immediacy of the
threat posed"368 element under use of force law.369 These human rights
proponents expound that a policy of targeted killing will not shake the
foundations of terrorism but rather will only attract retaliation,370 thereby
Sanctions, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 299,323 (2000).
363. Sean D. Murphy, Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
237, 249 n.91 (2002).
364. See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., A Nation Challenged: Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001,
at B5; Barton Gellman, CIA Weighs "Targeted Killing" Missions, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2oos, at Ai;
Bob Woodward, CIA Told to Do "Whatever Necessary" to Kill bin Laden, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001,
at Ai.
365. Sean D. Murphy, International Law, the United States, and the Non-Military "War" Against
Terrorism, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 347, 363 (2003); see also Barry A. Feinstein, Operation Enduring
Freedom: Legal Dimensions of an Infinitely Just Operation, II J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 201, 282-83
(2002).
366. Pickard, supra note 297, at 31-32.
367. See Daniel Statman, Targeted Killing, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 179 (2004).
368. It is interesting to note that the three requirements found under the famous Caroline incident,
namely necessity, imminence, and proportionality, also govern the exercise of preemptive self-defense.
See, e.g., Brunde and Toope, supra note 6, at 25i; Robert Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod
Cases, AM. J. INT'L L. 32, 82 (1978); Michael Byers, Letting the Exception Prove the Rule, under
heading "Self-Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction" (Carnegie Council on Ethics and
International Affairs), at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prmID/
852 (last visited May I, 2004).
369. See generally Georg Nolte, Preventive Use of Force and Preventive Killings: Moves Into a
Different Legal Order, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. I II (2004).
370. See, e.g., Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development and Trade: Winning the War on Terror
Without the War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 587,602 (2004).
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widening the gap between Arab and Western societies and confirming
that Islam is being singled out, scrutinized, and targeted." Fiercer voices
vehemently condemn the practice of targeted killing under international
law-with some emphasis on foreign policy37'  and diplomatic
considerations373 - regardless of the circumstances. 374 The most attractive
argument against a policy of targeted killing relies predominantly upon
due process concerns and procedural safeguards.375 In addition, not only
is targeted killing incompatible with due process, but it also eludes the
traditional war paradigm,3"6 while being inconsonant with the United
States' obligations toward Iraqi and Afghani nationals on their respective
territories.
3 77
More importantly, such a policy impedes stability and peace-
building, while placing collateral or by-standing civilians at significant
risk: "Targeted killings shrink institutional repertoire by decreasing the
stake of each side in peaceful means of dispute resolution. They also
undermine inclusion, because they tend to affect not only specifically
intended targets, but also civilians from the same communities who
happen to be in the way." ' As mentioned, not only do targeted killings
engender collateral damage in the form of unnecessary civilian death, but
they also have a deleterious effect on democratic due process, regardless
of whether terrorist organizations may be targeted with military force.379
By assassinating a suspected terrorist, we are in fact stripping that person
of all the procedural guarantees surrounding a fair trial and usually
371. See, e.g., Colum Lynch, Musharraf Criticizes Terror War: Pakistani President Says Muslims
Are Feeling Targeted, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at A12.
372. See, e.g., Amy C. Roma, Assassinations: Executive Orders and World Stability, 36 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 109 (2002).
373. See, e.g., Nathan Canestaro, American Law and Policy on Assassinations of Foreign Leaders:
The Practicality of Maintaining the Status Quo, 26 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2003).
374. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 45.
375. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Making "Regime Change" Multilateral: The War on Terror and
Transitions to Democracy, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 389, 410-I t (2004).
376. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
377. Margulies, supra note 375, at 410-I.
The "targeted killing" or assassination of suspected practitioners of violence by
government, including the Israeli government's killing of Hamas leaders, suffers from the
same flaws as killings carried out by transnational oppositional organizations. Such
summary measures do not comfortably fit within the procedural safeguards of law
enforcement, the temporal and geographic bounds of most wars, or the obligations to a
civilian population undertaken by an occupying power.
Id.
378. Id. at 41 t; see also supra note 33.
379. On the issue of whether terrorists may be targeted with military force, see Brown, supra note
191, at 24-25 ("If a non-state actor such as a terrorist organization commits aggression against a state,
and the aggression is of sufficient scale and effect to amount to an armed attack, then the terrorist
organization itself-notwithstanding its non-combatant status-has committed an armed attack
against the state.").
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afforded any accused under domestic criminal law or human rights law."'
In short, we are depriving that individual of the right to a fair trial, a
cognizable and irreconcilable affront to international human rights
norm."' The objective here is not to weigh every possible argument for
and against targeted killing, nor is to resolve the debate surrounding such
a policy.382 Rather, my analysis purports to briefly canvass the major
international legal restraints on targeted killing, in order to demonstrate
that, similar to indefinite detention, this practice is morally and legally
unpalatable under the current scheme of international law. Furthermore,
carrying out a shoot-to-kill policy when apprehension of a given suspect
is reasonably feasible would clearly violate the Fourth Amendment.""
B. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON TARGETED KILLING
Belonging primarily to the armed conflict paradigm, 384 the policy of
targeted killing engenders a myriad of moral dilemmas in the war on
380. See, e.g., William Joseph Wagner, As Justice and Prudence Dictate: The Morality of America's
War Against Terrorism-A Response to James V. Schall, S.J., 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 35, 44-45 (2OOI).
In the context of America's present dispute with terrorism, the true challenge to
prudence posed by the principle of proportionality is, yet again, different and it could easily
be overlooked. The perpetrators of the wrongs of September I ith were not themselves the
representatives of a sovereign state. They were rather individuals aligned with a movement
of cultural and religious reform. As individuals, they would ordinarily be entitled to the due
process of law. Thus, the Taliban asked for proof of Osama bin Laden's guilt before they
would agree to his extradition by the United States. On the face of it, they were observing
the appropriate form which is a prerequisite to the coercion of an individual. To directly
attack an individual to remedy redressable wrongs without notice or hearing would
ordinarily be itself a serious violation of the due process of law. The violation would be
twofold. It would be to disregard the public authority charged with maintaining the order of
justice under the rule of law within the individual's society. And, it would be to deprive the
individual affected of the respect owed every person until there is a legal adjudication of his
guilt. For these reasons, targeted killings, whether of Fidel Castro, as reportedly once
pursued by the CIA, or more recently undertaken by Israel against Palestinian leaders, are
presumptively illicit.
Id.
381. "For example, the Israeli army is engaged in assassinations (referred to in Israel as 'targeted
killing') of suspected terrorists, that is, killing suspected individuals without trial. During these attacks
civilians might also get killed or injured (the term used for this result is 'collateral damage')." Bilsky,
supra note 347, at L47.
382. For a thoughtful review of national and international legal restraints on state-sponsored
targeted killings, see Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609 (1992).
383. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 344, at 674, nn.27, 28 (citing Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F-3 d
359, 367, 377 (9 th Cir. 2ooi), vacated as moot, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2oo1)).
384. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 15, at 346.
The large body of international instruments on terrorism has not heretofore been regarded
as an aspect of the international law of armed conflict. Terrorist crimes do not generally
violate the laws of war. Mutual criminal assistance with respect to other transnational
crimes, such as drug trafficking and migrant smuggling, is similar to international
cooperation against terrorism. The fact that military forces participate in law enforcement
activities against terrorists or drug traffickers has not in the past sufficed to change the
character of the "war on terrorism" or the "war on drugs" from a criminal law paradigm to
an armed conflict paradigm. "War" terminology signifies a high priority, a marshaling of
substantial resources, and a sustained commitment to eradicating the threat.
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terror. The focal point is easily decipherable: to what extent is the
targeted killing of suspected terrorists justifiable under international
law? Although an analysis of the legality of this practice will ineluctably
require the international community to engage in profound moral
introspection, targeted killing, like indefinite detention, does not exist in
a legal vacuum. 5' In fact, international law is sufficiently defined and
circumscribed to condemn such a policy. The primary reason behind the
illegality of such practice lies in the very purpose underlying the laws of
war and international humanitarian law: the protection of innocent
civilians.3s6 Furthermore, the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, 387 including unprivileged belligerents, will undoubtedly
inform the analysis.
In a broader sense, from the perspective of international law and
order, condoning the targeted killing of human beings, without any form
of legal or judicial adjudication, regardless of the crimes involved, would
be tantamount to an aberration98 Unlike forcible displacement or
abduction of suspected terrorists, where the objective is to neutralize,
relocate, and prosecute certain individuals under domestic law, the very
purpose of targeted killing is to eliminate a human being without
detention or interrogation."" The policy of targeted killing inherently
entails greater stakes and, correspondingly, moral objection to it should
be heightened.
Articles 48 and 51(I)(2) of the Additional Protocol indicate that
civilians may not be targeted for an attack.3" As discussed above,39 this
rule is now part of customary international law.39 As a corollary, only
385. See, e.g., Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 347, at 369-7o ("Targeted state killings do not take
place in a vacuum; they reflect an administrative decision, a deliberate choice of means of warfare in
response to attacks against Israelis in the context of the al-Aqsa Intifada.").
386. See supra note 9.
387. On this rule of distinction, see Jinks, supra note 99, at 378-79.
388. In fact, I harbored similar resistance vis-A-vis a policy of forcible abduction of suspected
terrorists, namely when confronted with a Yunis-like situation. Vincent-Joel Proulx, Rethinking the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the Post-September sith Era: Should Acts of
Terrorism Qualify As Crimes Against Humanity?, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2004). In sum,
the thrust of my policy argument was that it is difficult to promote a system where transnational
bounty hunters abound, where legal institutions may lose part of their institutional structure or impact,
and where law enforcement agencies are free to concoct elaborate and deceitful schemes, such as "buy
and bust operations." This type of situation seems too reminiscent of the Far West to fit under a global
framework where human dignity and protection of the individual should prevail.
389. See, e.g., Imseis, supra note 35o, at io8 (speaking of a "a deliberate government policy carried
out under government orders").
39o. Additional Protocol, supra note 38, arts. 48, 51(I)-(2). The definition of "civilian" is found at
Article 5o of the Additional Protocol.
391. See supra notes 282-88.
392. See also Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud Kassem, 42 INT'L L. REP. 470, 483 (Israeli Mil.
Ct. 197) ("Immunity of non-combatants from direct attack is one of the basic rules of the
international law of war.").
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military targets are traditionally permissible under this regime.393 Like
under Article 44(3) of the Additional Protocol94 and Article 4.A(2)(b) of
Geneva Convention III," members of military forces have an obligation
to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. This reasoning is
also consonant with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Ex Parte
Quirin.396 Furthermore, Article 51(4)(5) of the Additional Protocol"
specifies that indiscriminate attacks are not permitted, while the methods
of warfare398 used should not inflict superfluous or unnecessary injury,
pursuant to Article 35(I)(2). 39 In order to attain this objective, Article 57
of the Additional Protocol" enumerates several precautionary measures
tailored to minimize possible damage to civilian life. This requirement is
also philosophically adjacent with the International Court of Justice's
Advisory Opinion on the use of Nuclear Weapons, where the Court
identified two cardinal principles of humanitarian law: the protection of
the civilian population, premised on the distinction between combatants
and non-combatants, and the prohibition on causing unnecessary
suffering to combatants.4" It is interesting to note that the U.S. Field
Manual also mirrors these fundamental postulates of international
humanitarian law:
The conduct of armed hostilities on land is regulated by the law of land
warfare which is both written and unwritten. It is inspired by the desire
to diminish the evils of war by:
a. Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary
suffering;
b. Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall
into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the
wounded and sick, and civilians; and
c. Facilitating the restoration of peace.4"'
From this legal framework, it is clear that the protection of civilians
is sacrosanct and is the uncontested cornerstone of international
393. Additional Protocol, supra note 38, art. 48.
394. Supra note 174.
395. Supra note 177.
396. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
397. Additional Protocol, supra note 38, arts. 51(4)-(5).
398. In its decision regarding targeted killing, H.C. 5872/01, Barakeh v. Prime Minister, 56(0) P.D.
i, the High Court of Justice of Israel initially declined to address the issue of state-sponsored
assassinations due to the nature of the means of warfare chosen by the state. See Naftali and Michaeli,
supra note 347, at 369 (translating the relevant portion of the judgment: "The choice of means of
warfare, used by the Respondents to preempt murderous terrorist attacks, is not the kind of issue the
Court would see fit to intervene in.").
399. Additional Protocol, supra note 38, arts. 35(l)-(2).
400. Id. art. 57.
401. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 827 para. 78 (Advisory
Opinion of July 8, 1996).
402. U.S. Field Manual, supra note 128, art. 2.
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humanitarian law. However, when faced with sophisticated terrorist
organizations such as Al Qaeda, well-defined theoretical guidelines tend
to blur. We know for certain from Article 51(3) of the Additional
Protocol that civilians who take part in hostilities are lawful targets.4 3 A
contrary policy would entail perverse results: members of military forces
could disguise themselves as civilians in order to deceive and to fulfill
military objectives.4 4 Many jurisdictions have confirmed the validity of
this statement, including in the case of Mohamed Ali. 5 An interesting
parallel may be drawn here between terrorists and mercenaries. It is fair
to assume that both these classes of irregular combatants will usually not
be afforded POW status, primarily because they do not conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws of war.4 6 Even if we were to
accept that these types of fighters do not raise a doubt as to their status
and, correspondingly, attract less protection than regular combatants,
they would nevertheless be entitled to a fair trial, along with all the
guarantees found at Article 75 of the Additional Protocol.4'
There is no doubt that the majority of Al Qaeda members actively
engaged in belligerent activities would fall within the purview of Article
51(3), thereby facing two major consequences for being unprivileged
combatants taking part in the hostilities. On one hand, they would not be
entitled to POW status.'0 On the other hand, and as a corollary to the
first consequence, such individuals who have become lawful military
targets as a result of their belligerency, are not immune from prosecution
for their acts.4" It logically follows that civilians not actively participating
403. Additional Protocol, supra note 38, art. 51(3). For academic support of this proposition, see,
for example, Watkin, supra note 354, at x6. See also supra notes 282-88.
404. This reasoning is consonant with the holding in Ex Parte Quirin. We also saw the
condemnation of this practice in the post-Geneva Convention era, namely in Mohamed Ali and
Another v. Public Prosecutor, 42 Int'l L. Rep. 458 (Malay., Judicial Comm. of the Privy Council, 1968).
405. Mohamed Ali, 42 Int'l L. Rep. at 458; see also Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud Kassem,
42 Int'l L. Rep. 470,470 (Israeli Mil. Ct. 1971).
406. See, e.g., Draper, supra note 204, at 173 (concluding that irregular combatants do not comply
with one or more requirements found in Article 4 of Convention III). For a practical application of this
concept to members of Al Qaeda, see, for example, Vierucci, supra note 98, at 294 ("Finally, Al Qaeda
has certainly also contravened the requirement of conducting its operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.").
407. Additional Protocol, supra note 38, art. 75; see also Kittichaisaree, supra note r6, at 14o n.63.
Since mercenaries are not considered by customary international law to be combatants,
they would presumably be civilians, but since they take a direct or active part in the
hostilities, the scope of their protection is relatively more limited than that of civilians
taking no active part in the hostilities. They would, for example, be entitled to the right to a
fair trial and the fundamental guarantees under Art. 75 of AP I....
Id.
408. Article 5o(i) of the Additional Protocol establishes who is entitled to POW status via a renvoi
back to Article 4A of Convention III. See my comments on Article 4 of Convention III, supra Part
II.B.4.b.
409. See Cassese, supra note 284, at 3.
Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities are "protected persons" under the Fourth
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in the hostilities retain their "protected person" status, pursuant to
Article 5 of Convention IV.4"' Furthermore, "when civilians taking a
direct part in hostilities lay down their arms, they re-acquire non-
combatant immunity and may not be made object of attack although they
are amenable to prosecution for unlawfully participating in hostilities
(war crimes). '4. Hence, we may draw an important question from these
considerations: are the U.S. and Israeli armies complying with
international law when they target individuals who, if captured, would
not attract POW status? In order to pronounce on the legality of such a
policy, it is imperative to briefly analyze to what extent the rules of jus in
bello prohibit targeting lawful combatants, before moving on to the more
delicate question of targeting non-combatants.
I. Targeting Lawful Combatants Versus Non-Combatants
As a general rule, the Geneva Conventions do not apply to targeted
killing, as they remain silent on who constitutes a lawful target.4"2 Thus,
to examine targeted killing of individuals who are not in the hands of the
enemy, we must rely on Article 23 of the Hague Regulations4"3 and the
Additional Protocol. Article 23(b) of the Hague Regulations provides
that it is "especially forbidden" to "kill or wound treacherously." In fact,
the "term 'treacherously' means that an act is carried out through a
breach of confidence",4 4 thereby militating in favor of a sharp distinction
between combatants and non-combatants."5 We could envision a
Geneva Convention but forfeit immunity from attack and become lawful targets for the
duration of their engagement in hostilities. These civilians retain the same protection as
combatants during the conduct of hostilities (e.g. protection from attack if hors de combat)
except for immunity from prosecution. They are referred to in some judicial decisions and
in the legal literature as "unlawful combatants", namely combatants who fight outside the
laws of war. However, the term "unlawful combatant" is merely descriptive and is by no
means intended to create a third status between those of combatant and civilian.
Id.
410. Convention IV, supra note II, art. 5.
411. Cassese, supra note 284, at 3; see also Yoram Dinstein, The Distinction Between Unlawful
Combatants and War Criminals, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 102, 112 (Yoram
Dinstein ed., 1989).
412. This is not to say that the Geneva Conventions will be excised altogether from the equation of
targeted killing. In fact, the Conventions will have relevant applications in some circumstances. A case
in point is the famous example of Navy Captain Shelly Young's legal advice. In October 2oo, the U.S.
military identified a Taliban convoy, which reportedly carried wanted Taliban leader Mullah
Mohammed Omar. The military asked permission to strike the convoy. Upon Captain Shelly Young's
advice, it refrained from carrying out the strike, fearing, among other things, that women and children
were also being carried in the convoy. One of the main concerns in disapproving the proposed strike
relied upon the prohibition of state-sponsored assassination, as found in the Geneva Conventions.
Esther Schrader, Who's Pulling the Trigger? Combat Often Conducted on the Advice of Counsel,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 24, 2002.
413. Hague Regulations, supra note 39.
414. Cassese, supra note 284, at 7.
415. See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel (s) Joseph P. "Dutch" Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful
Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L.
REV. I, 23 n.27 (citing HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTs 471 (Dieter Fleck ed.,
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situation where members of a mission purporting to "take out" a target
would resort to deceitful tactics and violate the laws of war to achieve the
objective. For instance, if the attackers were to infiltrate a community,
wearing civilian clothing, in order to remove the target, this would clearly
contravene to the Hague Regulations. In canvassing these provisions, we
automatically see a connection with Article 37 of the Additional
Protocol,4'6 which prohibits killing through perfidy or through the
usurpation of the opponent's confidence. However, these arguments are
far from dispositive, as aerial attacks on individuals do not, per se,
involve the use of deceitful tactics.
One of the most persuasive legal restraints on targeted killing of
individuals lies in Article 23(c) of the Hague Regulations4 17 and Article 40
of the Additional Protocol,'" which unequivocally create an obligation on
the targeting force to provide quarter. The explanation usually invoked
to paraphrase the obligation to provide quarter has taken on many forms
in history. In short, this obligation may be encapsulated as follows: in
combat, no one is ever entitled to state "kill them all" or "take no
prisoners," and is thereby forbidden from conducting operations aiming
to fulfill these statements.
Two divergent positions on the proper reading of the provisions
warrant consideration. Firstly, one could opine that, when engaged in
hostilities, an attacking force is entitled to kill any individual who belongs
to the enemy army. If a combatant decides to lay down arms and
surrender, then he will be entitled to claim POW status.4"9 This
necessarily places the onus to manifest the intention of becoming a POW
or laying down arms on the individual combatant and, correspondingly,
implies that the opposing side must be receptive to the notification.
Therefore, based on that reading of the provisions, the prohibition on
1985).
[T]he feigning of civilian, non-combatant status in order to attack the enemy by surprise
constitutes the classic case of "treacherous killing of an enemy combatant" which was
prohibited by Article 23 (b) of the Hague Regulations; it is the obvious case of disgraceful
behavior which can (and should) be sanctioned under criminal law as a killing not justified
by the laws of war, making it a common crime of murder. Obscuring the distinction between
combatants and civilians is extremely prejudicial to the chances of serious implementation
of the rules of humanitarian law; any tendency to blur the distinction must be sanctioned
heavily by the international community; otherwise the whole system based on the concept
of distinction will break down.
Id.
416. Additional Protocol, supra note 38, art. 37. On the notion of perfidy during wartime, see
Joshua Rozenberg, The Perils of Perfidy in Wartime, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 3, 2003; see also The
Iraq Conflict: Laws of War, Prisoners of War, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 1, 2003.
417. Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 23(c) ("Art. 23. In addition to the prohibitions
provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden... (c) To kill or wound an enemy who,
having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion").
418. Additional Protocol, supra note 38, art. 40 ("It is prohibited to order that there shall be no
survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis.").
419. See Cassese, supra note 284, at 3.
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not giving quarter would not be applicable to targeted killing.
Conversely, one could also advocate that the provision on quarter
governs the targeted killing issue, and rightly so. Although, in the past,
these provisions have sometimes been understood through the lens of the
first reading, I contend that targeted killing amounts to a violation of
customary international law. When the United States or Israel proceeds
to aerial attacks, they are effectively stripping the target of his right to
claim POW status,42 which is in direct violation of Articles 4 and 5 of
Convention 111.421 Similarly, another legal restraint on targeted killing
resides in Article 41 of the Additional Protocol,422 which grants immunity
from attack to soldiers who are hors de combat.423 It follows that, when
soldiers are not hors de combat, they remain lawful targets, provided the
attack is carried out using weapons that discriminate between
combatants and non-combatants to the extent possible. The language in
this provision clearly indicates the intention of its drafters to regulate the
conduct of hostilities. Even ordinary combatants who are entitled to
POW status are not unconditionally lawful targets or invariably subject
to attacks. This only reinforces the proposition that unprivileged
combatants, who are deprived of POW status, should have the
opportunity to surrender or lay down arms.4"4 Hence, a policy of targeted
killing seems intractable under any circumstance, even if applied to
regular combatants. There is a more than subtle distinction between
situational fighting, where combatants have the opportunity to abdicate
or to waive a white flag ostentatiously, and a willful plan to carry out an
assassination without providing the human target the opportunity to
surrender. I maintain that this distinction is authoritative.
The final legal restraint is found at article 5I(5)(b) of the Additional
Protocol4t and brings us to the legality of targeting unprivileged
420. Also, the practiceof targeted killing does not afford the targeted individual the possibility to
surrender, regardless of whether that person would have been entitled to POW status or not. Hence,
the obligation to provide quarter is defeated. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 45.
421. See my discussion on the importance of POW status, supra Part II.B.4.
422. See Additional Protocol, supra note 38, art. 41.
423. Id. It is interesting to note that, similarly to combatants who lay down arms, terrorists who are
planning an attack may not be targeted if they are not actively participating in hostilities. They are,
however, subject to prosecution for planning terrorist activities.
Terrorists who plan or prepare, or somehow aid and abet in the planning or preparation of
an attack, may not be targeted as long as they are not engaging in a military operation on
the battlefield. Also those terrorists who, after committing an hostile act, lay down arms,
may not be made object of attack. However, they may be arrested and brought to trial. The
trial must afford the relevant internationally recognised judicial safeguards.
Cassese, supra note 284, at 13.
424. It must be stressed that when they do lay down arms, these individuals will be amenable to
prosecution for their belligerent acts. See supra note 409; Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals,
United Nations War Crimes Commission, vol. VIII at 58 and vol. XII at 86 (i949).
425. Article 51(5)(b) of the Additional Protocol states:
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: ...
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426
combatants, namely individuals who do not enjoy the benefits of POW
status. This provision prohibits an attack that may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians and which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.2 7 When it ratified the Additional Protocol, the U.K.
specified its interpretation of this text, stating that the commander in
charge, with the knowledge he had at the time of the attack, has the
authority to make the decision on targeted killing.4"s According to this
position, we should not benefit from the hindsight of the judge in
applying the inherent standard of excessiveness. Rather the ultimate
determination is made on a moral basis. This scheme inherently entails a
wide margin of appreciation and discretion for the state conducting
military operations aiming to eliminate terrorists, especially vis-a-vis the
question of proportionality.4 9 I do not purport to review this standard
but do contend that it should be addressed on a case-by-case basis, as
different circumstances attract different degrees of morality.
2. Assessing the Legality of Targeted Killing
Professor Cassese suggests a test for gauging the exercise of targeted
killing which can be summarized as follows: only when an individual is
wearing civilian clothing and is manifestly carrying weapons or bombs
may that person be targeted.4" To some people, it may be synonymous
(b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Additional Protocol, supra note 38, art. 51(5)(b).
426. It must be recalled that these individuals do not comply with the laws of war and fail to
observe the criteria found in Article 4 of Convention III, supra note ii. Certain scholars infer that
terrorists may be lawfully targeted for extra-judicial killing by virtue of their status as "combatants."
See, e.g., Alan Dershowitz, They Don't Have to Wear Combats to Be a Fair Target, The Times, Apr. 22,
2004 (applying this reasoning to Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr: "It does not matter whether the
combatant is a cook or bombmaker, a private or a general. Nor does it matter whether he wears an
army uniform, a threepiece suit or a kaffiyeh. So long as he is in the chain of command, he is an
appropriate target regardless of whether he is actually engaged in combat at the time that he is killed
or is fast asleep.").
427. Similarly, Article 35 of the Additional Protocol also constitutes a restraint on any attack that
would cause superfluous or unnecessary injury.
428. In fact, the drafting history of this provision was punctuated by confusion and controversy, as
it entailed serious considerations pertaining to the issue of proportionality. See, e.g., Thomas Michael
McDonnell, Cluster Bombs Over Kosovo: A Violation of International Law?, 44 ARiz. L. REv. 31, 79-
85 (2002).
429. See, e.g., Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The
Third Geneva Convention and the "War on Terror," 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 301, 305 (2003).
The rule of proportionality is a classic example of an instance where a wide measure of
discretion is left to the state. The rule requires that, in the course of military operations,
attacks shall be prohibited if civilian loss of life or damage to civilian objects would be
"excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." The
compromise here is between human suffering and military utility ....
Id. (discussing Article 51(5)(b) of the Additional Protocol).
430. Cassese, supra note 284, at 6.
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with absurd to target Osama bin Laden only if those conditions are met.
However, I maintain that this type of reasoning leads to a series of
problems in the identification of terrorists, a concern sometimes labeled
as "the slippery slope" argument. "By participating in assassination, a
government places itself on a slippery slope. If the assassination of one
leader is acceptable, then the assassinations of other leaders are
tolerated, and if assassination is not condemned, then any troublesome
individual may be subject to assassination by the United States."43' If we
open the door to this type of measure, can the executive target anyone
suspected of being a terrorist or can it remove someone who constitutes a
mere inconvenience?43 This policy is obviously conducive to countless
abuses or even honest mistakes.433 Moreover, if there is no doubt as to
whether the targeted person is a terrorist and that-in carrying out the
attack, the targeting military does not injure civilians-they are still
acting on the assumption that the adversary accepts their determination
that the targeted individual was involved in hostilities against the
targeting power. We must recall that the laws of war are based on the
concept of reciprocity, regardless of whether Al Qaeda is respectful of
civilian life or not. It follows that protection "of the civilian population
must always be the overriding consideration." '434
Some may argue that if the military has no internal mechanism to
review decision-making, then it engages in indiscriminate attacks. In
response to this concern, we could envision a system where the judiciary
would review the discretion of the attacker and intervene in real time.
However, in addition to being burdened by logistical impediments, such
arrangement would raise serious evidentiary problems, pertaining,
among other things, to the applicable burden of proof, the protection of
confidential sources, the legitimacy of ex parte proceedings when the
objective is to kill a human being, etc. In order to dissipate some of the
legal uncertainty surrounding the war on terror, some commentators
suggest that the role of lawyers in assisting armed forces with making
split-second decisions in real time should be enhanced.435 In fact, I
alluded to the case of Navy Captain Shelly Young, whose advice resulted
in the decision not to strike a convoy reportedly carrying Taliban leader
431. Wiebe, supra note 263, at 403.
432. For a discussion of these concerns, see JOHN JACOB NUTrER, THE CIA's BLACK OPS: COVERT
ACTION, FOREIGN POLICY, AND DEMOCRACY 147 (Prometheus Books 2000).
433. See, e.g., Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2002, at AI; see also supra note 33.
434. McDonald & Sullivan, supra note 429, at 305; see also Red Cross Urges Observance of Laws of
War, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 21, 2003 (reporting that the President of "the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) called on all sides in the war in Iraq to abide by the Geneva Conventions
yesterday and reminded them that they must do everything possible to spare civilians and prisoners.").
435. For a concise review of these issues, see Rear Admiral Michael F. Lohr & Commander Steve
Gallotta, Legal Support in War: The Role of Military Lawyers, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 465 (2003).
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Mullah Mohammed Omar.436
The scenario of the unmanned drone has emerged from these legal
considerations and yields important questions, both from hypothetical
and realistic perspectives.437 In fact, the United States has taken the
position that anyone suspected of being part of the Al Qaeda network
may be legitimately targeted using an unmanned drone, a device capable
of locating and eliminating a human being."" Among other concerns, this
practice poses significant challenges to traditional law enforcement. For
example, it could reasonably be argued that the United States has a duty
to attempt to arrest suspected terrorists rather than to kill them, using
lethal force only as a solution of last resort.439 To remove a suspected
terrorist with an unmanned drone excises the possibility of arrest,
detention, and interrogation altogether from the equation." As a
corollary, the targeted killing of a suspected terrorist essentially
translates into an extra-judicial execution, a practice categorically
proscribed by human rights law."' If endorsed, the full extent of a U.S.
436. See supra note 409. Although counsel by international legal experts in the war on terror is
desirable, the executive has often brushed aside pertinent legal advice. On the issues of torture and
indefinite detention, see Suzanne Goldenberg, Guantanamo: Bush Ignored Pentagon Lawyers Over
Tactics in War on Terror: No Consultation on Detention Without Charge, THE GUARDIAN, June 9, 2004,
at 4.
437. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 45, at 327.
So those killing as part of an armed conflict, taking action against others understood to be
enemy combatants, will not generally be prosecuted for the deaths they cause. In these
conditions, suspected members of Al Qaeda who do not surrender may be killed without
warning. Whether they may be killed through the use of an unmanned drone is, however,
still controversial.
Id.
438. See, e.g., id. at 326.
One of the dangerous effects of the U.S. characterization of the "war on terrorism" as a
single global international armed conflict is that, if correct, such classification makes
deliberate attacks upon members of the "enemy armed forces" lawful worldwide. The
United States considers any member of a terrorist group as an "enemy combatant" who
may be attacked. Thus, the United States justified an unmanned missile strike that hit and
killed suspected members of AI-Qaeda in Yemen.
Sassbli, Use and Abuse, supra note 187, at 212.
439. See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,
Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba,
Article 9, at 112, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 14 4/28/Rev. I (i99o)
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or
defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the
perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person
presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and
only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event,
intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to
protect life.
Id.
44o. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 45, at 330. To arrest and detain suspected terrorists also serves
the function of advancing other cases and pending prosecutions. Hence, arresting a suspected terrorist
could prove more helpful to U.S. investigations than eliminating the individual. Id.
441. See, e.g., Sassbli, Use and Abuse, supra note 187, at 212-13. It has been argued that certain
governments, namely the U.S., Israel, and the U.K., engage in a policy of extra-judicial executions
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policy of targeted killing would empower law enforcement officials to
forcibly remove individuals within the United States or Canada. "[T]his
theory would have justified, subject to the principle of proportionality, an
ambush attack on Jos6 Padilla when he left his plane at a Chicago airport
or at his grandmother's birthday party."
442
Moreover, the fact that CIA operatives are most likely to coordinate
targeted killings using the drone is also problematic. Since these
operatives themselves do not conform to the laws of war, by failing to
wear distinctive insignia and by not carrying arms openly,"3 they may be
subject to prosecution for war crimes.'
More importantly, the policy of targeted killing generates two
unpalatable results under international law. Although the assassination
of a suspected terrorist might be executed with precision in certain
circumstances, the margin for error and abuse is simply too great to
ignore. To carry out a targeted killing when civilian deaths will likely
ensue-or when the target has not clearly been identified-is morally
irresponsible and in clear violation of the laws of war."5 In many
regards"6 the practice of targeted killing is often an indiscriminate attack
by definition."7 This type of policy frequently engenders the loss of
civilian life, or "collateral damage."44
Often, the targeting government does not fully or adequately assess
through the targeting killing of suspected terrorists. See supra note 350-353.
442. Sassbli, Use and Abuse, supra note 187, at 213.
443. The Israeli Military Court sitting in Ramallah was quite instructive on this issue. Military
Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud Kassem, 42 INT'L L. REP. 470, 479 (Israeli Mil. Ct. 1971) ("The phrase
'carrying arms openly' is not to be understood to mean carrying arms in places where the arms and the
persons carrying them cannot be seen.").
444. Sass6li, Use and Abuse, supra note 187, at 327-28.
Another problem with using the drone concerns the people operating it in the Afghan and
Yemen cases. The CIA is not part of the regular U.S. armed forces. Its members might still
qualify as lawful combatants if they could be characterized as a militia under the Geneva
Conventions, in other words, if they have a commander, wear insignia, carry their weapons
openly and conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Sometimes
CIA members do, in fact, wear uniforms with insignia. They sometimes operate in an
organization under a commander and are understood to be committed to law of war. But
operating a drone remotely hardly constitutes carrying weapons openly. This last factor is
the most important of all in distinguishing combatants from civilians. Civilians may not be
intentionally killed in combat, thus the imperative need for distinguishing them. If the use
of the drone does not constitute carrying weapons openly, then the CIA may have
committed violations of the law of war ....
Id.
445. See, e.g., Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18
WIS. INT'L L.J. 145, 172 (2000).
446. For more background on house demolitions, see Brian Farell, Israeli Demolition of
Palestinian Houses As A Punitive Measure: Application of International Law to Regulation 119, 28
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871, 884-99 (2003); Donald Macintyre, Israeli Destruction of Palestinian Homes
"Violates International Law," THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 19, 2004, at 29.
447. See, e.g., supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
448. See, e.g., Bilsky, supra note 347, at 147; Margulies, supra note 375, at 411; see also supra note
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the potential harm to civilians when preparing a targeted strike against a
suspected terrorist."9 The argument claiming that the military can readily
identify a single terrorist and remove that person, without any ripple
effects might seem attractive at first sight. However, the legal and moral
implications of this practice are further compounded when the military
is, for example, targeting a warehouse full of civilians and insurgents to
eliminate a single person.45 In addition, the targeting power may be
acting on unreliable intelligence reports or without assurances that the
given individual is in fact at the targeted location, and within the
expected timeframe of the strike.
The ticking bomb paradigm45' has sometimes been invoked to
vindicate a policy of targeted killing." Yet, when armed forces are in fact
pursuing a plan to eradicate a suspected terrorist through covert or
surreptitious means, the case for the ticking bomb argument is disabled.
In such instances, the admitted objective, whether grounded in pre-
emption or reaction, is not to prevent a future attack. Rather, it is to
remove the person for reasons of convenience or to circumvent any
subsequent judicial proceeding involving the targeted individual. Hence,
the threat, which was the very existence of the suspected terrorist, has
been eliminated without any genuine efforts to prosecute the targeted
individual through legitimate channels. This troublesome practice offers
all the convenience, practicality, and peace of mind of sentencing a
criminal to death, but without the initial finding of culpability.
This leads us to the most compelling argument against a policy of
targeted killing: The lack of due process resulting from this practice.
When armed forces proceed to aerial attacks without warning, they are
actually curtailing due process,453 violating the audi alteram partem
principle, preventing the target from contesting the determination that
he or she is a terrorist, and imposing a unilateral death penalty.454 In this
449. A case in point is Israel. It is doubtful whether Israel has properly evaluated the risks of
harming civilians in carrying out targeted killings. See generally Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Selective
Justice: The Case of lsrael and the Occupied Territories, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 934, 943-44 (2003).
450. See supra notes 33-34, and accompanying text.
451. For a concise definition of the ticking bomb paradigm, see Chanterelle Sung, Torturing the
Ticking Bomb Terrorist: An Analysis of Judicially Sanctioned Torture in the Context of Terrorism, 23
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193, 194-95 (2003) (book review).
The "ticking bomb" scenario refers to a hypothetical situation where a bomb has been
activated and the only person who may have information to prevent or minimize the
potential damage from an explosion of the bomb is the suspect, who refuses to disclose this
information.
Id.
452. See, e.g., David Rudge, Targeted Killing-Effective Anti-Terror or Counterproductive?,
JERUSALEM PosT, Jan. 7, 2003, at 2.
453. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 375, at 411-12.
454. The practice of targeted killing is also a flagrant violation of Article 75(4) of the Additional
Protocol, supra note 38 ("No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person
found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction
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way, the very purpose of international human rights is defeated, whether
through the violation of the right to a fair trial,455 the absolute
circumvention of the right to liberty,456 or the disregard of the inherent
right to life.457 The targeted individual is not afforded the opportunity to
surrender4" nor to claim POW status. Unlike indefinite detention, where
the suspected terrorist is temporarily deprived of personal freedom,
targeted killing entails far greater consequences with absolutely no
margin for judicial review, appeals, or any kind of procedural or
substantive safeguards for the targeted individual. In this light, it
becomes accurate, and perhaps trite, to state that targeted individuals are
stuck in a legal black hole. In any given case, endorsing a policy of
targeted killing essentially means that a single bullet will be prosecutor,
judge, and executioner all at once. On that basis alone, the international
community should categorically deplore and condemn targeted killing
under international law, as it challenges fundamental notions of law and
dignity.
This discussion requires a final word on the issue of
proportionality.459 In this analysis, we cannot forget the Caroline
doctrine,46° as the United States and Israel overtly violate the U.N.
Charter's prohibition on the use of force, pursuant to Article 2(4).461 In
pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized
principles of regular judicial procedure."). For a thoughtful review of the role of the death penalty in
the war on terror, see McDonnell, supra note 35 I .For a series of recent articles on the death penalty
under international law, see Symposium: Death Penalty and International Law, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 305,305-520 (2004).
455. See, e.g., Covenant, supra note 43, art. 9. It must be stressed that the right to a fair and regular
trial may not be derogated from in the context of armed conflict. See, e.g., Dormann, supra note 133, at
64-66.
456. Covenant, supra note 43, art. 9.
457- Id. art. 6(1). For the full text of the provision, see supra note 91.
458. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 45.
459. See also supra notes 428 and 442.
460. The 1837 Caroline incident set out the classic parameters of self-defense. "The Caroline
doctrine stands for the proposition that, in order for a country to strike before being attacked, they
will have 'to show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and
no moment of deliberation."' Raines, supra note 344, at 237-38. Furthermore, in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 94 & 122-23, the
I.C.J. specified that the force used must be necessary, immediate, and proportional to the seriousness
of the armed attack. See also THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 67 (Cambridge University Press 2002); Timothy Kearley, Raising the
Caroline, 17 WIs. INT'L L.J. 325, 328 (t999).
461. U.N. Charter art. 2(4), adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945, as amended by
G.A. Res. 1991 (XVIII), 17 Dec. 1963, entered into force 31 Aug. 1965 (557 UNTS 143); 2101 of 20
Dec. 1965, entered into force 12 June 1968 (638 UNTS 308); and 2847 (XXVI), of 20 Dec. 1971,
entered into force 24 Sept. 1973 (892 UNTS 119). On this issue, see Raines, supra note 344, at 237-40.
For a background discussion on the role of Article 2(4) in international relations, see Thomas M.
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 809 (I970); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620
(1984).
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justifying the policy of targeted killing,6 2 states and scholars invoke the
right to self-defense under Article 51,463 which is also subject to the
holding in the Caroline incident.464 Although all the elements of the self-
defense doctrine warrant proper consideration, the vital aspect remains
the proportionality of the response, which is characterized by the
targeted killing. The practical problem with applying the U.N. Charter's
notion of self-defense to targeted killing lies in the fact that the concept
of self-defense, itself, remains largely undefined, whether seen through a
preemptive or defensive light. 65
It is interesting to note that, the European Court of Human Rights
has developed a legal test in assessing the legality of targeting suspected
terrorists. In laying out the parameters for using lethal force against
terrorists, the Court emphasized three major requirements: i) there must
be a very strict and compelling test of necessity; ii) there must be
proportionality between the targeting state's response and the threat;
and iii) the targetinistate must also take into account alternatives to the
use of lethal force It follows that symmetry467 is not required but the
response should nonetheless be proportionate to the original attack. This
determination is hard to make in the abstract and will undoubtedly be
addressed on a case-by-case basis. However, it would appear that, given
the violations of due process and the seriousness of the consequences of
such tactics, namely death of possible innocent civilians or unnecessary
suffering, targeted killing does not meet the proportionality threshold. In
sum, the margin of error is too high and endorsement of such a policy
would undermine the inherent purpose of the laws of war, namely
protection of civilian life.
462. See supra note 350, 352-353.
463. U.N. Charter, supra note 461, art. 51.
464. See, e.g., Yogesh K. Tyagi, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 16 MICH. J.
INT'L. L. 883,893 (1995).
465. See, e.g., Raines, supra note 344, at 237; David Turndorf, The U.S. Raid on Libya: A Forceful
Response to Terrorism, 14 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. r87, 212-16 (I988); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 729, 761 (2004); see also FRANCK, supra note 460, at 51-52; Sir Arthur Watts KCMG QC, The
Importance of International Law, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW II, 13 (Michael Byers ed., Oxford 200o). But see
Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts As "Armed Attack": The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51(1/2) of the UN
Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35 (2003).
466. McCann v. United Kingdom, No. 18984/9i, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995), paras. 205-14.
467. On this issue, I refer to the dissenting opinions of Judges Higgins and Schwebel of the
International Court of Justice in their advisory opinion on nuclear weapons. See Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 839,934 (Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
IV. LIBERTY VS. SECURITY: A QUESTION OF REASONABLENESS
A. ADDITIONAL RESTRAINTS AND NEXT STEPS
In this article, I have attempted to enumerate and discuss the most
important international legal restraints on indefinite detention and
targeted killing of suspected terrorists. The objective was not to deliver
an exhaustive review of legal impediments to such practices. It was rather
to present a principled approach to upholding international human rights
norms in resistance to recent arguments purporting to subsume legally
insulated aspects of the war on terror into one overriding security
discourse, and to refute claims that the significance of the distinction
between POWs and protected persons has begun to fade. However,
many additional restraints come to mind. When addressing the question
of indefinite detention, for instance, one could envision a regime that
would impose frequent judicial reviews of the detentions and,
correspondingly, reduce the language of deference to executive decision-
making. This judicial mechanism would ensure and extend a legitimating
function on the courts, while also ascertaining their institutional
structure.46 However, the practical problem with this approach is readily
discernible: domestic courts are notoriously reluctant to apply norms of
international law and, when they do, they tend to defer to the executive's
own interpretation of the relevant international rules.469 Countries could
also implement commissions of inquiry that would proceed to ex post
facto reviews of executive decision-making and action, based on the logic
of the Mcshane decision.47° Whatever the checks and balances mechanism
may be, indefinite detention offers the opportunity to review and
scrutinize executive action in real time, as custody over prisoners is
ongoing.
Such is not the case with a policy of targeted killing: once the
executive action is carried out, the individual is removed with no chance
to appeal his situation or to contest the legality of the unilateral decision.
Surely, the case for targeted killing of suspected terrorists becomes
attractive when one considers that terrorists themselves do not
distinguish between civilians and military targets in perpetrating attacks.
In such cases, the parameters of the Caroline doctrine may appear to be
fulfilled and a reprisal may be justified, at least on a prima facie basis.4"
468. On these issues, see Eyal Benvenisti, Inter Armas Silent Leges? National Courts and the
"War on Terrorism" 15-24 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also
Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. "War on Terrorism," 5
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 69 (2004) (citing Benvenisti, among others).
469. On this issue, see for example, Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application
of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159, I60-75
(1993).
470. Mcshane v. United Kingdom, No. 4329o/98, 465 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002).
471. See, e.g., Wiebe, supra note 263, at 406 ("It is difficult to believe that international law would
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Although few people will convincingly advocate that the perpetrators of
9/11 deserved to perish,47 ' it is probably fair to assume that even fewer
would mourn the passing of Osama bin Laden. However, there is a
distinct possibility that a policy of targeted killing might engender the
adverse effect of hoisting a targeted terrorist to the rank of martyr.473 If
such eventuality was to materialize, namely if an influential terrorist or
insurgent leader was removed, anti-West sentiment might increase and
renewed support for the terrorist's agenda might ultimately transform
that individual's quest into a crusade. As a result, the rational's of
prevention and deterrence underlying the targeted killing of such
individual would be defeated from the outset. Furthermore, eliminating
some of Al Qaeda's senior leadership would only temporarily displace
the problem: there are several other groups willing to commit
widespread acts of murder. Therefore, the objective should not be to kill
terrorists but rather to reorganize society so as to understand and
prevent acts of terrorism.474 In addition, based on the considerations in
Part III of this article, targetted killing is untenable (and undesirable) in
terms of policy, international legitimacy, and law.
Finally, we must entertain the claim that certain governments are, in
fact, engaged in extra-judicial killings. In such cases, those governments'
only apparent concern becomes how well they cover up their
operations.47' A possible legal restraint on this practice lies in the
prohibit the killing of an individual who is willing to further national goals at the expense of hundreds
or thousands of innocent civilians. A state, following the self-defense requirements of imminence,
necessity, and proportionality, would presumably give the response legitimacy.").
472. See, e.g., id. at 405.
473. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 351, at 358 ("Might the death penalty help create martyrs
rather than discourage similar attacks? Could our imposing the death penalty increase support in the
Islamic world for al Oaeda and other extremist groups?"); see also id., at 400-11 (arguing that killing
or executing members of repressed political groups has historically advanced their cause and
transposing this reasoning to the case of Al Qaeda members). For more background on the underlying
rationales of holy martyrdom, see Roxanne L. Euben, Killing (For) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom and
Political Action, 30 POL. THEORY 4-35 (2002); Feinstein, supra note 365, at 233-43.
474. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Terror and Tolerance: Criminal Justice for the New Age of
Anxiety, I OHIo ST. J. CuM. L. 9, 10 (2003).
The current focus on a single source of terrorism-Islamic fundamentalism-however
urgent, is a rather distorted vision. The ability of committed fanatics to kill mass numbers is
now a fact of life (and death). The question is not whether this is so, or whether this fact can
be made to go away by killing the al Qaeda membership, root and branch, if that be
possible. The question is how to reorganize civil society so as to prevent-and this is an
important adverb- absolutely-mass murder. Al Qaeda is not the only group extant
prepared to commit mass murder for supposed causes; and there are more such groups in
the offing.
Id.
475. See, e.g., supra notes 350, 352-53 and accompanying text. For a detailed account of U.S.
cover-ups of military operations in the war on terror and in historical settings, as well, see Stanley
Cloud, The Fog of War: Covering the War on Terrorism, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 256-75 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., Century
Foundation 2003).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
increased use of lawyers to advise military personnel in combat and on a
real-time basis. The objective of this additional legal constraint is to
make split-second decisions consonant with international law, to the
extent possible. Another prospective mitigating solution to this
controversial policy would be to promote an absolute ban on targeted
killing. Consequently, a targeted killing would always be condemned, by
definition. However, the individuals carrying out the killing could
attempt to exculpate themselves ex post facto, based on the reasoning of
the High Court of Justice of Israel in the famous Torture case."76 This
justification would hinge on a logic of necessity, with particular emphasis
on the issue of proportionality.477 However, to adequately ensure that this
model diminishes abuse and honest mistakes, while also tackling the
slippery slope concern, it is imperative that the exercise of targeted
killing automatically trigger a prima facie finding of illegality. Under this
structure, the burden of proving necessity inherently rests with the
targeting entity or official. Nevertheless, it should again be stressed that
this type of model is ripe for retribution, misjudgment, and overreaction.
B. FALLACIES AND INACCURACIES OF THE BALANCING METAPHOR
A final word should be written on the balance between human rights
and security in the war on terror. Ample reference has been made
throughout this article to the balancing act both the executive branch and
the judiciary are called upon to perform in the war on terror. This type of
legal and moral exercise inexorably reverts back to the struggle between
collective rights and individual rights.4"' Certain moral objections to
employing a human being for the well-being of others, such as Kant's
Categorical Imperative,47 9 have been canvassed and discussed. Moreover,
several accounts have been considered, both in favor and against a
reduction of civil liberties or human rights in the post-9/II era.
Regardless of one's stance on the role and importance of human rights
post-9/I I, it is clear that the United States has initiated an important shift
in policy, characterized by exceptionalism reminiscent of the Cold War
era,48 strategic unilateralism, 48' and double standards.42 This problem is
476. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, paras. 33-38.
477. See supra notes 380, 428-29,442,460, 471, and accompanying text.
478. See, e.g., MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-196o, at 99 (Cambridge 2oo2) (discussing sovereignty, civilization,
international lawyers, and imperialism from 1870 to 1914, and stating that "[c]ollectivist theories-
such as the doctrine of the survival of the fittest-had become acceptable defenses to override
individual rights"). For a recent application of this principle to the war on terror, see Tracey Topper
Gonzales, Individual Rights Versus Collective Security: Assessing the Constitutionality of the U.S.A
Patriot Act, I I U. MIAMI INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 75, 75-113 (2003) (special issue on Islam).
479. See supra note 57-59 and accompanying text.
480. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: State Exceptions and the
Temptations of9/ii, 6 U. PA. J. CON. L. IOI (2004).
481. See, e.g., Koh. supra note 247.
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further compounded by the lack of input and control by Congress and
the judiciary."' 3 In fact, there has been little to no judicial or
congressional oversight of unilateral policies following 9/i1. Some argue
that "[t]ransnational networks of norm entrepreneurs have emerged
where traditional avenues for foreign policymaking in the United States
have failed to create a space for meaningful consideration of human
rights in the rights/security balance.
''84
In assessing executive action, particular attention should be paid to
the actual justification behind restricting rights in the name of the fight
on terror. More precisely, we should scrutinize the commonly used
expression "a new balance between liberty and security". As discussed
abundantly, international human rights norms consecrate the right to a
regular and fair trial.4 ' However, claiming that the detention of
Guantanamo prisoners is the result of a balancing act is unpalatable.
These individuals have been stripped of international human rights,
especially the right to a fair trial. In such a case, the balance is weighted
in favor of security, as there simply is no counterweight even considered
on the side of liberty.4s Furthermore, neutralizing and detaining all
Guantanamo detainees might have fulfilled a limited and short-term
security objective, but it might also have alienated the very community
from which the United States could have drawn intelligence gains and
other advantages. 48' Certain commentators resolve this issue by reference
to the existence of purported checks and balances within the executive.4S
Nevertheless, the most intractable aspect of weighing human rights
against security concerns pertains to the validity of the balancing
metaphor. In fact, I take issue with this commonly used device and join
482. See, e.g., supra notes 236, 247-48, 254 and accompanying text.
483. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PIr. L. REV. 767, 770
(2002).
484. Powell, supra note 468, at 48.
485. For a thoughtful account of the requirement of a fair trial under international human rights
norms, especially the Covenant, see Ana D. Bostan, The Right to a Fair Trial: Balancing Safety and
Civil Liberties, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. I (2004).
486. For a thoughtful account of these legal issues, see Anthony Lewis, Security and Liberty:
Preserving the Values of Freedom, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 47-73 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., Century Foundation 2003) (arguing that
the U.S. population usually regrets curtailing fundamental rights after a period of crisis, and that
terrorism is even riper than other historical events for abuses and restrictions on personal liberty in the
name of security).
487. See Lobel, supra note 483, at 771; supra note 7o. For a thoughtful commentary on how racial
profiling is prejudicial to law enforcement, see Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai
Quinlan, Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September ri World, 4o AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195 (2003);
see also Christopher Edley, Jr., The New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/II, in THE WAR
ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 170-92 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig,
Jr. eds., Century Foundation 2003); David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB, L.
REV. 73 (2003).
488. See generally Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note I7; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 234.
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several commentators who share this concern, especially Professor
Dworkin who has carried the torch eloquently and gracefully."" In short,
it has been advanced that, when we balance security interests against civil
liberty, we tend to oppose our overall interest to the rights of others.4"
The metaphor of balancing interests is questionable because the
institution or person actually performing the test is never impartial.49' As
discussed, the executive is afforded wide discretion and considerable
deference in the war on terror. In addition, when confronted with the
balancing of these interests, courts have often tipped the scale on the side
of security. As a society, we must question the morality behind these
policies. For example, many Americans would hastily, almost blindingly,
accept a reduction in civil liberties in the name of security, when the
question is posed in the abstract. Yet, in practice, few would assent to a
two-month detention for a minor infraction, such as not wearing a
seatbelt.49 "In other words, we have imposed on foreign citizens
widespread human rights deprivations that we would not tolerate if
imposed on ourselves." '493 When presented in this light, this scenario
clearly constitutes an affront to our fundamental freedoms, security or no
security. This type of excessive and unfettered law enforcement behavior
would characterize most police States, an undesirable designation for
America. Yet, such scenarios are unfolding regularly since 9/I 1."
This is why we must always examine whom or what the balancer
actually is, what is its affiliation. Most importantly, we must ask ourselves
to what extent can the balancer internalize the consequences of the risk
being evaluated. It is imperative to remind ourselves that this whole
489. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 58.
490. See generally Cole, supra note 254.
491. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 468, at i (discussing the balancing of rights versus security
threats "This process is prone to partial attitudes by decision-makers whether in the bureaucracy or in
the judiciary, as they are influenced by public opinion that is not particularly sensitive to minority
rights and concerns.").
492. See Lobel, supra note 483, at 770-71.
Most Americans would never consent to a rule that permitted the police to incarcerate
them for months because of mere suspicions of a terrorist connection, nor would they
consent to be tried in secret trials. Nor would they trade their liberty for security if it meant
that they could be detained for months without trial on some trivial charge such as not
wearing a seat belt while the FBI investigates whether they are terrorists. Hundreds of
resident aliens have indeed been subjected to such practices after September s m.
Id.
493. Cole, supra note 254, at 296.
494. Lobel, supra note 483, at 778-79.
A handful are being held as material witnesses. The rest of the over 1,200 detainees were
either not charged with any violation, charged with minor immigration offenses for which
they normally would not have been jailed, or charged with violations of federal law
unconnected to terrorism such as lying to the FBI. Many of these detainees have been held
in solitary confinement in which they are kept in their cells 23 hours a day. They are held
virtually incommunicado, being allowed one call a week. Some were shifted from prison to
prison to avoid their lawyers, family or friends from contacting them.
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campaign is an exercise in risk assessment and management.495
Furthermore, while performing this exercise, a human being will
inexorably tend to under-emphasize the rights of others in order to
protect his or her own rights. In that proposition lies the essential driving
force of the argument: when we engage in such a balancing act, we
evaluate the rights of others, 49 of a group of persons that share
extraneous qualities outside our own reality, whether they are related to
culture, race or background.l One commentator notes:
First, as Professor David Cole and Professor Ronald Dworkin have
argued, by reserving the most draconian measures for aliens suspected
of some connection to terrorism, we are not balancing fairly. We are
not deciding upon how to weigh our liberties against our security, but
instead are balancing others' liberties for our security4
98
It follows that, in the war on terror the rights of people of Middle-
Eastern descent are being placed in the balance or, more accurately, on
the chopping block. "Indeed, such restrictive policies seem virtually
costless when the threatened societies can single out 'others'-foreigners,
non-citizens, members of suspect minority groups-as the only targets of
liberties-depriving policies."' In fact, non-Arab Americans have little to
no chance of being subjected to these types of arbitrary detentions or of
seeing their fundamental rights curtailed." ° We have seen this attitude in
post-9/ii jurisprudence-where courts are resorting to legal rhetoric to
re-designate American citizens-in order to distance themselves from
the individuals that are associated with the lighter (or sometimes
weightless) side of the balance. It is evidently easier for a court to
internalize a risk when operating in a legal system that readily
distinguishes between citizens who are entitled to basic rights, and other
persons that have rights of lesser value or protection.
Any attempt at reconciling or resolving these difficult issues would
be futile. Expecting the balancing metaphor to be a reliable tool would
be tantamount to stating that the human being is infallible. What we can
hope for in any balancer of rights is an inherent sense of reasonableness
495. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 468, at 28 ("Balancing rights versus threats is a constant
exercise in risk-management. It involves the appraisal of opposite uncertainties that affect
fundamental human rights."); see also supra notes 8, 57-59 and accompanying text.
496. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, 49 N.Y. REV. BooKs, Feb. 28, 2002, at 41,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/I5 '45 (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
497. See generally Vijay Sekhon, The Civil Rights of "O'hers": Antiterrorism, the Patriot Act, and
Arab and South Asian American Rights in Post-911i American Society, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117
(2003).
498. Lobel, supra note 483, at 770.
499. Benvenisti, supra note 468, at i.
500. "Racial profiling of people of Middle-Eastern descent for purposes of interrogations and
searches, expulsion without judicial oversight of non-citizen residents, indefinite administrative
detention of suspected terrorists, are only some examples of reactions taken in the wake of September
xi and under the shadow of the new war." Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
in weighing realities that may be extrinsic to him or her. More
importantly, in addressing these difficult issues, we should acknowledge
and rely upon the legal safety net offered by international human rights
norms, which serve as a minimal threshold of reasonableness. In this
light, it is clear that indefinite detention and targeted killing of suspected
terrorists are both deplorable practices under international law.5"' In
addition to circumventing crucial due process safeguards, they both
erode the legitimacy of states subscribing to such policies. There is no
denying that the post-9/I i legal reality is all about tradeoffs." 2 We must
not only invoke the human rights project to vindicate our own rights
whenever convenient, but we must also aim to promote the international
human rights scheme as a truly enforceable mechanism across the board.
As Professor Thomas Franck notes: "The increase in individuals' human
rights is inevitably accompanied by an increase in their responsibility for
human wrongs, even when committed under the color of state
authority.""5 3 Hence, this global campaign against terrorism should not
lose sight of human rights and fundamental rules of humanitarian law. 4
It is undeniable that a delicate balance between security and human
liberty must be struck. However, we must not forget that human beings
form an integral part of the equation.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to highlight and discuss some of the main human
rights stakes involved in assessing U.S. policy in the war on terror. We
now live in an era dominated by security concerns, while chasing a threat
that is new and polymorph. Whether obscured by intricate information
networks, new technologies like the Internet, the sophisticated cellular
structure of organizations like Al Qaeda, complex financial systems, or
convoluted political realities, certain legal protections have begun to blur
indelibly. In the upcoming years, executive branches and judiciaries
501. See, e.g., Tom Bingham, Personal Freedom and the Dilemma of Democracies, 52 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 841,842 (2003).
But freedom from executive detention is, I think, arguably the most fundamental right of
all: for if a person is detained by the executive for an indefinite period, perhaps in
circumstances of great secrecy, without notice to relatives or friends, and held
incommunicado, he may suffer all manner of ill-treatment, and may even "disappear",
without his fate becoming known for years, if at all; and his right to a fair trial is of no value
if he is to have no trial.
Id.
502. See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 31, at 454-55.
503. FRANCK, supra note 104, at 264. On the emergence of public responsibility and enforceable
accountability in international law, see Philip Allott, The True Function of Law in the International
Community, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 391, 412 (1997-I998).
504. For a thoughtful overview of the main arguments advanced under U.S. constitutional law and
international law against the legal treatment of prisoners in the war on terror, see Laura A. Dickinson,
Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals and
the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002).
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across the globe will engage in balancing acts in an attempt to balance
security and liberty. With this in mind, we must remember that no
balancer can ever be completely impartial: we all carry some forms of
prejudice, life experience, and baggage. At the same time, we must also
stress that the war on terror cannot operate in a legal or conceptual
vacuum; it must absolutely be co-extensive with a set of international
norms and values underpinned by the rule of law. If we fail to adequately
promote and enforce the international human rights scheme, we will
continue to witness results similar to the aftermath of 9/I : deleterious
consequences on the social, economical, and political levels, unnecessary
civilian casualties, indiscriminate and irrational violence or counter-
attacks, a widening of the gap between Western and Arab societies," a
recrudescence of anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, and anti-West sentiments,
s6
an explosion of guerrilla warfare as currently seen in Iraq, and human
rights abuses across the board. It is no secret that international human
rights norms embody the "common interest of all humanity" and that
their aim is to generate the right incentives so that individual behaviour
conforms with the law.7
505. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 109, at 563-64.
For example, our present treatment of foreign prisoners of war ("POWs") will surely have
serious consequences if American POWs fall into the hands of a foreign power. Similarly,
our double standards in the treatment of Arab and Muslim Americans is bound to have a
like impact upon the way U.S. citizens are dealt with by populations in other countries.
Also, significantly, our unyielding support for Israeli terrorism against the Palestinians,
while at the same time undertaking a worldwide "crusade" against Muslim terrorism, will
only lead to increased terrorist attacks against the United States, either on our own soil or
against our citizens and installations abroad. Therefore, an objective assessment of the
strengths and failings of our present policies, absent the red, white, and blue sheen given to
such measures by their purveyors, is required.
Id.; see also Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Culture of Ugliness in Modern Islam and Reengaging Morality,
2 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR EASrERN L. 33, 40 (2002-2003) (speaking of a widely shared belief "that
the Islamic tradition and civilization is fundamentally at odds with the Judeo-Christian tradition, and
that a civilizational showdown or confrontation between Islam and the West is inevitable").
5o6. Steven W. Becker speaks to these issues when addressing the U.S.' lack of sympathy and
compassion in assessing Islamic culture.
In the United States, understanding the culture, religion, and reactions of Arabs and
Muslims, and they are different, is done under Washington's lamplight where all concerned
can see what they want. That it has little to do with what is going on in that unlit part of the
world blissfully escapes these observers. It is not because this country lacks experts on these
cultures and societies, but because these views, if different from Washington's wisdom, are
not wanted. The foreign policy establishment, political spinsters, and the media have their
way of seeing and doing things. Their list of Washington and New York sages on Islam and
Arab affairs seldom includes experts from such ethnic backgrounds. Even congressional
hearings draw on that same list. Their explanations are always the same: Arabs and Muslims
are violent, intolerant, ignorant, anti-Western, against modernity, and anti-Jewish. Nothing
is said about the reasons: U.S. double standards, the plight of these societies at the hands of
corrupt and undemocratic regimes supported by the United States, and the injustice
suffered by the Palestinians with the U.S.' unflinching support of Israel.
Becker, supra note so9, at 62o-21.
507. See Allott, supra note 503, at 400.
It is precisely this blueprint of the law-machine which must come to be our blueprint of the
international-law-machine-incorporating the common interest of all humanity in legal
form, then disaggregating that common interest through the law-conforming behavior of all
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Surely detaining Guantanamo prisoners might have achieved a
short-term, and limited, security objective. However, it has also alienated
a vast portion of the targeted communities, while essentially rendering
human rights norms toothless in the war on terror. Legal scholarship is
only one medium through which we can address and, hopefully, rectify
the mistreatment of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. Fortunately, the
judiciary, the press, and citizens are following suit in voicing their
outrage toward unilateral policies post-9/i 1.'8 One of these
manifestations, which was also central in this article, is the widespread
condemnation of indefinite detentions on U.S. soil and abroad. For
instance, denying members of the Taliban POW status is difficult to
countenance both on humanitarian and moral grounds. Similarly,
endorsing a policy of targeted killing of suspected terrorists is untenable
in international law, as it completely undermines the very protections
that came out of World War II. To accept that a human being can be
summarily shot, while circumventing all of the guarantees surrounding a
regular and fair trial, would mean taking an enormous step backwards. In
this light, the human rights project purports to take a step forward, to
suppress discrimination, and to treat every human being as equal,
without making initial distinctions between belligerent civilians and
ordinary civilians.
The prosecution of terrorists and war criminals can be successfully
pursued through normal judicial channels, be they national or
international7°9 without using the Geneva Conventions as a screening
device to selectively or unilaterally confer protection upon prisoners,
while also stripping countless innocent civilians of their fundamental
rights. It follows that prisoners and captives in the war on terror should
be afforded fundamental international protections, not based on their
particular membership to a given group, belief system, or nation, but
rather as an irreducible acknowledgement of their status as human
beings.
human beings and all subordinate human societies, so that the private interest of each
human being and each human society is reconciled with the common interest of all
humanity.
Id.
5o8. "There are some encouraging signs suggesting that governmental mistreatment of Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians (particularly via indefinite detention and denial of access to counsel) may
finally be coming under meaningful scrutiny by the courts, the press, and the public." Muneer I.
Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September ii Racial Violence As Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L.
REv. 1259, 1328 (2004); see also supra note 331. The U.S. Defense Department is also currently
entertaining options to strengthen detainee rights. See Tim Golden, U.S. Is Examining a Plan to
Bolster the Rights of Detainees, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 27, 2005, at Ai.
509. For a detailed account on whether acts of terrorism qualify as crimes against humanity,
thereby falling under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, see generally Proulx, supra
note 388.
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